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I. INTRODUCTION
This comment is the fifth in a series of annual efforts by the Law Review
to capsulize the year's developments in federal labor relations law.' The object
of this comment is to report those decisions which significantly depart from, or
which add substance to, prior policy in the application of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, and to discuss in detail those which the writers believe to
be the most significant. The subject matter comprises, for the most part, deci-
1
 The prior comments are: 1964-1965 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 6 B.C.
Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 815 (1965) ; Recent Developments in Labor Law, 5 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 629 (1964); Recent Developments in Labor Law, 4 B.C. Ind. & Com. L.
Rev. 661 (1963); Labor's New Frontier: The End of the Per Se Rules, 3 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L, Rev. 487 (1962).
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sions of the United States Supreme Court,2 the lower federal courts, and the
National Labor Relations Board, reported during the Survey year ending
March 15, 1966.
II. JURISDICTION: BOARD PRE-EMPTION OF STATE LIBEL SUITS
Two recent Supreme Court decisions' in the field of labor relations appear
at first glance to deal a serious blow to union organizational methods. How-
ever, upon closer inspection, they actually effectuate but a slight change
in the status quo.
In United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc.,2
 a union sought to remove
a libel action commenced in a state court to the federal district court. 3 Al-
though at the circuit court level the union based its removal right on two
premises, diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction, only the
former basis of jurisdiction was raised in the Supreme Court. 4 In affirming
the circuit court, the Court found that the union, an unincorporated asso-
ciation,5 has citizenship in the state of each of its members. The Court ad-
mitted the union's arguments in favor of diversity jurisdiction were compelling
but, citing Chapman v. Barney,6 advised the union to address its arguments
to the Congress. The decision merely continues traditional court practices,
reaffirming the traditional view that unincorporated associations are citizens
of the state of citizenship of each member.?
But even if unions were still foreclosed from using the fact of diversity
to obtain removal to a federal court, could they not use the San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmons pre-emption doctrine to preclude state court
jurisdiction over libel suits arising out of organizational activity? In Linn
2 It is interesting to note that, after its productive term in 1964-1965, the Supreme
Court has ruled on relatively few substantial labor law questions during this Survey year.
1 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); United Steelworkers v.
R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
2 Ibid.
a The federal district court allowed the removal on the ground that unions should
be treated as corporations for diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 146. The circuit court reversed
the district court on this issue. R. H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 336 F.2d 160
(4th Cir. 1964).
4 The Supreme Court found no merit in the union's request for remand on the
basis of Board pre-emption of state libel suits. 382 U.S. at 147 n.2, citing Linn v. United
Plant Guard Workers, 337 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1964).
5 The majority of the unions in the country are unincorporated associations. See
S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-17 (1947).
6 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889). Here a joint stock company sought federal diversity
jurisdiction on the ground that it was a citizen of New York. The Court stated that even
though the company was organized under the laws of New York, it is not a citizen since
the statutes only make corporations citizens.
7 The union contended that it was a citizen of Pennsylvania, where it maintained its
headquarters and principal place of business. The circuit court noted that the Supreme
Court has held that unincorporated associations are citizens of the state of citizenship of
each member and, therefore, since members of the union were situated in the forum
state, there was no diversity. R. H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, supra note 3,
at 161.
8 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
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v. Local 114, United Plant Guard Workers,° the Supreme Court answered
this question: the Court held that where either party in a labor dispute
circulates false and defamatory statements during an organizational cam-
paign, a state court has jurisdiction, and state remedies will be applied if the
complainant pleads and proves that the statements were made with malice
and caused injury. The Court reasoned that the state's right to protect its
citizens against defamation was paramount to the federal interest in uniform
labor regulation. However, since the case was arguably subject to section 7
or section 8 of the LMRA, and therefore arguably within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Board, the Court looked to the exceptions to the Garmon
rule."
In considering the first exception to Garmon, the Court, relying on past
Board decisions," found that libel during organizational campaigns was
only "a peripheral concern of the LMRA." The Court pointed out that the
Board was concerned only with the effects of a statement on an election and,
in fact, had stated that a party might lose its rights under the act with a
statement that was deliberately malicious. 12
In examining the second exception to Garmon, the Court also found
that this was the type of situation in which there exists an overriding state
interest which is "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility,”" namely,
the state's concern in protecting its residents from malicious libels." How-
ever, to prevent the possible abuse of this right to state action, the Court
limited state jurisdiction to those cases in which both malice and harm can
be shown.
Mr. Justice Black dissented on the grounds that the present decision
would stifle free discussion and would encourage libel suits with their irri-
tating and dispute-prolonging tendencies."' Mr. Justice Fortas, also dis-
senting, felt that the majority opinion was an uncalled for exception to
Garmon since, in the past, only violence or intimidation had excepted activity
from the Garman rule.' Thus, absent the compelling state interest to prevent
9 Supra note 1, at 662.
10
 Any activity which is arguably subject to §§ 7 and 8 of the LRMA is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board except (1) where the activity regulated is a
peripheral concern of the LMRA or (2) where the regulated conduct touches interests
so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling
congressional direction, it could not be inferred that Congress deprived the states of
the power to act. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, supra note 8, at 243-44.
11
 Bettcher Mfg. Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 526, 21. L.R.R.M. 1222 (1948); Atlantic Towing
Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1169, 21 L.R.R.M. 1128 (1948).
12 383 U.S. at 61,
13 Id. at 62.
14 The Court analogized the present case to UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958)
(state may entertain a compensatory and punitive damage action by an employee for
interference with his lawful occupation), and United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (state may enjoin union threats of violence which
force employer to close his business).
16 383 US. at 67. However, disputants now enjoy the same privilege that a
newspaper enjoys; the argument that this will stifle free discussion and bring about
a flood of litigation is contradicted by the experience of our newspapers. See New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
1° 383 U.S. at 69.
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violence, libel does not differ substantially from illegal picketing—which states
are unable to prevent even to protect a party's economic well-being. Justice
Fortas further argued that, because of the subjective nature of "malice,"
the outcome would depend less on the familiarity of the jury with the cus-
tomary labor rhetoric and more on the local community attitudes toward
unionization.
What the majority have done in Linn is merely to turn the unqualified
privilege for labor-management epithets into a qualified one. It has furnished
an admonition to both union and management that there is no longer a
need for the past practices of the organization campaigns, that it is time
that both sides curtail the proliferation of unnecessary invectives and assume
more responsible attitudes in their dealings. The question is simply whether,
in an organizational campaign, the parties should be allowed to make false
statements with impunity—either with knowledge of their falsity or with
reckless disregard thereof—where such statements cause harm and when the
harm can be redressed in a state court without any impingement on the
Board's authority. The Court has answered firmly—no!
III. ENFORCEMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS UNDER SECTION 301
Section 301(a) of the LMRA' provides a mandate for the courts to
establish a uniform body of federal substantive law based on federal labor
policies. 2
 This uniformity is to be achieved by applying section 301 law to all
suits involving violations of collective bargaining agreements, whether
brought in state or federal courts.' In determining the developments and
changes in section 301 law, it is necessary to cover five areas of collective
bargaining agreement enforcement; arbitration agreements in collective
bargaining agreements, individual rights under collective bargaining agree-
ments, enforcement of collective bargaining agreements' no-strike clauses,
exemplary damages in a section 301 action and timeliness of section 301
actions.
A. Arbitration
Duty to Arbitrate.—The Supreme Court has placed great emphasis on
the use of arbitration in the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. 4
The guidelines for determining when a dispute is arbitrable were set out in
1
 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964):
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
2 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
3
 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). See also Local 174,
Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
4
 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960): "A
major factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration of
grievances in the collective bargaining agreements."
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the Steelworkers Trilogy. 5 In United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,'
the union claimed that the employer violated the arbitration clause, a standard
arbitration clause with no exclusion clause.? The Court held that whether
the company violated the clause was the arbitrator's function—that the
court's only function in a case where all questions are to be submitted to the
arbitrator is to ascertain whether the party seeking arbitration is making a
claim which on its face is governed by the contract; that is, have the parties
agreed to arbitrate?
In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 8 there was not only
a broad arbitration clause, but also an exclusion clause. The Court concluded
that such an arbitration clause encompassed the whole employment relation-
ship and therefore that the parties had agreed to arbitrate all differences
between them, except those specifically excluded. The Court further stated
that the collective bargaining agreement encompasses more than matters
which appear on its face, in that it is also a guideline for solving unforeseeable
problems which may arise in the future. 9 Wherever such a broad arbitration
clause is present, 1° only the most forceful evidence of purpose to exclude a
particular grievance from arbitration can prevent arbitration.
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp." deals with the
ability of the courts to review arbitrators' decisions. The majority of the cases
during the Survey year have generally followed the Supreme Court's standards
on the issue of arbitrability. 12
 However, two recent Second Circuit cases
seem out of line. In Strauss v. Silvercup Bakers, Inc., 13
 there was a dispute
between the company and the union as to whether cutting down the work
week was a change in delivery methods. The collective bargaining agreement
provided for arbitration of "all disputes"“ between the parties. The exclu-
sionary clause excepted disputes concerning delivery methods. The district
court,19
 citing Warrior, held that since the exclusionary clause was vague
' United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) ; United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
0 Ibid.
7 The standard form for an arbitration clause provides for "arbitration of . . . all
disputes between the parties 'as to the meaning, interpretation and application of the
provisions of this agreement.'" See Id. at 565.
8
 Supra note 5.
0 This is so because "[a collective bargaining agreement] is more than a contract;
it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsman cannot wholly
anticipate." Id. at 578.
"[Pjarticularly where, as here, • • . the arbitration clause [is] quite broad." Id.
at 585. The clause read: "Should differences arise between the Company and the Union
... as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement, or should any
local trouble of any kind arise. . . ." Id. at 576.
it Supra note 5.
72 See, e.g., Camden Indus. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 353 F.2d 178 (1st Cir.
1965) ; Communication Workers v. Bell Tel, Lab. Inc., 349 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1965) ;
Association of Industrial Scientists v. Shell Dev, Co., 348 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1965); Los
Angeles Paper Bag Co. v. Printing Specialties Union, 345 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1965).
13 353 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1965).
14 In line with the Supreme Court's holding in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Nay. Co., supra note 5, at 585, this would be construed as a broad arbitration clause.
113 Silvercup Bakers, Inc. v. Strauss, 245 F. Supp. 199 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
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and the arbitration clause was broad there should be arbitration. The Second
Circuit reversed, basing its decision on the fact that there cannot be arbitra-
tion unless there is first an agreement to arbitrate.i.° Therefore, the district
court should have looked at the bargaining history to determine with "positive
assurance" 17
 whether the parties intended the dispute to be covered by the
exclusionary clause.' 8
 The inquiry is, however, to be limited to the duty to
arbitrate.
Thus the Second Circuit, on facts very similar to those in Warrior, is
requiring the district court to perform a function which was prohibited by
Warrior.'° In Warrior, the Supreme Court did not feel it was up to the courts
to look at the bargaining history to see if the parties intended subcontracting
to be included in the exclusionary clause, but left such decisions to the
arbitrator. Yet, in Strauss, the circuit court is ordering the district court,
contrary to the rule of Warrior, to become entangled in the construction of
the substantive provisions of the collective bargaining agreement through the
back door of interpreting the arbitration clause. 20
In both cases there was a dispute as to whether a certain act of manage-
ment was intended to be excluded from arbitration: in Strauss, the dispute
was whether the cut in a work week is a change in delivery methods, in
Warrior, the dispute was whether subcontracting was a management function.
The district court's function is not to say with "positive assurance" that a
change in the work week is within the exclusionary clause as required by the
Second Circuit in this case, 2 ' but to be able to say with positive assurance
that the "arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers
19
 Under the broad arbitration clause, the agreement is presumed unless specifically
shown to be excluded. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 5, at
585. The court, however, felt that
the juxtaposition of an "all disputes" clause . . . with a clause excluding certain
disputes from arbitration suggests that the parties intended to have questions
concerning the scope of the exclusion decided in the first place not by the arbi-
trator, but in the courts.
353 F.2d at 557.
17
 Id. at 558.
18 There is a conflict in the courts over whether there can be an inquiry into the
bargaining history to see if the parties intended to exclude the dispute from arbitration.
See A.S. Abell Co. v. Baltimore Typographical Union, 338 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1964);
Independent Petroleum Workers v. American Oil Co., 324 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1964), aff'd
per curiam, 379 U.S. 130 (1964); Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Communication
Workers, 310 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1962).
19
 In Warrior, there was a dispute over whether the subcontracting was a strict
function of management; here, the dispute is over whether a change in the work week
is a change in delivery methods.
20 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 5, at 585.
21 In a seemingly contrary opinion, the Second Circuit, in International Union of
Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., supra note 18, at 488, stated that, under a broad
arbitration clause,
unless the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement concerning .. .
arbitration contain some clear and unambiguous clause of exclusion, or there is
some other term of the agreement that indicates beyond peradventure of doubt
that a grievance concerning a particular matter is not intended to be covered by
the grievance and arbitration procedure set forth in the agreement .. .
there must be arbitration.
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the asserted dispute."' Here, where there is doubt, the court should resolve
this in favor of arbitration coverage and avoid the inquiry into the specific
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. 23
The other Second Circuit case is also contrary to Warrior, but for a
different reason. In Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers, 24 the collective
bargaining agreement provided that arbitration could be required for a
grievance with respect to "interpretation or application of any of the pro-
visions of this agreement. . . "25 The dispute between the company and the
union was over whether the recall of strikers was included in the collective
bargaining agreement. Although there was no mention of recall in the
collective bargaining agreement, the union contended that an oral agreement
subsequent to the collective bargaining agreement included recall within the
agreement. The district court," unable to find any forceful evidence to ex-
clude recall from arbitration, submitted the dispute to arbitration. In so
deciding, the district court specifically refused to look at the bargaining
history.
The circuit court reversed, because recall was not in the collective
bargaining agreement and arbitration can only be compelled where the
grievance concerns the interpretation and application of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. Therefore, the district court should have looked at the
bargaining history to see if the union and employer agreed that recall would
be subject to bargaining.
The circuit court did not consider the collective bargaining agreement in
the Warrior perspective, as encompassing the whole employment relationship,
but limited its analysis to the face of the agreement. Therefore, it follows that
"application and interpretation of the agreement" does not mean the written
agreement per se, but all disputes in the parties' relationship. A broad arbitra-
tion clause," as here, means the parties have agreed to submit all disputes
except those specifically excluded. This decision seems contrary to Warrior,
which considers a broad arbitration clause as creating a presumption that
all disputes in any way concerned with the employment relationship are to
be arbitrated; the presumption can be rebutted only by an express provision
which shows the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim.28
Procedural Arbitrability.—The Trilogy decisions were directed only to
the court's power to consider substantive provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement where there was an arbitration agreement. In John Wiley & Sons,
22 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 5, at 582-83.
28 "Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." Id. at 583.
24
 347 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 940 (1965).
25 Id. at 94.
26 Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers, 237 F. Supp. 139 (D. Conn. 1965).
27 A Third Circuit case, Boeing Co. v. International Union, UAW, 349 F.2d 412 (3d
Cir. 1965), is quite similar to the Torrington case. However, in Boeing, the collective bar-
gaining agreement provided that arbitration could come about only on the interpretation
and application of the specific provisions of the agreement. The court found that a ques-
tion outside the specific provisions was not arbitrable. This appears to be in line with the
Warrior decision, since the word "specific" would negate the broadness of the collective
bargaining agreement.
28 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 5, at 585.
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Inc. v. Livingston, 29 the Supreme Court extended the Trilogy rationale to
prohibit courts from interpreting the procedural provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement." The Court rejected the employer's argument that
the union had waived its right to arbitrate an issue by failing to observe
the grievance procedure set out in the collective bargaining agreement and
held that, once it is determined that the parties have agreed to submit the
subject matter of a dispute to arbitration, the procedural questions which
grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition should also be left
to the arbitrator 31
In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. IBEW, 92 the grievance procedure in the
collective bargaining agreement set up a certain time within which the em-
ployer would have to answer a written grievance of the union. The employer
failed to do this and admitted the failure. The union contended that the fail-
ure to answer automatically gave it the remedy it sought; the employer de-
nied this and sought arbitration. The court refused to allow arbitration on the
ground that the collective bargaining grievance procedure provided no pro-
cessing after forfeiture and, therefore, the employer could not have arbitra-
tion. A second case, Local 51, IBEW v. Illinois Power Co., 83
 overturned the
district court's holding that the Wiley case prevented it from determining
whether the time factor was significant. The circuit court stated that nothing
in Wiley prevents a court from determining whether a violation of the pro-
cedural steps leading to arbitration waives the right to arbitrate. The court
then interpreted Wiley to say that a union could abandon its right to have
its claim arbitrated by failing to comply properly with the procedural re-
quirements of the collective bargaining agreement . 34
Both of these cases seem contrary to the rationale in Wiley; both
courts have sought to determine whether or not the violation of the pro-
cedural provision of the collective bargaining agreement barred arbitration—
a matter which Wiley requires to be left to the arbitrator.
29 376 U.S. 543 (1964). Before this decision, the courts divided over the question of
who should determine the procedural questions. Cases favoring the arbitrator: Deaton
Truck Line, Inc. v. Local 612, Teamsters Union, 314 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Local 748,
IUE v. Jefferson City Cabinet Co., 314 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1963); Radio Corp. of Amer-
ica v. Association of Professional Eng'rs, 291 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1961) ; International Tel.
& Tel. Corp. v. Local 400, IUE, 286 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1961). Cases favoring the court:
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Hayes Corp., 296 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1961) ; South-
western Elec. Power Co. v. Local 738, IBEW, 293 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1961); IBEW v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 198 F. Supp. 817 (F.D. Pa. 1961).
30 There were two issues actually before the Court in Wiley. The first dealt with a
successor employer's duty to arbitrate. See p. 919 infra. The second issue—the one per-
tinent to our present discussion—concerned the ability of a court to look at procedural
questions. On the first issue, the Court stated that if a union failed to make its claim
known, it could lose its right to arbitrate with the successor employer. It is important to
note that the abandonment of the right refers only to the "successor employer" question
and not to the question of procedural arbitrability.
31
 376 U.S. at 557-58.
32 339 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1964).
33
 61 L.R.R.M. 2084 (7th Cir. 1965).
34 As pointed out, supra note 30, to read Wiley as permitting the courts to look at
the timeliness of filing arbitration was a misuse of the Supreme Court's language on the
issue of successor employers.
916
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
In Rochester Tel. Corp. v. Communications Workers:36 the Second
Circuit refused to consider the timeliness issue. The employer contended that
the procedural questions involved did not grow out of the dispute. The court
dismissed the contention: "We do not . . . read . . . Wiley to say that pro-
cedural defenses fail to the arbitrator only if factually related to the merits
of the dispute.""
The question of whether an issue is arbitrable has been settled by the
Supreme Court to a large extent. However, in spite of Congress' and the
Court's favoring of arbitration as a method of settling disputes, some lower
courts still deny this remedy where it seems applicable. The courts should
bear in mind that the arbitration of grievance is a major factor in achieving
industrial peace so that in cases of doubt, arbitration should be ordered.37
Staying of Section 301 Actions Pending Arbitration--The issue whether
a section 301 action can be stayed pending arbitration was settled in Drake
Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery Workers. 38 The Supreme Court held
that a section 301 suit should be stayed in the face of an agreement to
arbitrate." The Court stated that it "could enforce both the no-strike clause
and the agreement to arbitrate by granting a stay until the claim for
damages is arbitrated."'" The Court also stated that since the parties had
agreed to arbitrate "all disputes," they must necessarily arbitrate the damage
issue. Finally, the Court noted that the duty to arbitrate could possibly be
renounced by the union under certain circumstances, such as when it strikes
in violation of a no-strike clause."
The Court extended Drake in Local 721, United Packinghouse Workers
v. Needham Packing Co.,42 again staying a section 301 suit, although the
duty to arbitrate went only to the discharge grievance and not to the dam-
ages. Finally, in Atkinson v. Sinclair Rej. Co., 43
 the Court held that, before
a stay could be granted, it must be shown that the party against whom the
stay is sought has the right to bring arbitration proceedings. Unless it is
affirmatively shown that the party is excluded, a stay will be granted.
The majority of the cases in this area have applied these criteria with-
out difficulty." Some courts have also added to the decisions. For example,
35
 340 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1965).
36
 Id. at 239. For an extensive review of the Wiley decision's applicability to pro-
cedural arbitrability, see In re Long Island Lumber Co., 15 N.Y.2d 380, 207 N.E.2d 380
(1965).
37
 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 5.
58
 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
39
 There was a very broad arbitration clause which provided that:
The parties agree that they will promptly attempt to adjudge all complaints, dis-
putes or grievances arising between them involving questions of interpretation
or application of any clause or matter covered by this contract or any act or
conduct or relation between the parties hereto, directly or indirectly.
Id. at 257 n.2. The grievance procedure climaxed with arbitration.
40 Id. at 264.
41 Id. at 263. The Court gives an example of what could constitute a repudiation.
Id. at 263 n.10.
42 376 U.S. 247 (1964).
93 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
44
 Pietro Scalzitti Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 351 F.2d 576 (7th
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in Boeing Co. v. International Union, UAW," where, unlike Atkinson,
the employer was not specifically precluded from arbitration, but the arbi-
tration procedure was not open to him, the court, following Atkinson, refused
stay of a section 301 action. In Local 595, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Howe
Sound Co.," the court held that where an employer did not move in the
lower court to stay the action, but only moved for a dismissal and summary
judgment, the court should have stayed the action pending arbitration since
this is basic to the employer's defense. And, finally, in Trailways v. Amalga-
mated Ass'n of Street Employees, 47
 the union struck and the employer in-
formed the union that he was rescinding the collective bargaining agreement;
the court held that such an arguable section 8(d) violation would not release
the employer from his duty to arbitrate.
Review of Arbitrator's Decision.—In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp.," the third case in the Steelworkers Trilogy, the issue was
the reviewability of arbitrators' decisions. The Court stated that the courts
as a rule, should avoid reviewing the arbitrator's award if he confined him-
self to the construction of the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator,
the Court stated, may draw guidance from many sources,49
 but must draw
his award from the essence of the collective bargaining agreement and the
evidence submitted to him.
In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Jeffrey Galion Mfg. Co., 5° the
Sixth Circuit found that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by deciding
the award on contract provisions not before him. Here, the arbitrator had
found that the governing provision of the collective bargaining agreement
was not applicable to the claimed grievance and, therefore, that the company
had not violated the agreement. However, he thereupon made an award
against the company, basing his decision on matters not submitted to him.
The court held that since the company had not violated the contract pro-
visions which brought about the arbitration, the arbitrator's award was in
excess of his authority. 91
In Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers, 52
 the arbitrator found that
the practice of allowing employees time off for voting was a firmly established
practice—an implied part of the employment contract—and hence, since the
Cir. 1965). The Court stated that a dispute over the interpretation of the contract must
be suspended pending arbitration. See also East Shore Newspapers, Inc. v. St. Louis
Stereotypers Union, 59 L.R.R.M. 2494 (E.D. Ill. 1965); Franchi Constr. Co. v. Local
560, Int'l Hod Carriers Union, 248 F. Supp. 134 (D. Mass. 1965); Los Angeles Paper
Bag Co. v. Printing Specialties Union, supra note 12.
45
 Supra note 27.
40 350 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1965).
47
 343 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1965).
48 Supra note 5.
49
 Id. at 597 (e.g., bargaining history and prior procedures in the industry).
Go 350 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1965).
51
 If an arbitrator were allowed to decide more than the issue which was submitted
to him, this would open the proverbial Pandora's box. A party, by filing and following
one grievance to arbitration, would then be able to present innumerable other grievances
which would hinder the effectiveness of the arbitration process. See United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., supra note 5, at 597.
52 237 F. Supp, 139 (D. Conn. 1965).
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collective bargaining agreement did not state the practice was to he discon-
tinued, it was still within the collective bargaining agreement. The court
disagreed." The court said that to allow the arbitrator to read into the
contract an implied contractual relationship which has been bargained over
but not included in the contract would be permitting arbitrators an unlimited
rein to go outside the collective bargaining agreement and impose their own
brand of industrial justice." In so holding, the court apparently disregarded
the Steelworkers Trilogy. Since both parties agreed that the issue was arbi-
trable, the dispute was whether the arbitrator had exceeded his authority,
as established in the collective bargaining agreement. 55 The collective bar-
gaining agreement bound the arbitrator to the terms of the agreement with
no power to add to, delete from, or modify it in any way. However, the
agreement is not merely the document itself but is a generalized code
to govern the relationships of the parties. 56 Everything within this relation-
ship is arbitrable except matters specifically excluded. In this case it seems
that it was possible for the arbitrator to construe the employment relation-
ship in such a manner so as to say that the parties are required to bargain
over the dispute, despite the fact no mention of the issue is on the face of
the agreement.
Finally, in Kracoff v. Retail Clerks," the court determined that the
misuse or abuse of power by the arbitrator was a violation of a collective
bargaining agreement within the meaning of section 301. The court stated
that although it could be argued that this abuse of power is not a violation
of the contract by one of the parties thereto, it does in fact constitute a
violation of the contract between employer and a labor organization within
the meaning of the statute." Further, section 301 does not state the violation
of the contract must be by one of the parties, but merely confers jurisdiction
when a contract "between employer and a labor organization"" is violated.
Successor Employer's Duty to Arbitrate.—InWiley, 6° the Supreme Court
was also concerned with the duty of a successor employer to arbitrate under
the succeeded employer's collective bargaining agreement. The Court held
that, under appropriate circumstances, that is, a substantial continuity of
. 53
 The court stated that labor contracts affirmatively recite the terms and conditions
to which parties agree and not those which they have agreed to discontinue. The validity
of this is subject to question. As Warrior pointed out, a collective bargaining agreement is
a generalized code and thus would not contain all the matters the parties have agreed upon.
Besides, it is likely that, if something is to be discontinued, a collective bargaining agree-
ment would spell this out.
54 237 F. Supp. at 141.
56
 For a discussion of the arbitrator's authority, see Carey v. General Elec. Co.,
315 F.2d 499, 508 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 908 (1964).
56 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 5, at 578.
57 244 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
58 Id. at 41.
59 Ibid. Even though, the courts would have § 301 jurisdiction, a recent Sixth Circuit
decision stated that, where an arbitrator violated the procedure set forth in the collective
bargaining agreement, a court cannot procecie with the case and decide it on the merits,
but must remand it to the arbitrator to procede according to the contract. Smith v. Union
Carbide Corp., 350 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1965).
60 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, supra note 29.
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identity and no abandonment of right to arbitrate by failing to make claims
known, 61 a successor employer would be bound to arbitrate with a union,
even though not a party to the original contract. 62
In two recent decisions," the Wiley holding has been extended to in-
clude successor employers where there has been a sale of assets" but no
substitution of employees. In both, the sales agreement did not provide for
the new employer's assuming the collective bargaining agreement of the old
employer. However, both courts agreed that, under Wiley, the new employer
had the duty to arbitrate.
A case which has undertaken an extensive analysis of the Wiley decision
is McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref." Here the successor employer refused to
arbitrate with the old union, Local 553, on the grounds that another union
was now representing the employees of the old company and the NLRB had
announced, under its unit clarification procedure, that Local 553 no longer
represented these employees. The court found that the Wiley criteria are the
similarity of the work performed by the employee, similarity of the employ-
ing industry and similarity in the employment relationship, which were all
present in this case. The court discounted the physical location of the em-
ployer's industry and the fact that employees are now working out of dif-
ferent offices with different supervisors."
The obligation to arbitrate, the court noted, arose under the collective
bargaining agreement between Local 553 and the old employer, and this ob-
ligation continues on to the new employer under these circumstances despite
the fact there is another union, although the arbitrator should take into
account the existence of the new union when forming a remedy. The court
concluded that the arbitrator should take into account the provisions of and
the practices under the old contract, under which the duty to arbitrate arose,
and should also adjust the grievances in light of the changed circumstances
created by the transfer of ownership.
This case, if it is followed as it should be, would lessen many of the
disputes which arise in the sale of businesses under the above circumstances.
It very clearly spells out the duties of the parties involved and gives to the
arbitrator the authority which the Supreme Court has decided he holds.
One further case under this aspect of Wiley was a Board attempt to
apply the Wiley criterion of substantive continuity of identity to a geographi-
01 Id. at 551. It is unclear whether a claim can be made after the merger. This,
however, does not appear to be too important since a successor employer should be on
notice of the existence of a collective bargaining agreement.
62 "The preference of national labor policy for arbitration . • . could be overcome
only if other considerations compellingly so demanded." Id. at 549. The Court reiterated its
earlier stand in Warrior that collective bargaining agreements call into existence a new
common law which supersedes the traditional common law of contracts.
63 United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964) ;
Wackenhut Corp. v. International Union, United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954
(9th Cir. 1964).
64 The fact situation in the Wiley case dealt with a successor employer resulting from
a merger. The language of the Court is equally applicable to a successor employer result-
ing from a sale.
05 247 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
00 Id. at 119.
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cal shift, where there was no change of employer; this was reversed by the
Supreme Court per curiam.°7
Arbitration After Expiration of Contract.—Arbitration will also be
ordered by the courts after the contract in which the duty arose has expired.
In Local 595, Ina Ass'n of Machinists v. Howe Sound Co.," the collective
bargaining agreement had expired one day before the company closed its
plant. Neither party had requested the arbitration before the collective bar-
gaining agreement expired. The court held that since - the union was now
seeking a claim based on the expired agreement, it must proceed to arbitra-
tion even though the claim was not raised until after the expiration of the -
agreement.
In International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Local 400, WE," the court
ordered arbitration where a union was in the process of being decertified,
holding that rights which arose under the collective bargaining agreement
would not fail with the decertication of the union. This appears to be the
present trend. If rights arise under the collective bargaining agreement and
there is an arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement, then the
courts will order arbitration even if the collective bargaining agreement has
expired and another union now represents the employees 70
Board Interpretation of Collective Bargaining Agreements.—Two recent
circuit court cases, both of which have been granted certiorari, have con-
fronted the problem of the Board's ability to find an unfair labor practice
when this finding depends upon interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement.
In NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 71 the employer contended that the
collective bargaining agreement gave him the right to institute a wage in-
centive plan and that the union had waived its right to bargain over this.
The union denied this and filed a section 8(a) (5) unfair labor practice."
The Board found that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice
by instituting a wage incentive plan without consulting the union, which
was an invasion of the union's statutory right to bargain about changes in
terms and conditions of employment."
The Ninth Circuit Court held that the Board had exceeded its powers
since the resolution of this dispute depended upon interpretation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. The employer's act would be an unfair labor
practice, the court stated, if there were no collective bargaining agreement;
4:17 Piano Workers v. W.W. Kimball Co., 333 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'd per
curiam, 379 U.S. 357 (1964).
138 Supra note 46.
au 248 F. Supp. 949 (D.N.J. 1965).
70 See McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref., supra note 65.
71 351 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 34 U.S.L. Week 3353 (U.S. April 19,
1966) (No. 884). This case is scheduled for argument immediately following Acme Ind.
Co. v. NLRB, 351 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 86 Sup. Ct. 893 (1966). See
34 U.S.L. Week 3356.
72 Section 8(a) (5) states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—(5)
to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. . . ." 61 Stat.
141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
73 C & C Plywood Corp., 148 N.L.R.B, 414, 57 L.R.R.M. 1015 (1964).
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but here the agreement may have sanctioned the employer's action. 74 There-
fore, before an unfair labor practice can be found, the Board had to decide
that the contract did not preclude the union from protesting the employer's
unilateral change in wages, and to do this the Board had to interpret the col-
lective bargaining agreement, which is outside its jurisdiction.
In Acme Ind. Co. v. NLRB," the union sought information relative to
the removal of machinery from the employer's plant in order to decide
whether it could complain under two clauses in the collective bargaining agree-
ment: work transfer and subcontracting. The company refused to provide
this information. The union filed grievances relating to the removal and,
while these were pending, filed an 8(a) (5) unfair labor practice based on
the employer's refusal to supply information which the union alleged it
needed to process its grievances intelligently. The trial examiner dismissed
the complaint on the basis that the dispute relates to a matter covered by
the contract and therefore should be resolved through the arbitration proce-
dure in the contract."
The Board found that the contract contained no clause specifically
dealing with the duty to furnish information on matters relevant to the
processing of grievances or any clause by which the union waived its statutory
right to such information. Therefore, there was no arbitration procedure
through which the union could have the information. The Board then found
that the information sought was relevant to a grievance under the contract
and therefore was necessary for the union to perform its function as the
employee's representative, to present grievances effectively and intelligently."
In reversing the Board, the Seventh Circuit held:
Where the determination of the relevancy of information necessarily
involves factors interrelated with or dependent upon construction
of the substantive provisions of the labor agreement, and those
provisions are the bases of pending grievances already submitted
under the grievance and arbitration procedures of the agreement,
Board intervention in the guise of determining and enforcing the
peripheral matter of the duty to furnish information requested
contributes nothing to any objective of the Act and in our opinion
is improper. 78
In Acme, the Board stated that under section 8(a)(5) the union is
entitled to all information relevant to its effective duty as a bargaining
74
 The court stated that if "the disputed provisions of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment do not more than affirmatively prohibit conduct already defined and forbidden by
the Act as an unfair labor practice, the Board can never be ousted of jurisdiction . . ."
(i.e., the parties cannot oust the Board of jurisdiction by parrotting the LMRA). But
where "the parties have arguably agreed affirmatively to permit conduct which, sans
contract, the Act would admittedly condemn as an unfair labor practice," the question of
whether the contract provisions sanction the action is "a matter for arbitration," (i.e., the
parties may waive their statutory rights). 351 F.2d at 227.
76 Supra note 71.
70 Acme Ind. Co., Trial Examiner Decision No. TDX-504-64, Case No. 13-CA-6396
(1964).
77
 Acme Ind. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 144, 58 L.R.R.M. 1277 (1965).
78 351 F.2d at 261.
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representative. There can be no doubt that this is correct and applies
regardless of the fact that the information sought is not wage and related
data."
The only situation where a union would not be entitled to this informa-
tion from the Board would be where, as stated in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
NLRB," the collective bargaining agreement clearly indicated that demands
for information must be made through the grievance procedure and the
collective bargaining agreement had a broad disclosure clause which would
allow the arbitrator to order the employer to furnish the information. Here,
also, the mandatory-nonmandatory dichotomy is irrelevant. Under either,
the union has waived its right to receive this information in any manner
outside the arbitration procedure.
The first problem in Acme, therefore, is whether the union can obtain
the information through the grievance machinery. If the agreement clearly
provides for this, then the Board has no jurisdiction and the arbitrator must
order the information furnished. If the contract does not clearly provide for
this, it is doubtful that the union can receive the information from the arbi-
trator's order. The Board therefore held that, under the latter situation, it
can look at the contract to determine if the information is available through
the grievance machinery. If the Board does not find this broad disclosure
clause, then it should be able to order the employer to furnish the informa-
tion relevant to the union's duty to police the collective bargaining agree-
ment. If the Board is lacking in this power, then the union would have a
statutory right to the information without any means of obtaining the in-
formation.
Herein arises the second issue in Acme: How does the Board determine
if the information sought is relevant to the union's duty as a bargaining
representative? At this point in Acme, the mandatory-nonmandatory di-
chotomy arises. If the information sought relates to a mandatory subject,
then clearly the Board can order the employer to furnish the information
to the union, which has a statutory right to the information. The Board
would not have to refer to the collective bargaining agreement to find that
it is relevant to the union's duties in policing the collective bargaining agree-
ment.
If the matter sought relates to a non-mandatory subject of bargaining,
then the Board will run into the C & C Plywood situation where it is appar-
ently not allowed to interpret the collective bargaining agreement to find
70 The Seventh Circuit avoided deciding the issue. It looked only to the issue of
determining relevancy of the information sought. Assume in this case that the union could
receive this information under the collective bargaining agreement and the arbitrator had
determined that this nonmandatory information sought, that is, the information on the
removal of machinery, was relevant. The employer would then be under a statutory duty
to furnish the information. Therefore it can be safely said that all information which is
relevant to the union's duty to process grievances and to police intelligently the collective
bargaining agreement must be furnished the union. See NLRB v. F.W. Woolworth Co.,
352 U.S. 938 (1956), reversing per curiam 235 F.2d 319, 322-23 (9th Cir. 1956); Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 750 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
971 (1964); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 253 F.2d 149, 153-55 (7th Cir. 1958).
80 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965); se infra, p. 976.
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that the information sought is relevant to the union's intelligent performance
of its duties. However, if the Board is precluded from determining relevancy
of the information sought, and the arbitrator has no jurisdiction under the
collective bargaining agreement to determine if the union is entitled to the
information, then the union will be unable to receive information which it
might have a statutory right to receive.
In this situation it appears that the Board should be given the right
to determine that the information sought is relevant. This would not conflict
with the C & C Plywood decision because the Board is not usurping an
arbitrator's function, for it is not clear that the arbitrator can provide the
union with information when nothing in the contract provides for the fur-
nishing of information. This would also conform to the Curtiss-Wright de-
cision which gives the union the right to all information necessary to enable
the union to present and resolve a grievance matter. The only alternative
to this is to force the union to process its grievance to arbitration without
information.
B. Individual Employee Rights
In the famous J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB decision,' the Supreme Court held
that a collective bargaining agreement encompasses all the employees' rights
with the employer except those clearly outside its scope. Only those rights
which are not inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement and
which would not undercut it can continue to exist. Subsequent decisions
established the right of the collective bargaining representative, through
bargaining, to change, modify or revoke all the employees' rights under the
collective bargaining agreement so Iong as it acts in good faith? The
employee, however, was given the right to use section 301 to protect the
individual rights given to him under the collective bargaining agreement,'
but only if he first attempts to process the grievance through the grievance
procedure set up in the collective bargaining agreement:'
With the above as precedents, the courts have been given the mandate
to create uniform federal law regulating individual rights under the col-
lective bargaining agreement.° Although one recent case has stated that
"the courts are writing on a clean slate,"° recent attempts to formulate this
uniform law have been uniformly inconsistent.
In Woody v. Sterling Aluminum Prods. Inc.,7
 the employee was seeking
specific performance of an arbitration agreement between the company and
the union. The court found that the employee had no standing to compel
arbitration where the union refused to process his grievance. It held that the
1 321 US. 332, 335 (1944).
2
 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S . 330, 338 (1952).
3 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U S. 195, 200-01 (1962), 4 B.C. Ind. & Cam.
L. Rev. 766 (1963).
4
 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650, 652 (1965).
5
 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
0
 International Bhd. of Tel. Workers v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 240 F. Supp.
426, 429 (D. Mass. 1965).
T 243 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
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right to arbitration is not part of the employer-employee relationship; the
employer had agreed to arbitrate only with the union—thus leaving out
the employees. The employee was further accorded no right of action against
the union for breach of its duty of fair representation. Thus the employee
was left remediless, even though the employer may have deprived him of
his rights under the collective bargaining agreement, since he could not, in
the face of the union's reluctance to process his claim, obey the mandate of
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox to exhaust his grievance procedures before
coming to court.8
In Wagner Mfg., Inc. v. Culbertson? there was discrimination against
the employee on the face of the collective bargaining agreement. He asked
the union to process his grievance; the union followed three steps in the
grievance procedure but then decided that the employer had committed no
discrimination. The court stated that if any employee remedy existed, it
was against the union for breach of its duty of fair representation. But the
court added that even if the employee's seniority rights had been adversely
affected, he could not complain since the employer and union have the
authority to bargain these rights away. 1°
In Addeo v. Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, Inc.," the employee
succeeded in alleging that the union and the employer had conspired to
deprive him of his rights by refusing to abide by the seniority provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement. Here the only remedies the employee
had were to proceed to the court or to use the grievance procedure against
a hostile employer with an allegedly hostile union as his advocate. The
court held that in such a situation the employee should not be forced to
submit to futile arbitration or be deprived of his alleged seniority rights but
could proceed to the court.
Finally, in Kociuba v. Stubnitz Greene Corp., 12
 the union had ceased to
process the employee's complaint, with the mutual consent of the employer,
after three steps of the grievance procedure had been completed. The court
held that here the employee had the right to submit his grievance to arbitra-
tion despite the union's refusal to do so. 13
8 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
0
 206 N.E.2d 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965).
10
 This statement appears erroneous. The court has cited various cases which show
that seniority rights can be bargained away; however, it does not follow that outside of
the bargaining process, as was the case here, the seniority rights can be abrogated. As
shown in LMRA § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964) (see note 15
infra), the collective bargaining representative is the exclusive representative for bargain-
ing purposes, but under the proviso, it is not the exclusive representative for an employee's
grievances. What the union can do at the bargaining table and what it can do in
settling grievances must be separated. The union may "bargain" away the employee's
seniority rights, but it may not informally deprive him of these rights consistently with
the concept of individual rights.
11 47 Misc. 2d 426, 262 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
12 60 L.R.R.M. 2267 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1965).
13 In the court's decision it is not clear whether, under the collective bargaining
agreement, arbitration was available for both the employee and the union or just for
the union alone. The court pointed out that the grievance procedure was open to the
employee but made no mention of the right to seek arbitration.
925
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
These four cases clearly show the confusion that exists in the protection
of the employee's individual contract rights, where the union has refused to
process his grievance. Two decisions leave the employee without remedy.
Under the third decision, the employee skips the procedure by alleging futility.
In the last decision, the employer, despite the union's decision that the claim
was frivolous, is still required to arbitrate the claim."
Since the employee has individual rights under the collective bargaining
agreement, the union's refusal to process his grievance should not leave him
without a remedy as in the Woody and Culbertson cases. However, the
employer and the union should be able to dispose of various grievances
without proceeding to arbitration. Bearing these two main considerations
in mind, there are four alternatives open to an employee when a union will
not process his grievance. First, he may approach his employer directly
with his grievance, relying on section 9(a) ; however, the Black-Clawson
Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists and Maddox decisions place con-
siderable doubt on the effectiveness of this approach." Second, he can
proceed against the union for breach of its fiduciary obligation either in court
or before the Board—again, a difficult task." Third, he may petition the
court to order specific performance of the grievance procedure which is also
14
 The following articles show the diverse opinions that exist in the courts: Blum-
rosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Authority Versus
Employee Autonomy, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 631 (1959); Cox, Rights Under a Labor
Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (1956) ; Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective
Labor Relations, 45 Cornell L.Q. 25 (1959); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective
Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 362 (1962).
la LMRA § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964), states:
Representatives . • selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees . . . shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining • • . Provided,
That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at
any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances
adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as
the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargaining
contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining
representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
16
 The employee would come before the Board under § 8(b)(2) of the LMRA:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agent&—
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a) (3). .. .
61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 138(b) (2) (1964).
Section 8(a) (3) of the LMRA prohibits "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment. . . ." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964). The ability of the Board to give relief to a union member
for the union's breach of its fiduciary duty in representing him is in question. Courts
have held that the Board has no jurisdiction in these circumstances. See NLRB v.
Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1964) ; NLRB v. Local 294, Teamsters Union,
317 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1963). However, Justice Goldberg, concurring in Humphrey v.
Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 351 (1964), suggested that the Board has jurisdiction, citing Syres
v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955), and Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard,
343 U.S. 768 (1952).
The employee, if he entered the courts against the union, would not be able to
attain the remedy he sought. The court could only order the union to pay damages, and
it would not be able to have the employee reinstated.
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a questionable method.17 Finally, he may file a section 301 action for breach
of the collective bargaining agreement against the employer; this appears
to be the best approach."
This latter approach was taken in a recent decision, Serra v. Pepsi-Cola
Gen. Bottlers, Inc.'9
 Here the employee was discharged and the union
refused to process his grievance. The employer also refused to process the
grievance. The court first pointed out that the employee had individual
17
 If the employee sought specific performance, he would first have to show that he
attempted to use the grievance procedure as required in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,
supra note 8. Since the union would not process his grievance, he is now asking the
court to order the employer to arbitrate his discharge with him in lieu of the union.
Such an order by the court would precipitate several difficulties. First, as stated in
Black-Clawson Co. V. International Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 15, the arbitration
clause is an incident of the employer-union relationship. The employee, as a result, has
no individual right to have his grievance arbitrated. The right belongs to the union,
unlike the right to bring a § 301 action to enforce his contract rights which are personal
to him. The second difficulty is that the employer has not agreed to arbitrate with the
employee but only with the union. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., .363
U.S. 574 (1960), held that there can be no arbitration unless a party has agreed to arbi-
trate. Thirdly, the order would undermine the collective bargaining agreement so that the
employer's manner of settling grievances is no longer the sole method.
18 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, supra note 3, established that § 301 does not
foreclose the right of employees to bring suits under that section.
The word "between" [in § 301] it [respondent] suggests, refers to "suits," not
"contracts," and therefore only suits between unions and employers are within
the purview of § 301. According to this view, suits by employees . . . would
not arise under § 301 and would be governed by state law, if not pre-empted
by Garmon, as this one would be, whereas a suit . by a union for the same breach
of the same contract would be a § 301 suit ruled by federal law. Neither the
language and structure of § 301 . . . supports this restrictive interpretation... .
We conclude that petitioner's action arises under § 301 and is not pre-empted
under the Garmon rule.
Id. at 200. Therefore, an employee has the right to bring suit if the contract between the
employer and the union is violated and an individual right of his is affected. The
Court left open the question of what clauses in a collective bargaining agreement would
give rise to the right to bring a § 301 action.
The question arises whether the employee can bring a § 301 contract action when
the conduct of the employer and the union is tortious, i.e., either a conspiracy, or a
breach by the union of its duty of fair representation. This was answered in Humphrey
v. Dealers Transp. Co., 54 L.R.R.M. 3020 (W.D. Ky. 1965), where the court stated
that even though the union's or employer's conduct might be tortious, this does not
prevent it from also constituting a breach of the implied covenant of good faith.
However, the Supreme Court, in 1963, held that where conduct is tortious the
Garmon rule is applicable. In Local 207, Intl Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. Perko, 373
U.S. 701 (1963), the employee sought damages from his union under state common law.
He alleged a conspiracy by his union and the employer to deprive him of his work and
interfere with his contract of employment. The Court made no reference to § 301, but
held that the matter was within German.
The basis under which a court can take jurisdiction of an employee's claim that his
union and employer have conspired to deprive him of his contract rights is still in
question. Is it a § 301 action under Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962), where the Court stated that "suits of a kind covered by section
301" must be decided according to the precepts of federal labor policy, or is it purely a
matter of local contract law? See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356
U.S. 617 (1958); Sipes v. Vaca, 61 L.R.R.M. 2054 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1965).
19 248 F. Supp. 684 (N.D, Ill. 1965).
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rights under the collective bargaining agreement. Since he could not force
the employer to arbitrate his grievance under section 9(a), he had two
alternatives: a section 301 action or an action against the union for breach
of its duty of fair representation. Since the latter would be unable to provide
him with his most important remedy, reinstatement, his only means to
vindicate his contract rights would be under section 301.
The court did not consider the type of action it would take when the
employee brought his section 301 action. That is, would it stay the case
and order arbitration or would it give the employee a hearing on the merits.
As pointed out above, the first method would be undesirable. Therefore, it
appears that the employee would be entitled to a hearing on the merits. In
order to have the employee reinstated the court would have to find first
that the employee's contract right was violated, and secondly, that if the
union and employer had agreed to the discharge, that this agreement was
arbitrary.
C. Union Violation of No-Strike Clauses
During the Survey year, the dispute has continued to rage as to whether
a state court can enjoin a strike in violation of a no-strike clause and, as a
corollary, whether a union can deprive the employer of this possible state
remedy by removal to the federal courts. Since courts' and commentators 2
have adequately covered all aspects of this dispute in much detail, we shall
only briefly note the latest decisions.
In Publishers Ass'n v. New York Newspaper Pressman's Union, 3 the dis-
trict court held that removal to a federal forum is available even though only
an injunction is sought and the federal court cannot act upon the request.
However, the district court in Dixie Mach. Welding v. Marine Eng'rs Benefi-
cial Ass'n' denied removal, finding no jurisdiction in the federal courts. The
1
 States have the right to enjoin breaches of a no-strike clause: American Dredging
Co. v. Local 25, Intl Union of Operating Eng'rs, 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965) ; Radio Corp. of America v. Local 780, Int'l Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees, 160 So. zd 150 (Fla. App. 1964); C. D. Perry & Sons, Inc.
v. Robilotto, 39 Misc. 2d 147, 240 N.Y,S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1963). States do not have the
right to enjoin breaches of a no-strike clause; Independent Oil Workers v. Socony Mobil
Oil Co., 85 N.J. Super. 453, 205 A.2d 78 (1964).
Federal courts lack removal jurisdiction: Merchants Refrigerating Co. v. Local 6,
Warehouse Union, 213 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Cal. 1963); see lA Moore, Federal Practice
0.167[7] (1965) and cases cited therein. Federal courts have removal jurisdiction:
Tri-Boro Bagel Co. v. Local 802, Bakery Drivers, 228 F. Supp. 720 (EDN.Y. 1963);
S. E. Overton Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 115 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich.
1953) ; Pocahontas Terminal Corp. v. Portland Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council, 93 F. Supp.
217 (D. Me. 1950).
2
 Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions,
63 Colum. L. Rev. 1027 (1963); Isaacson, The Grand Equation: Labor Arbitration
and the No-Strike Clause, 48 A.B,A.J. 914, 920 (1962); Comment, Quid Pro Quo in
Federal Labor Law: Enforcement of the No-Strike Clause, 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 626
(1963); 6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 957 (1965); 65 Colum. L. Rev. 907 (1965);
78 Harv. L. Rev. 1665 (1965).
3
 246 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
4 243 F. Supp. 492 (ED. La. 1965).
928
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
state courts have continued to uphold uniformly their right to issue the in-
junction. 8
This hiatus will continue to exist until the Supreme Court decides the
matter. As discussed infra, the Court may, in International Union, UAW v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,° have laid the foundation for a decision on these
questions.?
D. Timeliness of Section 301 Actions
The absence of any statute of limitations provision in section 301' has
disturbed the courts because of the existence of two diverse lines of Supreme
Court decisions. 2 While the Supreme Court has traditionally allowed federal
courts to apply state statutes of limitations for federal causes of actions where
the federal legislation is silent,2 there is, on the other hand, a Supreme Court
mandate to develop a uniform body of law for section 301 actions. 4 Not with-
standing its mandate, however, the Supreme Court held, in International
Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,° that state statutes of limitation will
determine the timeliness of section 301 actions.
The Court, although recognizing the need for uniform law, held that the
need for uniformity in the present situation was too insignificant for the
"bald . . . form of judicial innovation"° which would be needed to devise a
uniform time limitation. Uniformity will be necessary, the Court said, when
the lack of it would exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation
and administration of collective agreements. The need for uniformity "is
greatest where its absence would threaten the smooth functioning of those
consensual processes that federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote—
the formation of the collective agreements and the private settlement of
disputes under it." 7 Since statutes of limitation come into play only after the
above processes have broken down, "lack of uniformity in this area is ..
unlikely to frustrate in any important way the achievement of any significant
goal of labor policy," and there is hence no justification for judicial legisla-
tion.
0
 Dugdale Constr. Co. v. Local 538, Operative Plasterers, 135 N.W.2d 656 (Iowa
Sup. Ct. 1965); Strecher-Traung Lithograph Corp. v. Local 11L, Lithographers Union,
46 Misc. 2d 925, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (Sup. Ct. 1965) ; Shaw Elec. Co. v. Local 98, Int'l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 418 Pa. 1, 208 A.2d 769 (1965).
6 86 Sup. Ct. 1107 (1966).
7 For a discussion supporting the right of state courts to enjoin strikes in violation
of no-strike clauses, see Janofsky & Vaughn, The Affirmative Role of State Courts to
Enjoin Strikes in Breach of Collective Bargaining Agreements, supra p. 869.
1
 LMRA § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
2 See, e.g., International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Fishbach & Moore, Inc.,
350 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1965),
3
 E.g., Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947); McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154
(1905); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895); M'Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S.
(3 Pet.) 415 (1830).
4 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); see Local 174, Teamsters
Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
5 86 Sup. Ct. 1107 (1966).
0 Id. at 4301.
7
 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
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Mr. Justice White, in a dissenting opinion in which Justices Douglas and
Brennan joined, thought that state law should be resorted to only where
it will effectuate the federal labor policy; fifty-plus different statutes of limi-
tations would not further this policy, especially in light of the unity mandate.
Relying on such authority as Gaines v. Miller," the dissent also disagreed that
the Court has always considered the creation of a statute of limitations as
excessive judicial legislating.
The Hoosier Cardinal decision, in addition to solving the immediate
limitations question, has, more broadly, stated new criteria for the applica-
bility of the uniformity rule. Rejecting the substantive-procedural dichotomy
as inapplicable (section 301 had been construed to apply only to substantive
law) 1° the Court indicated that henceforth courts would have to examine the
disruptive influence of non-uniformity upon both the negotiation and ad-
ministration of collective agreements.
This new standard necessitates that courts reconsider the state's right to
enjoin a strike in violation of a collective bargaining agreement. For example,
if the states possess the right to enjoin strikers (in violation of their collective
bargaining agreements) as the Third Circuit so held in American Dredging
Co. v. Local 25, Ina Union of Operating Eners,n would this bring about
the disruptive influence which is the basis of uniformity under section 301?
Certainly the state's right to enjoin differs from the right to apply the state
statute of limitations: In the former, the "consensual processes," to wit, the
private settlement of disputes, have not broken down. Does this not bring
about the need for "drastic ... judicial legislation"? 12 In Local 174, Team-
sters Union v. Lucas Flour, upon which the present Court relied heavily, the
Court emphasized the parties' right to know with certainty "the rights which
. . . [they] had obtained or conceded." 18 But, under American Dredging, a
union can never know with certitude whether it will be enjoined for breaching
a no-strike agreement. Such uncertainty might well substantially impede its
"willingness to agree to contract terms"" providing for a no-strike clause.
Therefore, judicial legislating might soon be in order to overturn the Ameri-
can Dredging doctrine, now that section 301 law can include Norris-La-
Guardia's procedural as well as substantive terms.
E. Exemplary Damages Under Section 301
In Sidney Wanzer & Son, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Union,' the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois awarded exemplary
damages to an employer in a section 301 suit brought by the employer to
compel arbitration and obtain damages on account of the union's constant
work stoppages. Acting under the Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills' mandate
l111 U.S. 395 (1884).
la International Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., supra nate 5, at 4301 n.4.
II 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965).
12 International Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., supra note 5, at 4301.
13 Supra note 4, at 103.
14 Id. at 104.
1 249 F. Supp. 664 (ND. 111. 1966).
2 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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to fashion remedies, the court reasoned that since the NLRA is silent on this
question, the court could determine punitive damages to be the ideal remedy
in the present case to prevent future strife.
In the first and apparently only prior federal case dealing with punitive
damages, the district court, in Local 127, United Shoe Workers v. Brooks
Shoe Mfg. Co.,3 had awarded employees punitive damages against a "run-
away employer." The decision was, however, overturned on appeal by a
divided court. 4 The basis for the reversal was that courts cannot prescribe
penalties under section 301 since the NLRA is only remedial; hence, punitive
damages, not being remedial, are barred.
The Wanzer court distinguished Brooks Shoe on the ground that in
Wanzer there is a continuing relationship which must be preserved, while in
Brooks Shoe the relationship had been severed. The punitive damages in
Brooks Shoe would thus be a deterrent only to future "runaway employers,"
hence taking on the aspect of a punishment, while in Wanzer the damages
would be remedia1.5
Whatever the force of the opposing legalistic arguments to section 301
exemplary damages,° their prudent use can be a powerful tool in the pre-
vention of industrial strife and the fulfillment of the purposes of the NLRA.
Their legality should not be lightly denounced."'
3 187 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
4 Local 127, United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir.
1962).
5 249 F. Supp. at 670. The court stated that "an award ... to deter potential future
violators . . . is barred." Therefore, an award against a "runaway shop" which could
not remedy the situation at hand would be barred.
The court continued: "Where the award is a uniquely effective device for changing
a specific pattern of illegal conduct by a party before the court, it comes within the
remedial purposes of labor law." The courts are precluded from imposing sanctions
which are in excess of what is needed to pacify the particular labor-management dispute.
However, since here the punitive damages propose to redress particular acts of mis-
conduct, they do not exceed the remedial necessity.
6 There are several arguments against allowing punitive damages. The contractual
theory would stress that punitive damages are not allowed for a breach of contract;
however, the Supreme Court has constantly stated that traditional contract theory is
no longer applicable to collective bargaining agreements. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v.
Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964) ("a collective bargaining agreement is not an
ordinary contract"); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960) (collective bargaining agreement "is more than a contract; it is a generalized
code"); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 2, at 456 (common law rule on
specific performance of arbitration awards under a contract rejected). See also the
circuit court's argument for punitive damages in Local 127, United Shoe Workers v.
Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., supra note 4, at 285 (bring in punitive damages under an excep-
tion to contract law).
A second argument against allowing punitive damages is the NLRA's emphasis on
remedy, rather than punishment; but, according to the Supreme Court, "a remedy is the
means employed to enforce a right or redress an injury," Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S.
Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918). Compensatory damages, although sufficient to redress
the employer's injury, would not sufficiently enforce his right to operate his business
free from illegal work stoppages. This right could be protected only through punitive
damages.
7 LMRA § 1(b), 61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1964):
It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full flow of
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IV. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES
A. Use of Authorization Cards to Compel Bargaining
One of the oldest methods of union organizing is to obtain employees'
signatures on cards authorizing the union to represent the signers. Under the
original Wagner Act, these authorization cards could be used by the NLRB
for election purposes, as the act permitted the Board to hold secret ballot
elections or to use "any other suitable method" of determining employee
choice as to union representation.' In 1947, however, the Taft-Hartley
amendments deleted the words "any other suitable method." 2 Thereafter, the
Board could resolve representation cases only by secret ballot election.°
Today, the cards serve two important purposes. They are used in
conjunction with a section 9(c)(1) representation petition to prove that
a "substantial number of employees" wish to be represented, and with a
section 8(a) (5) refusal-to-recognize charge to demonstrate the union's ma-
jority status at the time of the employer's refusal.' It is with this latter use
that we shall be concerned. 5
The historic Bernel Foam Prods. Co. decision,° and the subsequent cases
upholding the doctrine expressed therein, 7 have given added importance
to the use of cards to prove majority status. Under the Aiello Dairy Farms
rule, 8
 a union which lost an election could not later file a section 8(a) (5)
refusal-to-recognize charge against the employer, since the Board deemed
the union to have waived the charge when it proceeded to the election;
rather, the union's remedy was a re-run election. In Bernel, the NLRB ex-
pressly overruled Aiello, allowing the union a choice of remedies: It could
file a section 8(a) (5) charge before the election, or it could risk an election
and, upon losing, file the section 8(a) (5) charge.° The Board in Bernel,
commerce, . . to provide orderly and peaceful procedure for preventing the
interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other. . . .
1 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
2 LMRA 9(c) (1), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1964).
3
 Ibid.
4 LMRA § 8(a) (5), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
5 It is submitted that the cards remain an alternative to a § 9 election, despite the
1947 amendments. Since the remedy for a refusal-to-recognize charge is a bargaining
order, the employer must bargain with the union for a reasonable time. NLRB v.
Warren Co., Inc., 350 U.S. 107, 112 (1955). Board certification under § 9 does confer
more benefits than a bargaining order.
Criticism of the use of cards in a § 8(a) (5) proceeding to establish a bargaining
relationship can be understood when one compares the informal method of obtaining
cards with the "laboratory conditions" standard for NLRB elections set down in
General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337, 1341 (1948).
0
 146 N.L.R.B. 1277, 56 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1964).
7 See, e.g., NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1965).
8 110 N.L.R.B. 1365, 35 L.R.RM. 1235 (1964).
13`  In the later Irving Air Chute Co. decision, 149 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 57 L.R.R.M.
1330 (1964), the NLRB emphasized that it would not grant a bargaining order under
§ 8(a) (5) to a union which had lost an election unless sufficient unfair labor practices
occurred between the filing of the election petition and the election itself to warrant
setting aside the election. It is assumed that unions will stay any election and proceed
with § 8(a) (5) charges where the refusal-to-recognize occurs before the election petition
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noting the inadequacy of a re-run election, 1 ° ordered the employer to bargain
with the union, although it in fact had never won an election."
Thus, since a section 8(a) (5) violation can result in an order to bargain
with the union, proof of majority status by the union at the time of the
employer's refusal, a sine qua non for a section 8(a) (5) finding, has become
crucial—and authorization cards have been held to be a proper determining
factor of the majority status.12
One final point should be noted. The decisions on the problem of cards
in the section 8(a) (5) context must be considered in the light of the serious
and lingering effects of an employer's anti-union conduct. As the NLRB
observed in Bernel, for example, once the employees have felt the anti-union
wrath of the employer, the damage to the union in that unit is usually
irreparable. The damaged union stands little, if any, chance of ever again
commanding majority support. Thus, the only effective remedy is a bargain-
ing order after a section 8(a) (5) violation has been found. If for some
reason the Board decides that the union in fact never had an uncoerced
majority, then there can be no section 8(a) (5) violation—and the union
involved has been laid to rest, probably forever. In short, the Board and
courts seem to feel obliged to listen with a sympathetic ear to the union's
arguments in this vital area.
1. Card Language
In the vast majority of cases involving cards, there are no defects in
the cards themselves.' The language clearly states that the signer is autho-
rizing the union to represent him in collective bargaining. The cards contain
no mention of an NLRB election. However, some ambiguously-phrased cards
have been invalidated.
In NLRB v. Peterson Bros., Inc., 2 the card was titled, in bold type,
"AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRESENTATION." However, the body of
the card contained the following language in ordinary type: "I, the under-
signed employee, . . . hereby select the above named union as my collective
bargaining agent." At the bottom of the card appeared this additional state-
ment: "This is not an application for membership. This card is for use in
is filed and either the employer thereafter engages in no other unlawful conduct, or he
commits § 8(a)(1) violations, for example, but ceases before the petition is filed.
10 "[Elxperience has demonstrated that a vast majority of the rerun elections'
results favor the party which interfered with the original election." 146 N.L.R.B. at 1281,
56 L.R.R.M, at 1041.
11 For a full discussion of Aiello, Bernel and Irving Air Chute, see 1965 Annual
Survey of Labor Law, 6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 844-49 (1965).
12 Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999, 1001, 32 L.R.R.M. 1580,
1582 (1953). See, however, a speech made by NLRB Chairman McCulloch in which
he cited the following statistics to show the unreliability of cards: "In 58 elections, the
unions presented authorization cards from 30 to 50 percent of the employees; and
they won It or 19 percent of them. In 87 elections, the unions presented authorization
cards from 50 to 70 percent of the employees, and they won 42 or 52 percent of them."
50 L.R.R.M. 36 (1962).
1 See, e.g., Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268, 54 L.R.R.M. 1233 (1963).
2 342 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1965).
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support of the demand of this union for recognition from the company in
your behalf, or for an N.L.R.B. election." 3 The Fifth Circuit reversed the
Board4
 and held the cards invalid. Basing their decision partly on the
ambiguous language of the cards and partly on misrepresentations by union
solicitors as to an election purpose, the court held that, because of the
ambiguity on the face of the cards, the NLRB should have considered the
signers' intent. The court stressed the ease with which a union can prepare
an unambiguous form authorizing union representation. It could find no
excuse for the misunderstanding engendered by the language.
In a contemporaneously decided case, NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores,
Inc.,5 the Sixth Circuit reached the opposite result on nearly identical card
language. Although admitting the dual meanings possible from the wording
of the cards, the court stressed the absence of any representations by solic-
itors about an election. The court stated a policy consideration in such
cases: "The decisions of the Board as well as the opinions of the courts place
more emphasis upon the representations made to the employees at the time
the cards were signed than upon the language set forth in the cards." In
light of this statement, the reliance of the Fifth Circuit in Peterson Bros.,
partly on the ambiguous language and partly on the misrepresentations,
becomes more meaningful.
A more objectionable type of ambiguous card was involved in S.N.C.
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB.? There the heading consisted of the following language
in bold type: "I WANT AN N.L.R.B. ELECTION NOW." Below, in
ordinary type, appeared: "I authorize the IUE-AFL-CIO to act as my bar-
gaining agent. . . ." There was evidence that solicitors had mentioned an
election purpose to a few employees. The Board upheld the cards as valid,
noting that representations were not made to a sufficient number of em-
ployees to destroy the union's majority. The Board neither discussed the
card language nor specifically held that those cards secured by representations
were invalid. The District of Columbia Circuit in a per curiam opinion up-
held the NLRB.8 In an earlier decision, Morris & Associates, Inc.,9 involving
card language nearly identical to that in S.N.C. Mfg., the Board had ruled
the cards invalid, relying on the presence of representations as to purpose.
Thus, absent representations as to an election purpose, the Board and
courts have refused to invalidate even highly ambiguous cards, thereby acting
consistently with the policy considerations mentioned at the outset,' specifi-
cally with regard to the consequences to the union from such invalidation.
8 Id. at 222-23.
4 144 N.L.R.B. 679, 54 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1963).
5 341 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965).
6
 Id, at 754.
7 147 N.L.R.B. 809, 56 L.R.R.M. 1313 (1964).
8 352 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 902 (1966). Judge Burger,
in a concurring opinion, echoed the argument of NLRB v. Peterson Bros., Inc., supra
note 2, that the cards were unnecessarily misleading.
9 138 N.L.R.B. 1160, 51 L.R.R.M. 1183 (1962).
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2. Representations as to Purpose
As the Sixth Circuit suggested in Winn-Dixie Stores,' the Board and
courts look closer at oral representations than at the written card language.
Representations of solicitors seem to deserve closer scrutiny, for in the
ordinary organizing campaign the employees rely heavily, if not exclusively,
on the statements of the solicitors.2
Despite the heavy reliance on the representations, and despite the
crucial importance of the cards since Bernel Foam in establishing a bargain-
ing relationship without an NLRB election, the Board and courts have taken
a strict approach to the invalidation of cards for misrepresentations as to
their purpose.
The representation cases can be divided according to how flagrant the
misstatements areas In an early case, NLRB v. Dadourian Export Corp.,4
the Second Circuit invalidated cards obtained by means of representations
made by the organizer that if employees did not sign the cards they would
no longer be able to work. Judge Hand summarized the court's attitude
toward such untrue statements:
We cannot agree that the statute ... sanctions the selection of a
bargaining representative by such means. Fraud—which this was—
will vitiate consent as well as violence, and the Board itself implies
that a vote procured by violence should not be counted. . . .
§ 7 confers the right on all employees freely to choose their bargain-
ing representatives, and the invasion of that right is as much a
wrong, when committed by a union organizer as by an employer. 5
The Dadourian case presented a somewhat unique representation situa-
tion. The common situation today concerns statements that the cards are
for election purposes when, in fact, the wording clearly provides that they
are for representation purposes and will be so used by the union. One type
of misrepresentation always invalidates the cards thereby obtained, namely,
the "only purpose" representation. For example, the Board recently invali-
dated cards secured by solicitors' statements to employees that the cards
were to be used only for the purpose of an NLRB election. 5
1 341 F.2d 750, 754 (6th Cir. 1965).
2 A dissenter in NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 61 L.R.R.M. 2177 (2d Cir. 1966),
remarked that a substantial number of employees, usually enough to destroy a union's
majority, either do not read or do not understand the meaning of the cards.
a For example, it would be flagrant to state that false consequences would result if
cards were not signed. A non-flagrant misstatement would be stating that the cards would
probably be used for an election, without mentioning the intended representation purpose.
4 138 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1943).
5 Id. at 892. The court also pointed out that the "overriding consideration must
always be the employees' untrammelled freedom of choice. . ." Id. at 893.
6 Engineers & Fabricators, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 61 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1966). The
NLRB usually insists that the magic words "only purpose" be uttered. However, some
courts have acted under the Dadourian fraud rationale, supra note 4, and invalidated cards
when different words were used yet conveyed the same false idea. See NLRB v. Koehler,
328 F.2d 770, 773 (7th Cir. 1964), where the court reversed the Board and invalidated
cards obtained by statements that they were not to be used to select the union as the
bargaining representative, but to obtain an election.
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Where less flagrant misrepresentations are concerned, the cases do not
turn on the nature of the statements, but rather on whether the employer
has waged an anti-union campaign or committed any serious section 8(a) (1)
violations, the Board being more concerned with the lasting harm of the
employer's unfair labor practices than with the misstatements.? In Happach
v. IVLRB,8 the bargaining unit was composed of fifteen employees in a retail
grocery store. Cards were signed upon representations by solicitors that one
purpose of the cards was to get an NLRB election. There was further
evidence that the solicitors understood, and led the employees to believe,
that the cards were for an election. Thereafter, on four occasions, the union
informed the employer of its majority status, requested recognition, and
offered to prove its majority by a card check. The employer never questioned
the union's majority, asked it to produce the cards, gave any reason for his
refusals-to-recognize other than advice of counsel, or furnished his attor-
ney's name so the union could discuss the matter with him. Although the
employer at no time engaged in any anti-union campaign or otherwise
violated section 8(a) (1), he did discriminatorily discharge a strong union
supporter.
The NLRI3 ruled the cards valid since the solicitors never said the "only
purpose" was for an election, and found a section 8(a) (5) violation based
upon the employer's "complete disregard of his bargaining obligation."9
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Board's order and reasoning." However,
Judge Castle partially dissented on the basis of the misunderstanding
created by the representations. He would hold invalid cards which were
secured by solicitors who misunderstood their purpose and signed by em-
ployees who were similarly confused.
Although the Happach decision, given the facts of the employer's deaf-
and-dumb attitude and the discriminatory discharge in the small retail store,
is probably justified, in a closer case Judge Castle's thinking would be the
better view." In the situation where the employer's conduct did not poison
the air against unionism, what justification can there be in foisting on
employees a union which they, without a full understanding, selected as
their representative? 12
The third type of misrepresentation case couples the kind of mis-
representations found in Happach with anti-union conduct by the employer.
7
 In the flagrant misrepresentation cases already discussed, the outright fraud seems
to outweigh the effects of the employer's unfair labor practices. In Engineers and
Fabricators, Inc., supra note 6, and in NLRB v. Koehler, supra note 6, there were
serious § 8(a) (1) violations, yet the cards were ruled invalid in both cases.
8
 353 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1965).
151 N.L.R.B. No. 68, 58 L.R.R.M. 1448, 1449 (1965).
to The court distinguished the case factually from NLRB v. Koehler, supra note 6,
and stressed the lack of any "only purpose" statements.
11
 For example, consider the case where the union obtains cards through confused
solicitors from misled employees, and the employer refuses recognition, demands an
election, yet commits no serious §§ 8(a) (1)(3) violations.
12
 The union, which has not been irreparably damaged, does not need such a
remedy. The employees, who have not truly expressed preference for the union, do not
want such a remedy.
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The two recent circuit court cases in this area involved the same basic facts:
cards were signed on representations either that one purpose was to get an
election, or that there probably would have to be an election eventually;
recognition was requested and refused; the employer then undertook an
anti-union campaign and committed section 8(a) (1) violations; both courts
held the cards valid. The majority of the Second Circuit in NLRB v. Gotham
Shoe Mfg. Co., 13 relied on the "only purpose" rule and did not squarely
face the misrepresentation issue. However, the Sixth Circuit, in NLRB v.
Cumberland Shoe Corp.,14 treated the problem fully. After distinguishing
the case from cases of "outright misrepresentation" such as Koehler,15 the
court listed the factors favoring acceptance of the cards:
The authorization cards were themselves wholly unambiguous and
they related solely to authorization of union representation as
collective bargaining representative. .. . [T]he signing of author-
ization cards was an essential preliminary to a union petition for
an election. In no instance did any employee testify that he was told
that the election was the only purpose of the card. And the union
did indeed seek an election, withdrawing that request only after it
had become convinced that the company's Section 8(a) (1) viola-
tions had coerced a sufficient number of employees so as to eliminate
the union's majority support. 19
The court understandably failed to find any trace of fraud in the mention of
an election purpose, since in fact the cards can be used only for an election
until they are signed by a majority of employees. In Gotham Shoe, Judge
Timbers filed a lengthy and convincing partial dissent in support of invali-
dating cards similarly obtained. 17 Criticizing the practice of the Board and
courts of permitting a certain degree of fraud, he stated:
In my opinion, it [the present case] furnishes a striking demonstra-
tion of the utterly irrational basis for the Board's rule distinguishing
between fraud in obtaining authorization cards by misrepresenting
that an election is the sole purpose of the cards and fraud in mis-
representing that an election is one purpose of the cards. 18
Judge Timbers was basically concerned with the rights of the employees:
After all, it is the employees' rights under Section 7 with which we
are concerned.. .. [T]o permit the vice of such solicitations to turn
upon whether an election or a vote was said to be the sole purpose
or a purpose of signing the cards, is wholly to ignore whose rights
13 Supra note 2.
14' 351 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1965).
16 Supra note 6.
10 Supra note 14, at 920.
37
 He cited the present case as a "glaring illustration" of the unreliability of cards,
since enough cards to destroy the union's majority were signed by employees who did
not read or understand the cards, and/or under misrepresentations as to their use for an
election. NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., supra note 2, at 2184.
18 Id. at 2185-86.
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are intended to be guaranteed by Section 7. Upholding the Board's
rule here, based on this irrational distinction, may pull the union's
chestnuts out of the fire; but it surely will open the door to future
organizational sharp dealing, to the detriment of the very em-
ployees' rights we seek to safeguard."
The answer to Judge Timbers' arguments may be that the act does
provide remedies for employees who are represented by a union which no
longer enjoys majority support, while it is helpless to aid a union whose
chestnuts are not pulled out of the fire.
3. Good Faith Doubt
When can an employer refuse to recognize a union which requests bar-
gaining, claiming to represent a majority of the employees as evidenced by
signed cards?' The landmark Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB decision held
that an employer could refuse recognition and insist upon an election "when
motivated by a good faith doubt as to the union's majority status." 2 The
court there stated the test of good faith doubt:
LT] he question of whether an employer is acting in good or bad
faith at the time of the refusal is, of course, one which of necessity
must be determined in the light of all relevant facts in the case,
including any unlawful conduct of the employer, the sequence of
events, and the time lapse between the refusal and the unlawful
conduct.8
In general, the Board has found a refusal in bad faith when the em-
ployer subsequently waged an anti-union campaign, regardless of how strong
the reasons for the original refusa1.4 Recently, in Engineers & Fabricators,
Inc.,5
 the employer alleged a good faith doubt because the union had re-
peatedly and falsely claimed majority status in the past, as recently as one
year prior. The Board found a section 8(a) (5) violation, pointing to the
employer's subsequent series of section 8(a)(I) violations.°
16 Id. at 2188.
I In general, the employer has a duty to bargain as soon as the union presents con-
vincing evidence of majority support. See NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112
F.2d 756, 757 (2d Cir. 1940). An employer cannot refuse to bargain solely because he
would prefer an NLRB election. See NLRB v. Decker, 296 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1961).
2 185 F.2d 732, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
3
 Id. at 742. For a discussion of the method of determining good faith doubt, see
Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401 (1958).
4 See, e.g., NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 61 L.R.R.M. 2177 (2d Cir. 1966). How-
ever, in NLRB v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 274 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1960), there were serious
f 8(a) (1) violations, yet the court found a "good faith" doubt, basing its decision
partly on the "razor thin majority" which the union claimed-167 cards from 332
employees. Id. at 387. The case suggests that where the reason for doubt is extremely
convincing, even later 8(a) (1) violations will not render incredible the claim of good
faith doubt.
5 156 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 61 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1966).
6 The Board reasoned:
The question of the employer's good or bad faith . . . must, of course, be
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Conversely, the Board and courts have upheld an allegation of good
faith doubt when the employer does not subsequently engage in any unfair
labor practices. In John P. Serpa, Inc.,7 an employer was asked to recognize
the union and was confronted with cards from five of his seven employees.
He asked for time to consult his attorneys and did so, but never responded
to the union's request. The employer committed no later unfair labor prac-
tices.8
 In finding a good faith doubt, the Board held that the General Counsel
had not met his burden of proof since there was no evidence introduced
showing "that respondent has completely rejected the collective-bargaining
principle or seeks merely to gain time within which to undermine the union
and dissipate its majority.") Likewise, where the employer later commits
merely an isolated or minor section 8(a) (1) violation, the Board generally
has found no bad faith. In NLRB v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.," the Fifth
Circuit found a section 8(a) (1) violation when the employer asked an em-
ployee her reasons for signing an authorization card, yet found no section
8 (a) (5) violation, stating:
While this incident may well have constituted a technical transgres-
sion of section 8(a)(1), it must be placed in its proper context in
the whole record for the purpose of determining whether it consti-
tutes substantial evidence of an improper refusal to bargain. We
think that, standing alone, the incident is too isolated to warrant an
inference of lack of good faith. 11
There is, however, a controversial line of cases in which the Board and
courts have found a bad faith refusal despite the absence of subsequent
unfair labor practices.12 One group of, such cases is represented by Snow v.
NLRB," where the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board's finding of a refusal-
assessed in the light of the facts of each case, including any reasons he may
offer to justify the refusal and any conduct violative of the Act for which he
may be held accountable.
Id., 61 L.R.R.M. at 1159.
7
 155 N.L.R.B. No. 12, 60 L.R.R.M. 1235 (1965). Accord, Ben Duthler, Inc., 157
N.L.R.B. No. 3, 61 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1966). See NLRB v. Johnnie's Poultry Co., 344
F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1965), where the court listed the factors showing good faith doubt:
the union one year earlier had obtained cards from 55 of 68 employees, yet received only
27 of 68 votes in the election; there was a prompt filing of an election petition by the
employer; and there was a lack of later unfair labor practices.
8
 In the vast majority of cases the employer merely seeks delay in order to conduct
an anti-union campaign.
' John P. Serpa, Inc., supra note 7.
1° 346 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1965). Accord, Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp. v. NLRB, 352
F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1965), where the court found non-flagrant § 8(a)(1) violations but
refused to enforce a § 8(a)(5) violation. See Strydel Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 61
L.R.R.M. 1230 (1966), where the Board held that an employer's coercive statements
violated § 8(a)(1) but were not serious enough to show intent to dissipate the union's
majority.
11
 346 F.2d at 941.
12 These cases involve an employer's rejection either of the results of a card check
or of the principle of bargaining with a union.
73
 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962); see Kellogg Mills, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 342, 56
L.R.R.M. 1223 (1964), enforced, 347 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1965), where the employer not
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to-recognize. There the parties consented to a card check by a minister, who
reported that a majority of employees had applied for union membership."
The company continued to withhold recognition until an election was held,
but commited no later unfair labor practices. The court held: "The manner
in which an employer receives reliable information of union representation
. . . is of no consequence. Once he has received such information from a
reliable source, insistence upon a Board election can no longer be defended
on the ground of a genuine doubt as to majority representation." 15 More-
over, the court stated that proof of anti-union motivation through unfair labor
practices is not needed to find bad faith doubt "if lack of a reasonable doubt
is established in some other way. ,12143
The second group of cases is illustrated by George Groh & Sons,17 where
the NLRB found a bad faith refusal by the employer. After being notified by
the union of its majority status, the employer agreed to a meeting with the
union representatives. At the meeting, Groh refused a neutral card-check
saying it was unnecessary since "he was satisfied we represented these
people."'s The union attorney informed Groh of his duty to bargain but
Groh stated they "were wasting . . . [their] time, that he wasn't interested
in the union." When the union later asked for another meeting, Groh said he
"didn't want any part to do with the Union again.''' 9 The NLRB concluded
that Groh's "refusal to recognize . .. was motivated not by a good-faith
only refused the results of a card check but held 3 bargaining meetings before questioning
the union's majority; Jem Mfg., Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 61 L.R.R.M. 1074 (1966),
where the employer copied the names on the cards, admitted the union's majority, met
in negotiations with the union, and then questioned the union's status.
14
 Compare Snow v. NLRB, supra note 13, with John P. Serpa, Inc., supra note 7,
where the Board held the situation "clearly distinguishable" and found no bad faith
when the union spread the cards on the employer's desk, giving him the opportunity to
examine them. Ibid. It has been suggested that the Serpa decision leaves the Snow holding
in doubt. Note, Refusal-To-Recognize Charges Under Section 8(a) (.5) of the NLRA:
Card Checks and Employee Free Choice, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 387 (1966).
15
 308 F.2d at 692.
16
 Id. at 693.
17
 141 N.L.R.B. 931, 52 L.R.R.M. 1424 (1963), enforced, 329 F.2d 265 (10th Cir.
1964); see Happach v. NLRB, 353 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1965), where a bad faith finding
was based on a § 8(a)(3) discriminatory discharge and the employer's complete lack
of response to repeated union requests for recognition.
18
 The offer to prove status will rarely support a § 8(a) (5) charge against an
employer who refuses it. NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., supra note 1, is cited
for the opposite holding, but it should be noted that the court there also pointed to
§ 8(a)(1) violations as evidence of bad faith. Four recent decisions support the general
rule. In Superex Drugs, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 97, 58 L.R.R.M. 1178 (1965), the Board
found no bad faith when the employer refused the offer of proof but committed no
later unfair labor practices. Three circuit courts found bad faith based on both the
refusal of offers of proof and § 8(a)(1) violations: Matthews & Co. v. NLRB, 354 F.2d
432 (8th Cir. 1966); Irving Air Chute Co. v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1965); NLRB
v. Elliott-Williams Co., 345 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1965). A refusal of a card check offer
should not be entitled to much weight in determining good or bad faith, since the
result of such proof is merely confirmation that a majority signed cards. The signature on
the card does not necessarily represent a vote for the union in an election, but often
merely means that the employee desires an election in order to cast a secret ballot against
unionism without incurring the displeasure of his pro-union co-workers.
io 141 N.L.R.B. at 940, 52 L.R.R.M. at 1424.
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doubt of the union's majority status but by a rejection of the collective-
bargaining principle." 2°
Snow and Groh stand as support for the proposition that an employer
can be guilty of a refusal-to-recognize charge without committing later unfair
labor practices. However, these cases represent extreme situations—refusing
the results of a card check, and completely rejecting the concept of bargain-
ing. Despite belief to the contrary, the Board has not found section 8(a) (5)
violations without subsequent unfair labor practices or extreme expressions
of bad faith by the employer. The employer who refuses recognition because
he doubts the reliability of cards probably will not find himself faced with
a section 8(a) (5) charge 21 unless he (1) commits unfair labor practices, 22
or (2) rejects the results of an agreed-upon card check and insists upon an
election,23 or (3) examines the cards himself and rejects them, 24
 or (4) com-
pletely ignores or dismisses the union's requests. 25
4. Remedies
Section 10(c) of the act empowers the Board "to take such affirmative
action ... as will effectuate the policies of this Act . . ." in remedying unfair
labor practices.' The Supreme Court early recognized that the Board could,
under this section, issue an affirmative order to bargain as a remedy for an
employer's unfair labor practices. 2
 Under Bernel Foam, 3 the Board was given
authority to issue a bargaining order for an unfair labor practice which de-
stroyed the union's opportunity for a fair election, even if the union actually
proceeded to and lost the election.'
20 The Board added:
The absence of good faith, then, may be manifested as well by attitudes and
conduct demonstrating a rejection of the collective-bargaining concept as by
more overt, readily discernible Section 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) conduct potentially
more immediately destructive of the Union's majority status.
Id. at 940.
21 A sophisticated employer should at least be able to secure an NLRB election.
When confronted with a bargaining request based on a card majority, he could refuse,
expressing doubts that the union represents a majority of employees. He could explain
his disbelief in the reliability of cards and stress the fairness to all parties of an NLRB
election. He could refuse either to examine the cards himself or to submit them to a card
check, explaining his feeling that a signed card does not necessarily prove that its
signer is pro-union. Such an employer can cite language and statistics from the Board
and courts in defense of his positions.
22 Engineers & Fabricators, Inc., supra note 5.
23 Snow v. NLRB, supra note 13.
24 Jem Mfg., Inc., supra note 13.
25 George Groh & Sons, supra note 17. Contra, John P. Serpa, Inc., supra note 7.
1 LMRA § 10(c), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
2 The Court stated in International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 82
(1940): "Where as a result of unfair labor practices a union cannot be said to represent
an uncoerced majority, the Board has the power to take appropriate steps to the end
that the effect of those practices will be dissipated," See also Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB,
321 U.S. 702, 705 (1944), where the Court discusses the particular appropriateness of a
bargaining order remedy.
3 146 N.L.R.B. 1277, 56 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1964).
4 The Board there rejected a re -run election as a meaningful remedy. See Pollitt,
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The past year has seen at least one circuit court attempt to limit the
application of Bernel Foam. In NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 5 decided by the
Second Circuit, after securing cards from a majority of employees the union
wrote a letter to the employer advising him of its majority status and request-
ing recognition. The letter requested a reply within five days; otherwise the
union would assume a refusal and file an election petition. Two days after
the letter was received by the employer, the union mailed a petition to the
Board. The union representative then met with the employer and explained
that the letter requesting recognition was required as a prelude to an election.
A consent election was held on May 2 and the union lost. On June 10, the
union filed unfair labor practice charges based on a letter which the employer
distributed to the employees on May 1 and 2, containing promises of benefits.
The NLRB found the employer justified in not regarding the union's
letter as a specific request to bargain, and thus held there was no section
8(a) (5) violation.° However, the Board found a section 8(a)(1) violation
and, since it further found the pre-election letter distributed by the em-
ployer destroyed the conditions for a fair election, it ordered the employer
to bargain.7
The Second Circuit, however, refused to enforce the bargaining order,
and held the proper remedy to be a cease-and-desist order followed by a
new election.° The court stressed that a bargaining order is "strong medicine"
and, since it dispenses with the need for a secret election, it jeopardizes the
employees' rights to refrain from, and to vote secretly against, unionism .°
The court could not justify such an extreme remedy on the facts before
it—a single unaggravated section 8(a) (1) violation, an absence of any
accurate indicia of employee desires regarding unionism, a risk that the em-
ployees were being saddled with a union they never in fact chose, and the
lack of any precedent for a bargaining order in a similar situation. The
underlying concern of the court was that, in view of Bernel Foam, the Board
NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. Rev. 209 (1963). The study revealed
that in 267 re-run elections held between 1960-1962, a different result was reached in 84
(31%) of them. However, the author observes that unions will not seek new elections
without a substantial possibility of success.
5 347 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1965).
6 147 N.L.R.B. 1304, 1305, 56 L.R.R.M. 1391, 1392 (1964).
7 It stated: "IOJnly a bargaining order could restore as nearly as possible the situa-
tion which would have obtained but for the respondent's unfair labor practices." Id.
at 1307. 56 L.R.R.M. at 1393.
8 The court found no precedent for the Board's issuance of a bargaining order
based on a single § 8(a) (1) violation. Neither of the two cases which the Board cited
as authority involved only a § 8(a) (1) violation. Bannon Mills, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 611,
55 L.R.R.M. 1370 (1964), and Western Aluminum, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 1191, 54 L.R.R.M.
1217 (1963), both involved § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a) (3) violations. The case which comes
closest to the Board's proposition is D. H. Holmes Co. v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 876 (5th Cir.
1950), where the court enforced a bargaining order based on a series of § 8(a) (1) viola-
tions. However, in the Board decision in D. H. Holmes Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 753, 23 L.R.R.M.
1431 (1949), the Board found §§ 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) violations. It appears that the
Board's Flomatic decision represents a new extension of the use of the bargaining order.
9 Unlike the Board, the court was not convinced that cards from 20 of 28 employees
necessarily meant that the union would have won the election but for the § 8(a) (1)
violation.
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would be issuing increasing numbers of bargaining orders for "minimal"
violations.1° The court limited Bernel Foam as follows:
We do not hold that the Board can never issue a bargain order in an
8(a) (1) case but where there is at most a moderate unbalancing
of an election by an employer such as there was in this case, there
is no adequate justification for putting the union in a position to
unbalance it the other way to an extreme degree." (Emphasis
supplied.)
Judge Hays, dissenting, would regard the issue of whether the employer's
acts "moderately" or "immoderately" unbalanced the election as particularly
within the Board's expertise. Here, since the Board had determined that the
employer's practices in fact dissipated the union's majority and destroyed
the conditions for a fair election, any discussion by the majority of "degrees
of interference" was improper. Although neither the majority nor dissenting
opinion mentioned the NLRB's Irving Air Chute Co. decision,42 the latter
seems more consistent with it. In Irving, the Board qualified the Bernel
Foam bargaining order remedy by requiring the election to have been set aside
before bargaining relief would be granted. The majority in Flomatic, however,
would insist that the section 8(a) (1) violation which sets the election aside
be an aggravated one before it would enforce an order to bargain.
The Second Circuit has addressed itself to the remedy issue in two
further cases since Flomatic. In Irving Air Chute Co. v. NLRB," the union
notified the employer of its majority status and demanded recognition. After
the employer asked for time because of a family death, the union filed an
election petition. The union requested recognition again and offered to prove
its majority, but the employer never responded. Before the election was
held, the employer made threats and promoted a company union. The union
lost the election. The Board found that the employer had violated sections
8(a) (1),(2) and (5), and issued a bargaining order. The Second Circuit
enforced the order, distinguishing Flomatic:
In that case, however, there was only a minimal § 8(a) (1) violation
and no demand and refusal to bargain. The appropriate remedy
must be fashioned to meet the situation presented in each particular
case and often depends on factual differences seemingly slight but
sufficient to tip the scales in favor of the Board's conclusion. Here
an election at this time would be manifestly unfair to the Union
since it would allow the Company to reap the benefits of its anti-
union acts. . . . 14
10
 The court cautioned that "the effect, on future similar cases, of the application
of Berne! Foam in conjunction with an affirmative order to bargain should be contem-
plated." NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., supra note 5, at 79. It added that a union will
henceforth raise unfair labor practice charges, however trivial, along with its election
petition and, if it loses the election, it will press the charge and the Board will follow
its Flomatic decision and order bargaining.
11 Ibid.
12 149 N.L.R.B. 627, 57 L,R.R.M. 1330 (1964), enforced, 350 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1965).
la 350 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1965).
14 Id. at 182.
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In NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co. 7 ' 5
 the union had made a demand
for recognition based on cards. When the employer refused recognition
because of doubts as to the union's status, the union petitioned for an
election. During the pre-election period, the employer committed a series of
section 8(a) (1) violations. The election was stayed when the union filed
unfair labor practice charges. The Board then found section 8(a) (1) and (5)
violations, and ordered bargaining." The Second Circuit again upheld the
order, distinguishing Flomatic in the same fashion as it had done in Irving
Air Chute. Judge Timbers dissented. Although agreeing with the majority's
finding of section 8(a) (1) violations, he dissented on the section 8(a) (5)
finding and on the bargaining order remedy.'7
 Timbers adopted the Flomatic
rationale and would have ordered a new election to remedy the section
8(a) (1) violations. He cited reasons why the case at hand presented even a
stronger argument for a new election than did Flomatic. 18 Judge Timbers'
opinion may, however, go even further than Flomatic; given his previously
discussed suspicion of authorization cards and concern for section 7 rights,
his view may be that a bargaining order should never be issued when based
on an alleged prior majority as evidenced only by cards.
The Flomatic decision and Timbers' dissent in Gotham Shoe indicate
growing concern over the implications of Bernel Foam. Particularly, the con-
cern centers around the reliance placed solely on cards to prove majority
status, in the context of the NLRB's oft-repeated warnings of the notorious
unreliability of these cards as an indicia of union sentiment. Whether cir-
cuits other than the second will follow Flomatic remains to be seen."
B. Union Communication with Employees
Excelsior Rule.—Union organizing efforts in large units have tradition-
ally been handicapped by inability to contact all the employees. One major
cause of this failure to communicate has been the lack of knowledge of the
15
 61 L.R.R.M, 2177 (2d Cir. 1966).
16 149 N.L.R.B. 862, 57 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1964).
17
 See earlier discussion of Judge Timbers' dissent pp. 937-38 supra.
18
 He listed the employer's doubt as to the union's card majority, the confusion as to
why large numbers of employees signed, the good faith efforts of the employer to
investigate the union's claimed status, and the prompt filing of the election petition by
the union. However, he overlooked the crucial difference between the two cases—the
series of flagrant anti-union acts committed. The court in Flornatic specifically stated
that its decision did not extend to situations where the employer's flagrant anti-union acts
ruined the chances for a fair election. NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., supra note 5, at 78.
10
 It can be argued in opposition to the Second Circuit that the bargaining order
remedy based on cards does not greatly affect employees' rights. Although the remedy in
effect makes the union the representative of the employees, they need not be so repre-
sented forever—the employees need not join the union or pay dues, and can always
decertify the union after one year. See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in
Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev,
38, 134-36 (1964). Moreover, the remedy can be viewed as merely giving the union
what it deserved, namely, a fair chance to win the support of a majority of employees.
Since the employer's conduct ruined any opportunity for a fair election, the bargaining
order merely gives the union initial bargaining rights. If the union never in fact represented
a majority, it can be decertified.
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employees' names and addresses.' The consequential inability to reach em-
ployees at home has confined unions to communicating in and around the
plant, where employer rules prohibiting some or all solicitation have further
restricted their efforts. As a result, unions have been forced to resort to more
expensive and burdensome, yet less personal and effective, methods of inform-
ing the employees of their position. 2
In February 1966 the NLRB concluded that the lack of effective union
communication with employees prevented a free and reasoned choice in an
election, and took a long step toward achieving a well-informed electorate.
In Excelsior Underwear, Inc., the Board announced a new rule designed to
"maximize the likelihood that all voters will be exposed to the arguments for,
as well as against, union representation." 8 The Excelsior rule requires that
whenever an election has been scheduled, 4 the employer must file with the
Regional Director within seven days a list containing the names and ad-
dresses of all eligible voters.° In turn, the Regional Director "shall make this
information available to all parties in the case."° Failure to supply the list
will be grounds to set aside the election.? The Board gave two reasons for
requiring the disclosure of the information:
[1] [N] of only does knowledge of employee names and addresses
increase the likelihood of an informed employee choice . . . but, in
the absence of employer disclosure, a list of names and addresses
is extremely difficult if not impossible to obtain. . . 8
[2] . . . [The requirement of prompt disclosure . . . will further
1
 See, e.g., May Dept. Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797, 49 L.R.R.M. 1862 (1962),
where, after 20 months of campaigning, the union had obtained names and addresses
of 1250 of approximately 3000 voters.
2
 In NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1963), the Second
Circuit stated:
Mailed material would be typically lost in the daily flood of printed matter
which passes with little impact from mailbox to wastebasket. Television and
radio appeals, where not precluded entirely by cost, would suffer from competi-
tion with the family's favorite programs and at best would not compare with
personal solicitation. Newspaper advertisements are subject to similar objec-
tions. Sidewalks and street corners are subject to the vicissitudes of climate and
often force solicitation at awkward times, as when employees are hurrying to
or from work.
3
 156 N.L.R.B. No. 111, 61 L.R.R.M. 1217, 1218 (1966).
4 The
 only exception is the expedited § 8(b) (7) (C) election, where the Board felt
that the short time between the scheduling and the election prevented sufficiently
meaningful use of the list to justify disclosure. Id., 61 L.R.R.M. at 1219 n.14.
6
 The rule is prospective only, and applies to elections scheduled after March 6.
8
 Excelsior Underwear Inc., supra note 3. It is assumed that the Regional Office will
copy the list and send it to the union involved.
7
 Likewise, there would seem to be grounds for setting aside an election when,
for example, the employer supplied only names, or when it furnished the list ten days
after an election was directed.
The Board in Excelsior would not comment on whether the employer's noncom-
pliance would be a § 8(a)(1) violation. Id., 61 L.R.R.M. at 1221.
Id., 61 L.R.R.M. at 1219.
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the public interest in the speedy resolution of questions of rep-
resentation .9
The Board rejected the following arguments against the rule. First, it
could find no significant employer interest in keeping the information secret.
Whatever interest in secrecy the employer may possibly have had was
"plainly outweighed by the substantial public interest in favor of disclosure
where, as here, disclosure is a key factor in insuring a fair and free election." 10
Second, the Board could not agree that the rule compelled an employer to
interfere with an employee's right to refrain from union activities by giving
the information without the employee's permission, since the employee could
exercise this right by voting against the union in the election. Third, al-
though conceding the possibility of resulting harassment and coercion of
employees in their homes, the Board did not regard this possibility as suffi-
cient reason to deny the union opportunity to communicate. Fourth, the
Board rejected an argument based on an NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co."
and NLRB v. United Steelworkers (Nutone) 12 analogy that an employer
should not be required to disclose the information unless the union would
otherwise be unable to reach the employees. The Board distinguished Excel-
sior as follows: (1) The employer here has no significant interest, such as
a right to control the use of his property, which must be overcome by a
showing of lack of alternative means; (2) an election has been scheduled
here, and thus the protection of the employees' rights to organize justifies
subordinating any interest which the employer may have in nondisclosure;
and (3) the Excelsior rule does not deal with an unfair labor practice but
only with conduct which will set aside an election. The Board further stated
that even the existence of alternative methods of communication would not
"insure the opportunity of all employees to be reached. . . ."i 3
The NLRB also rejected suggested limits to the rule. One approach was
not to apply the rule unless the employer himself had mailed literature to
homes. The Board stated that the union's access to the voter lists was essen-
tial to a fair election and should not be qualified by employer conduct.
Another suggestion was to furnish the information to a mailing service, on
the theory that, since the employer was forbidden to visit employees' homes,"
the union should not be allowed to do so. The Board rejected the idea "be-
cause this would create difficult practical problems and because we do not
9 Id., 61 L.R.R.M. at 1220. The Board believed the rule would eliminate sub-
stantially all unnecessary challenges and allow time to settle eligibility disputes.
10 Ibid.
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956). The Supreme Court held
that an employer could exclude nonemployee union organizers from company property in
the absence of a showing that it was unreasonably difficult to communicate with em-
ployees elsewhere.
12 NLRB v. United Steelworkers (Nutone), 357 U.S. 357 (1958). The Court held
that an employer could enforce his no-solicitation rule against his employees and at
the same time engage in anti-union solicitation without giving the union equal time.
There was no showing that the no-solicitation rules diminished the ability of the union
to carry its message to the employees.
13 Excelsior Underwear Inc., supra note 3, 61 L.R.R.M. at 1220.
14 See, e.g., Peoria Plastic Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545, 39 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1957).
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believe that the union should be limited to the use of the mails in its efforts
to communicate with the entire electorate.”'°
It seems certain that employers will refuse to supply the lists until the
validity of the rule is upheld by a court." Among the arguments likely to be
advanced by.employers is that the Board has exceeded its statutory authority,
since neither the act nor decisional law empowers the Board to insure a fully-
informed electorate.17 Although section 6 does authorize the Board to make
"such rules ... as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act," 18
the act itself, it may be argued, only directs the Board to conduct elections
and certify the results;" nowhere does it require the Board to judge the
voters' level of information. Prior decisions which seem to support the
Board's power dealt with prohibitions on conduct which interfered with a
"fair and free" choice, not with a "fully informed and reasoned" choice. 2°
Rules governing the mechanics of an election and actual electioneering, such
as pre-election speeches and handbilling, are clearly distinguishable from a
rule governing the amount of campaign propaganda to which an employee
must be subjected.
On the other hand, the Board, starting from its broad rule-making
power under section 6,21
 might argue that section 9(c), in requiring the
11 Excelsior Underwear Inc., supra note 3, 61 L.R.R.M. at 1221.
111
 A circuit court may be asked to enforce an NLRB bargaining order based on an
employer's refusal to bargain after he supplied the list and lost the election. Or, a
district court may be asked to enforce a Board subpoena against an employer who
refused to comply with the rule. The latter method offers the greater chance for employer
success since it allows use of the numerous arguments against the rule and permits
arguments against what might be viewed as an unwarranted extension of the Board's
subpoena power.
17
 Other arguments are suggested in § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act,
60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1964), which provides that the reviewing court
shall set aside agency action found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, (2) contrary to constitutional right,
such as the rights to due process and privacy, or (3) without observance of procedure
required by law.
18
 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1964).
15
 LMRA § 9(c)(1), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1964).
211 The five decisions cited to justify the rule are distinguishable. The Board, in
Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429, 33 L.R.R.M. 1151, 1152 (1953), pro-
hibited last-day election speeches on company time, since they destroyed the employees'
"free and untrammeled" choice. In Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 69, 50 L.R.R.M.
1532, 1533 (1962), and Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 50 L.R.R.M. 1152
(1962), the Board set aside coercive speeches which ruined the "reasoned, untrammeled"
choice. And, in Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 224, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600,
1601 (1962), and Gummed Prods. Co., 112 N.L.R.B, 1092, 1094, 36 L.R.R.M. 1156,
1157 (1955), the NLRB set aside elections after false handbills impaired the "free and
untrammeled expression of choice," and the "full and complete freedom of choice,"
respectively.
21
 A commentator in 1961 observed that "the NLRB has issued no formal rules
other than those governing the practice and procedure to be followed in cases brought
before the agency." Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor
Relations Board, 70 Yale L.J. 729, 732 (1961). In criticizing the Board's failure to use
its formal rule-making power, Professor Peck cited the legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act and statements of Board members to show that § 6 authorizes the Board to
make formal rules. It should be noted that decisions such as Peerless Plywood Co., supra
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Board to conduct elections, entrusted to it alone the responsibility for con-
ducting fair and free elections. 22 As the most qualified tribunal, the Board
could properly conclude that voter eligibility lists are essential for a fair
and free election, and that employers interfere with employees' rights to
organize when they refuse to supply such lists.
Equal Time.—A companion case to Excelsior, General Elec. Co. (Som-
erset),23
 considered another communication issue—equal time. Here the
union requested equal time to respond to a campaign speech which the
employer made on company time and property. In suggesting that Livingston
Shirt Corp.24 be overruled and Bonwit Teller, Inc. 25 be revived and expanded,
the union proposed a new equal time rule: Unions should be allowed to
campaign on company premises whenever an election is directed, or, at least,
whenever the employer uses the premises to campaign. The Board, however,
noted that the employer's communication advantage had been considerably
lessened by Excelsior. Thus the Board concluded:
In light of the increased opportunities for employees' access to com-
munications which should flow from Excelsior, but with which we
have, as yet, no experience, and because we are not persuaded on the
basis of our current experience that other fundamental changes in
Board policy are necessary to make possible that free and reasoned
choice for or against unionization which the ... Act contemplates
and which it is our function to insure, we prefer to defer any recon-
note 20, espoused interpretative rules which were neither made in compliance with the
APA nor thereafter published in the Code of Federal Regulations. Likewise, the Excelsior
rule was not made in compliance with certain APA requirements such as publication
in the Federal Register of the time and place of the proceedings, the authority under
which the rule was proposed, and the substance of the proposal. However, there was
opportunity for interested persons to file briefs and the rule was published 30 days
before its effective date. The Board's compliance with the two most important provisions
of the APA may indicate that the Board is reacting to the growing criticism of its failure
to make formal rules. See, e.g., NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 859-60
(2d Cir. 1966); International Union of Eng'rs v. NLRB, 353 F.2d 852, 856 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
22 The Board might also cite other policy sections, e.g., LMRA § 1(b), 61 Stat. 136
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1964), which declares that "it is the purpose and policy of
this Act . . . to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference
by either [employees or employers] with the legitimate rights of the other"; or LMRA
§ 101(1), 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964), which states the policy of the
United States to be to protect. "the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing."
23 156 N.L.R.B. No. 112, 61 L.R.R.M. 1222 (1966).
24 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 33 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1953). The Board held that an employer
does not commit an unfair labor practice if he makes a pre-election speech on company
time and premises to his employees and denies the union equal time unless there is
either an unlawful broad no-solicitation or a privileged broad no-solicitation rule. See
S. & H. Grossinger's, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 61 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1965) (unfair labor
practice where coercive speeches plus no-access rule).
25 Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 28 L.R.R.M. 1547 (1951), enforcement
denied, 197 F,2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), which held that an employer who made a privileged
speech was guilty of an unfair labor practice if be denied a request by the union to reply
on the employer's time and property, was overruled in Livingston Shirt Corp., supra
note 24.
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sideration of current Board doctrine in the area of plant access
until after the effects of Excelsior become known. 26
The Excelsior rule will very likely increase the level of knowledge of
employees, and substantially reduce the employer's communication advan-
tage by virtue of the increased union personal contact with employees at
their homes. Yet Excelsior is not the panacea for all equal time problems:
it does not effectively aid the union in overcoming the effects of employer
speeches made during the last few days before an election. Limitations of time
may preclude effective use of names and addresses.
Perhaps time will convince the Board that requests for voter lists and for
equal time reflect very distinct desires. In fact, although voter lists and equal
time decidedly assist unions in their organizing efforts, it is submitted that
the communication advantage problem would have been better solved if the
Board had announced an equal time rule rather than a voter list rule. 27 In-
plant communications would substantially preclude all need for names and
addresses, while names and addresses are an ineffective device with which to
combat last-minute employer speeches.
C. Appropriate Bargaining Unit
Section 9(b) of the LMRA1 directs the Board to decide the appropriate
bargaining unit in each case, 2 yet provides no standard by which to decide
such questions.2 The Board is given broad discretion, guided only by the
express legislative intent "to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exer-
cising the rights guaranteed by this Act. ..." The sole limitation on this dis-
cretion appears in section 9(c) (5), which prohibits the Board from giving
controlling weight to "the extent to which the employees have organized."4
26
 General Elec. Co. (Somerset), supra note 23, 61 L.R.R.M. at 1223.
27
 Professor Bok, in The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 38, 101-02 (1964), suggested
two solutions to the problem of union access to employees. One was to give the union a
voter eligibility list. The other was that in units of 75 or more employees, the employer
should not be allowed to make a speech on company time within 7 days of the election,
unless he gives equal time to the union.
1 Section 9(b) states:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees
the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit,
craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof. . . .
61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
2
 The act does not require the most appropriate or only appropriate unit. See, e.g.,
Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L,R.B. 409, 418, 26 L.R.R.M. 1501, 1506 (1950);
accord, Parsons Inv. Co., 152 N.L.R.B. No. 14, 59 L.R.R.M. 1027 (1965).
3
 A growing number of commentators have analyzed the inconsistent and often
mysterious standards used by the Board in this area. See, e.g., Daykin, Determination of
Appropriate Bargaining Unit by the NLRB: Principles, Rules, and Policies, 27 Fordham
L. Rev. 218 (1958); Grooms, The NLRB and Determination of the Appropriate Unit:
Need for a Workable Standard, 6 William & Mary L. Rev. 13 (1965); Note, The Board
and Section 9(c)(5): Multilocation and Single-Location Units in the Insurance and Retail
Industries, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 811 (1966).
4 Section 9(c)(5) states: "In determining whether a unit is appropriate . . . the
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On the other hand, in recent years the NLRB has held that the act does not
require unions to seek the most comprehensive grouping of employees, recog-
nizing that to require comprehensive units in effect deprives the employees of
their right to self-organization. 5 Although the Board has traditionally used
slightly different rules regarding unit determinations in various industries,
the trend is toward applying uniform rules for all industries.
Insurance District Offices.—The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
has eight district offices in greater Providence. In 1963, the NLRB deter-
mined that one of these district offices, located at Woonsocket, was an appro-
priate bargaining unit.° In a later enforcement proceeding, the First
Circuit refused to enforce the Board's bargaining order against the company?
After examining prior unit determinations in the insurance industry and
failing to find any consistency therein, and taking into account the union's
success in obtaining the Iess-than-comprehensive unit whenever sought, the
court stated it could only conclude that the Board was regarding extent of
organization as controlling.° The Supreme Court reversed, and remanded the
case to the Board.° Although it agreed that the Board had failed to state
the reasons for its unit determination, it could not agree that the "only
possible conclusion" was a section 9(c)(5) violation. The Court further
stated that the Board could consider extent of organization as a factor,
albeit not the controlling one.
In February 1966 the Board announced its Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
decision.10
 It herein reaffirmed its unit determinations in Metropolitan Life
and other related cases, 17 and stated the factors to which it looks in deter-
mining unit questions. They included
the community of interest among the employees sought to be rep-
resented; whether they comprise a homogeneous, identifiable, and
distinct group; whether they are interchanged with other employ-
ees; the extent of common supervision; the previous history of bar-
gaining; and the geographic proximity of various parts of the em-
ployer's operation.' 2
extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling." 61 Stat. 144
(1947), 29 U.S.C.
	 159(c)(5) (1964).
9
 See, e.g., Bagdad Copper Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1496, 54 L.R.R.M. 1264 (1963). See
also Merner Lumber & Hardware Co,, 145 N.L.R.B. 1024, 55 L.R.R.M. 1114 (1964).
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (Woonsocket), 142 N.L.R.B. 491, 53 L.R.R.M. 1096
(1963).
7
 Metropolitan deliberately refused to bargain in order to obtain judicial review of
the unit determination. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1964).
8
 Id. at 911. The Board's decision in Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 960,
49 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1961), marked a change in its insurance industry policy. Since the
anticipated statewide organization in the industry had failed to materialize, the Board
majority stated it would no longer preclude less than employerwide or statewide units.
Id. at 962, 49 L.R.R.M. at 1282. In Metropolitan Life, the First Circuit noted that in
no instance since Quaker City had the Board refused the smaller units sought by unions.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 7, at 910.
9
 NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 442 (1965).
70
 156 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 61 L.R.R.M. 1249 (1966).
11 Id., 61 L.R.R.M. at 1253.
72
 Id., 61 L.R.R.M. at 1251.
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The Board admitted that it considers different factors in varying degrees in
each case. Yet it pointed out that it recognizes the limitation of section
9(c) (5) and denied giving controlling weight to extent of organization."
The Board further stated:
In short, the district office is the insurance industry's analogue of
the single manufacturing plant, or the single store of a retail chain.
Accordingly, if petitioned for, we will ordinarily find a single district
office to be an appropriate bargaining unit for insurance agents, and
will direct an election in that unit, just as we normally do for a
manufacturing plant or a retail store. 14
Thus, the Board has explicitly extended a presumption of appropriateness to
the single insurance district office.
Retail Chainstores.—Prior to 1962, Board policy in retail chainstore
cases had been that the appropriate unit should include employees of all
stores located within the employer's administrative division or geographic
area." In its Say-On Drugs, Inc. decision," the Board modified that policy
and stated it would henceforth apply to retail chainstores "the same unit
policy which we apply to multiplant enterprises in general," that is, a deter-
mination based on all the factors in each case." As the Board stated, the
effect of its holding was simply to add the possibility that a single store
could be an appropriate unit even though not including all employees within
the administrative division." Within a year, in Weis Markets, Inc.," the
Board reaffirmed that the existence of an administrative division is a factor
to be considered: "The fact that the unit sought would include all em-
ployees within such an area has been and continues to be one of the criteria
to which the Board looks as part of its general unit policy.
18 The Board listed these factors in the present case which justified its determination:
Each office is largely autonomous and serves a defined area; each manager exercises
control over the agents in that office; each office's agents enjoy common working condi-
tions and benefits; there is minimal inter-office transfer of employees; there is no bargain-
ing history at the Woonsocket office; there is no union seeking to represent the Woonsocket
agents as part of a larger unit. Id., 61 L.R.R.M, at 1252.
14 Ibid. Moreover, it stated that when two or more groupings are possible, it
would consider the union's request for "there is no reason to compel a labor organiza-
tion to seek representation in a larger unit than the one requested unless the smaller unit
is itself inappropriate." Id., 61 L.R.R.M. at 1252-53.
15 See, e.g., Daw Drug Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 1316, 46 L.R.R.M. 1218 (1960).
18 138 N.L.R.B. 1032, 51 LR.R.M. 1152 (1962). Dissenting member Rodgers pre-
ferred the old rule since it recognized the integrated nature of retail chain operations and
the community of interests of employees in such multistore groups.
17 Id. at 1033, .51 L.R.R.M. at 1153. The Board felt that employees in retail chain-
stores were being impeded in their rights to self-organization by the overemphasis of
"administrative grouping" of stores.
18 In Say-On, even though the employer's administrative division consisted of nine
stores, one store was found to be an appropriate unit based on: authority of the manager ;
minimal inter-store employee interchange; geographic separation; no prior bargaining
history; no union seeking a larger unit.
19 142 N.L.R.B. 708, 53 L.R.R.M. 1141 (1963). Here, the union was granted a
separate citywide unit despite the administrative area being statewide.
20 Id. at 710, 53 L.R.R.M. at 1142.
7 ,20
951
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
However, in a 1964  decision, Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 21 the Board
interpreted Say-On differently. Here the employer owned and operated, under
franchises, ten restaurants in Indianapolis, and the union sought certifica-
tion at one of these. The NLRB concluded that the single restaurant unit
was appropriate. 22
 The Board pointed out that, since Say-On, it was apply-
ing general unit criteria to retail chainstores. However, it then added:
Under such criteria, a single-plant unit is presumptively appropriate
unless it be established that the single plant has been effectively
merged into a more comprehensive unit so as to have lost its in-
dividual identity [citing Dixie Belle Mills, Inc.23 ]. We find no com-
pelling reasons to over-ride the presumption that the single-store
unit sought is appropriate."
In matter-of-fact fashion, the Board had extended the presumptive
appropriateness of a single plant unit to a single retail chainstore unit,
neither discussing nor attempting to justify its significant extension of Say-On
and Dixie Belle. Dissenting members Leedom and Jenkins emphasized
language from Say-On and Weis Markets showing that administrative divi-
sion was still to be considered. They concluded, upon the totality of the
factors, that the single-store unit was inappropriate 25
 In a subsequent unfair
labor practice proceeding the employer was found to have violated section
8 (a) (5) and was ordered to bargain. 26
In its recent decision, NLRB Tr. Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 27
 the
Seventh Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order. It observed that the
Board had departed from its earlier holdings in not considering administra-
tive division as a factor. The Court discussed the factors listed by the Board
and held the unit inappropriate. 28
21 147 N.L.R.B. 551, 56 L.R.R.M. 1246 (1964).
22
 It admitted that the "optimum" unit was citywide, yet found the single restaurant
appropriate because of: the autonomy of each restaurant; the control exercised by each
manager; minimal employee interchange; no bargaining history; no union seeking larger
unit. Id. at 553, 56 L.R.R M. at 1247.
23 In Dixie Belle, the Board found appropriate a single textile manufacturing plant
unit although the employer had another plant twenty miles away. it stated:
A single plant unit, being one of the unit types listed in the statute as appropriate
for bargaining purposes, is presumptively appropriate. Therefore, unless such
plant unit has been so effectively merged into a more comprehensive unit by
bargaining history, or is so integrated with another as to negate its identity, it
is an appropriate unit even though another unit, if requested, might also be
appropriate.
139 N.L.R.B. 629, 631, 51 L.R.R.M. 1344, 1345 (1962).
24 Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., supra note 21, at 551 n.1, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1247 n.1.
25
 The dissenters listed these factors: Close geographical proximity, centralized
managerial policy, substantial employee interchange, identical prices, menus and conditions
of employment at each restaurant. Id. at 553-54, 56 L.R.R.M. 1247-48.
26
 151 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 58 L.R.R.M. 1438 (1965).
27 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1966).
28
 Two other circuits have recently upheld single-store units, where the NLRB did
not use a "presumption of appropriateness." In NLRB v. Merner Lumber & Hardware
Co., 345 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1965), the court held a single-store unit appropriate even
though the employer had another unorganized store four miles away. In NLRB v.
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Retail Store Departments.—Prior to 1965, the NLRB traditionally had
held that the optimum unit in a department store was a storewide grouping
of all employees,2° and had generally refused requests for separate units of
selling and nonselling employees in the absence of a showing of homogeneity
or a distinct community of interests. 3° In 1965, the Board, in three companion
decisions, modified prior policy and allowed separate units of selling and
nonselling employees. 31 In Allied Stores of New York, Inc. (Stearn's Para-
mus)," the Board honored a union's request for three separate units of sell-
ing, nonselling and restaurant workers in the employer's department store.
Although the Board conceded that it has regarded the "optimum" unit as
storewide, it stated that such a grouping is not necessarily the only appropri-
ate one. The Board concluded that it found sufficient differences in the
conditions and interests of the three groups to justify separate units.33
The Allied Stores decision represents a clear departure from prior Board
policy. Although the "community of interest" test still controls, the Board
has broken with prior practice in apparently dropping the presumption that
the "community of interest" for department store employees is storewide. 34
Conclusion.—The obvious trend of the Board decisions is toward smaller
units. 35 To this end, the Board has recently eliminated presumptions against
Primrose Super Mkt., Inc., 353 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1965), the court allowed a unit com-
posed of one of the employer's five stores within Essex County. The Board had followed
Say-Ore's holding that general unit criteria would henceforth be applied to single-store
Units. Primrose Super Mkt., Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 610, 57 L.R.R.M. 1057 (1964).
20
 See, e.g., Robertson Bros. Dept. Store, Inc., 95 N.L.R.B. 271, 28 L.R.R.M. 1335
(1951).
90 In May Dept. Stores Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1007, 1008, 29 L,R.R.M. 1206 (1952),
the Board stated it would only recognize smaller units "who had among themselves a
mutuality of employment interests not shared by other department store employees,
which existed by reason of their singularly different work and training skills." Here the
union was granted a unit of hair stylists employed in the beauty salon department of one
of the employer's stores.
31 The three cases raise identical issues. Only the Allied Stores case will he discussed
herein. Lord & Taylor, 150 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 58 L.R.R.M. 1088 (1965); Arnold Con-
stable Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 58 L.R.R.M. 1086 (1965) ; Allied Stores, Inc., 150
N.L.R.B. No. 79, 58 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1965).
32 Id., 58 L.R.R.M. at 1082. The Board cited May Dept. Stores Co., supra note
30, as an instance where it recognized a smaller unit when working conditions and
interests of employees were distinct.
33 The Board listed these differences among others: Location of work areas, super-
vision, job qualifications, dress, performance standards, wage scales, and the nature of
the work force. Id., 58 L.R.R.M. at 1083-84. Dissenting member Jenkins stressed the
similarities among the groups: Integration of operations, overlapping of duties and
supervision, lack of distinctive job skills, and uniform working conditions and benefits.
Id., 58 L.R.R.M, at 1084.
34 A subsequent decision has cited Allied Stores as rejecting the policy that store-
wide units are exclusively appropriate in the retail industry. The Board stated it does
not consider Allied Stares limited to its facts and treated it as authority for the prop-
osition that Less than storewide units may be appropriate. J. L. Hudson Co., 155 N.L.R.B.
No. 133, 60 L.R.R.M. 1516, 1517 (1965).
99
 Member Brown, in a speech delivered in January 1964, 55 L.R.R.M. 93, stated
that the old rules hindered organizing efforts in the insurance and retail chainstore areas.
Since the Board could find no compelling community of interests requiring broader
units, its new rules gave employees in those industries the same rights as other employees.
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smaller units and applied the single manufacturing plant unit presumption of
appropriateness" to insurance offices" and retail chainstores."
Since extent of organization may be considered as a factor in making
unit findings," the Board seems to find it easier to justify smaller units. 4°
For example, in the situation where a union seeks to organize only the
smaller unit, the Board considers the union's ability to organize in the smaller
group as evidence of homogeneity among those employees. As the act states,
extent of organization cannot be controlling; but if other commonly found
factors such as geographic separation and minimal employee interchange
also exist, the Board has three strong factors to support the distinct nature of
the smaller unit sought.
V. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS AND THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
In June 1965 the Supreme Court handed down two cases, UMW v.
Pennington) and Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,2
representing the latest attempt by the Court to harmonize the long-standing
conflict between the nation's labor laws and the antitrust laws.
In Loewe v. Lawlor (Danbury Hatters),3 the Supreme Court, unable to
find a clear mandate in the Sherman Act, 4 held that unions were subject to
the antitrust law. Congress responded in 1914 with the Clayton Act, which
states in section 6 that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or
article of commerce," and in section 20 that, "nor shall any of the acts
specified [traditional union activities, strikes, picketing and boycotts] be
considered violations of any law of the United States." 5 The Supreme Court,
again failing to find a clear congressional mandate,° held in several cases?
36
 Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., supra note 23.
87 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra note 10.
38
 Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., supra note 21. In addition, the Board in P.
Ballantine & Sons, 141 N.L.R.B. 1103, 52 L.R.R.M. 1453 (1963) treated a single branch
liquor distributorship as equivalent to a single manufacturing plant, and ruled it
presumptively appropriate.
39 NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra note 9.
40 Allied Stores, Inc., supra note 31, represents the most striking example of the
new liberality. The Board found distinct homogeneity among (selling and nonselling)
employees for reasons which it had never previously regarded as sufficient to justify
separate units.
1 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
2 381 U.S. 676 (1965). These two cases have received much comment in the law
reviews. See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1965, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 823
(1965) ; Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 659 (1965) ; Summers, Labor Law in the Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75
Yale L.J. 59 (1965) ; Comment, 34 Fordham L. Rev. 286 (1965) ; Note, 7 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 158 (1965) ; 41 Notre Dame Law. 221 (1965).
8 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
4
 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
6
 38 Stat. 731, 738 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964).
6
 For a legislative history, see Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act 3-54 (1930) ;
Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930).
7 E.g., Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37
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that the antitrust laws still applied to unions. In the early 1930's Congress,
by enacting several labor relations acts, clearly stated that the national
policy was one of encouragement of union activity. 8
The Supreme Court, in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,° recognized the
meaning of the policies enunciated by Congress and gave unions the right to
eliminate all labor market competition, regardless of its effect on the product
market, because such activity could not be considered "the kind of' curtail-
ment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act."'° Then, in United
States v. Hutcheson,ll the Supreme Court held that no union engaged in a
valid labor dispute would be subject to the antitrust laws. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter expressed it:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with
non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 are not to be
distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom,
the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the
end of which the particular union activities are the means. 12
However, in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, 1BEW,' 3 the Court elaborated
on combining with non-labor groups and held that, although unions acting
in their own self-interest could legitimately pursue the activities in question,
when they combined with the conspiring employers, they lost their immunity
from the Sherman Act. Despite certain differences of opinion 14 as to the true
facts of Allen Bradley, it is clear that the Supreme Court treated the case as
one in which the employers used the union as a shield against antitrust
liability. 18
This was the state of the law preceeding the instant decisions. If past
law was cloudy, the Pennington and Jewel Tea decisions, due to the unusual
split and proliferation of concurring and dissenting opinions," may only
serve to further muddy the waters.
(1927); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1920). For an excellent
discussion, see Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of
Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 Yale L.J. 14 (1963).
8 See Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15
(1964); NLRA, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1964).
9 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
19 Id. at 504.
11 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
12 Id. at 232.
13 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
14 In
 the lower court, Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, MEW, 41 F. Supp. 727, 732
(S.D.N.Y, 1941), it appears clear that the union was the motivating force behind the
conspiracy. See generally Bernhardt, The Allen Bradley Doctrine: An Accommodation of
Conflicting Policies, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1094 (1962).
16 See 325 U.S. at 811, where the Court stated, "A business monopoly is no less
such because a union participates, and such participation is a violation of the Act."
16 The Court split into three identical groups in both cases. Mr. Justice White,
speaking for Chief Justice Warren and justice Brennan, wrote the opinion of the Court
in Pennington, finding a violation of the antitrust laws; and, while there was no majority
opinion in Jewel Tea, Mr. Justice White, speaking for the same Justices, would find no
loss of exemption in this case. Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Clark
would find the union violated the Sherman Act in both cases. Justices Goldberg, Harlan
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In Pennington, trustees of the United Mine Workers Welfare and
Retirement Fund brought suit against Phillips Coal Company to recover
royalty payments due the fund under a wage agreement between Phillips
Coal and the UMW. Phillips Coal flied a cross-claim alleging that the UMW
and the larger coal companies had concluded a wage agreement in 1950, the
ultimate purpose of which was to eliminate the smaller companies and
consequently leave a larger market for the surviving larger companies.
Phillips specifically alleged that the union had initially promised to curtail
its opposition to rapid mechanization and to impose the same wage scale on
all the companies without regard to their degree of mechanization or their
ability to pay. The larger companies had promised increased wages and
greater royalty payments into the fund as productivity increased with auto-
mation; and the union, in turn, had further bound itself to impose these
increases in wages and fund payments on alI other companies. Phillips
claimed that this agreement was in violation of the Sherman Act. 17 The jury
returned a verdict for Phillips, and the trial court awarded treble damages
to Phillips against the union. The court of appeals affirmed, 18 and the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. In an opinion written by Mr. Justice White,
the Court held that the union lost its exemption from the Sherman Act when
it agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other
bargaining units.1 °
In Jewel Tea, after prolonged negotiations, seven affiliate members of
Amalgamated Butchers concluded an agreement with Associated, representing
a substantial number of retail meat dealers in the Chicago area, which agree-
ment prohibited the sale of fresh meat before nine A.M. and after six P.M.
Threatened with a strike, Jewel Tea signed a contract containing the same
restrictions and shortly thereafter brought suit against the union and As-
sociated under the Sherman Act to invalidate this restrictive provision. The
complaint alleged that Associated and the union had conspired to prevent the
sale of fresh meat at retail after six P.M. and that the Jewel Tea markets
were particularly restricted by the provision since they were primarily self-
service stores that remained open evenings without butchers. The trial judge
found no evidence of a conspiracy and no unreasonable restraint of trade.
After the court of appeals reversed on the ground that a conspiracy could be
inferred from the contract between the union and Associated,2° the Supreme
Court granted certiorari and, while there was no majority opnion, held that
the union had not lost its exemption from the Sherman Act.
and Stewart, dissenting in Pennington and concurring in Jewel Tea, would find no
violation in either case.
17 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §1 1-7 (1964).
18
 Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963).
19 The Court actually reversed on two grounds. (1) Evidence was admitted to the
effect that the conspiracy was accomplished by influencing public officials, and the
Court, citing Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961), stated: "joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the
antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition." 381 U.S. at 670. (2) The
trial court had erroneously instructed the jury to include in its award the amount of
damages Phillips sustained as a result of the Secretary of Labor's action.
20 Jewel Tea Co. v. Associated Food Retailers, 331 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1964).
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Mr. Justice White, writing the opinion of the Court in Pennington, found
that the conspiracy to impose wages upon another bargaining unit was not
only not a protected agreement under the labor laws but was explicitly for-
bidden by the antitrust laws. In disposing of the labor law argument, Justice
White argued that bargaining operates on a unit basis and hence it is in-
appropriate for one unit to impose standards on another unit. Also, the
union's obligation to its members would be best served if the union retained
the ability to respond to each bargaining situation as the individual cir-
cumstances might warrant without being strait-jacketed by prior agreements
with a favored employer. Finally, Justice White cited the Board's con-
demnation of an employer conditioning his willingness to bargain upon the
union's promise to organize the employer's competitors.2 '
In his examination of the antitrust laws, Justice White first analogized
the present facts—i.e., the agreement to set a wage level which marginal
producers could not meet—to an agreement between an employer and union
to impose a higher wage scale on a second employer. Justice White considered
the latter as a clear violation of the antitrust laws, and the former as suffering
from even a more basic defect, "without regard to predatory intention or
effect in the particular case,"22 in that the union had surrendered its freedom
of action with respect to its bargaining policy, contrary to antitrust policy. 23
Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissent, reads the opinion of the Court as
affirming the principles of Allen Bradley and
tells the trial judge: First. On the new trial the jury should be
instructed that if there were an industry-wide collective bargaining
agreement whereby employers and the union agreed on a wage scale
that exceeded the financial ability of some operators to pay and that
if it was made for the purpose of forcing some employers out of
business, the union as well as the employers who participated in the
arrangement with the union should be found to have violated the
antitrust laws. Second. An industry-wide agreement containing these
features is prima fade evidence of a violation. 24
In a significant footnote, Justice Douglas points out that simultaneous action
is not necessary and that successive negotiations could be a violation. 25
Mr. Justice Goldberg dissented on the grounds that mandatory collec-
tive bargaining subjects should be free of judicial scrutiny for antitrust
violations and the national labor law policy supports uniform wage agree-
ments. His major criticism centered on the fact that the effect of the Court's
holding would be to place collective bargaining agreements under the scrutiny
of juries and judges. It would leave to them to decide whether the union
was pursuing a legitimate self-interest in imposing uniformity or was
21 The value of such Board decisions for the proposition that the labor law policy
does not favor bargaining about other units appears doubtful for, as Justice Goldberg
points out in UMW v. Pennington, supra note 1, at 725 n.25, there is nothing in those
decisions precluding a voluntary agreement to do so.
22 Id. at 668.
23 Ibid.
24 Id. at 672-73.
25 Id. at 673.
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conspiring with an employer to force competitors out of business. In Justice
Goldberg's view, Congress took this decision from the courts when it involves
mandatory subjects of bargaining.
In regard to the labor law argument, Justice Goldberg felt that the
opinion of the Court ignored the realities of the bargaining table as well as
the sanction for such uniformity in the labor relation acts. 26 Since multi-
employer agreements were clearly permissible, he felt that the Court was
looking to form rather than substance. Moreover, the insidious conspiracy
was a clearly announced union objective. 27
In Jewel Tea, Mr. Justice White announced the judgment of the Court
and in an opinion in which Justices Warren and Brennan joined, made
collective bargaining agreements between a single employer and a union
subject to the scrutiny of the antitrust laws. Although noting that the lower
court had found no conspiracy between the union and the employer as-
sociation, as had been found in Pennington, Justice White continued,
The fact that the parties to the agreement are but a single employer
and the unions representing its employees does not compel immunity
for the agreement. We must consider the subject matter of the
agreement in the light of the national labor policy. 28
Although Justice White agrees that "the national labor policy expressed in
the National Labor Relations Act places beyond the reach of the Sherman
Act union-employer agreements on when, as well as how long, employees
must work," 28
 nevertheless, in balancing the interests involved, the union
objective must be "intimately belated"" to wages, hours and working condi-
tions and of "immediate and direct" 3 ' concern to the union. Although the
fact that both parties must bargain about such matters weighs heavily in
favor of antitrust exemption, Mr. Justice White evidently does not believe
that all mandatory subjects are exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny.
Mr. Justice Goldberg, in his concurring opinion, proposes a broader test:
" [U]nions and employers are exempt from the operations of the antitrust
laws for activities involving subjects of mandatory bargaining. . . ." 32 He did
not join in Justice White's opinion because
[Mr. Justice White] apparently draws lines among mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining, presumably based on a judicial determination
28
 In the preamble to the NLRA (Wagner Act), one of the objectives of labor is
stated as being "the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within
and between industries." 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 151 (1964).
27 See Baratz, The Union and The Coal Industry 62-74 (1955).
28 381 U.S. at 689. Prior to this, Justice White had held that primary jurisdiction
in such cases did not rest with the Board since (1) courts themselves have experience
in classifying bargaining subjects; (2) it is futile to send the case to an administrative
agency when the case must ultimately be decided on a question of law; and (3) the
Board has no available procedure for determining mandatory subjects unless connected
with an unfair labor practice charge of a refusal to bargain. Id. at 686-87.
29 Id. at 691.
no Id. at 689.
al Id. at 691.
32 Id. at 735.
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of their importance to the worker, and states that not all agreements
resulting from collective bargaining based on mandatory subjects
of bargaining are immune from the antitrust laws, even absent
evidence of union abetment of an independent conspiracy of
employers.33
Justice Goldberg would consider union activity directed at its interest in
preserving the job security of its over-all membership to be exempt from
antitrust liablity.
"To believe that labor union interests may not properly extend
beyond mere direct job and wage competition is to ignore not only
economic and social realities so obvious as not to need mention, but
also the graphic lessons of American labor union history!" 34 (Ci-
tation omitted.)
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, would find a clear Allen Bradley
violation, contrary to the finding of the trial court, since "in saying that
there was no conspiracy, the District Court failed to give any weight to the
collective agreement itself as evidence of a conspiracy and to the context in
which it was written." 35 Thus, Justice Douglas did not reach the question of
the balancing of interests raised by Justice White's opinion.
In both of these cases, the question before the Court was whether the
activities in question were within the labor exemption to the Sherman Act,
rather than the ultimate question of Sherman Act liability. Justice White
does not enunciate this distinction as clearly in Pennington as he does in
Jewel Tea. Nevertheless, in Pennington, he not only found a loss of exemp-
tion, but also a Sherman Act violation, since he ruled that the union motions
for a directed verdict and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict were cor-
rectly denied.3°
Pennington is, on its facts, a clear Allen Bradley situation. But Justice
White goes further than Allen Bradley in finding that the mere imposition
of a wage rate on another bargaining unit is a per se Sherman Act violation
"without regard to predatory intention or effect in the particular case." 37
This position has been criticized,38 and one commentator has argued that since
the concurring judges viewed the facts as a clear Allen Bradley situation,
Justice White's position does not represent the majority view." In addition,
in the one case which has applied Pennington, Republic Prods., Inc. v. Ameri-
can Fed'n of Musicians," the district court emphasized the facts involved in
Pennington, including the intent to drive competitors out of business, stating:
[But its reason for so holding,] as I read the Pennington opinion,
was the Allen Bradley principle, i.e., that the union had entered
33 Id. at 727.
34 Id. at 728.
35
 Id. at 737.
36 381 U.S. at 661.
37
 Id. at 668.
38 Handler, supra note 2, at 836.
39 Meltzer, supra note 2, at 721.
40 245 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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into a conspiracy with large employers to impose a high wage scale
upon smaller employers who could not afford to pay it, for the pur-
pose of putting the smaller employers out of business."
The question also arises whether the loss of the exemption auto-
matically means a Sherman Act violation. Although Justice White found a
Sherman Act violation in Pennington on its facts, he implies in Jewel Tea
that the answer is "no." In Jewel Tea, he states that, after loss of an exemp-
tion, "whether there would be a violation of §§ 1 and 2 would then depend
on whether the elements of a conspiracy in restraint of trade or an attempt
to monopolize had been proved," and in deciding this question, "the rule of
reason would apply. "42
One of the chief difficulties engendered by the Pennington case is what
evidence will be sufficient to withstand a union motion for a directed verdict 43
On this question, Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion assumes im-
portance, for he states that a collective bargaining agreement itself can be
prima fade evidence of a Sherman Act violation." Justice White, in a foot-
note,45
 admits that indirect evidence of a conspiracy is sufficient to find a
violation of the Sherman Act. Thus, although the Court acknowledges that
unions may pursue uniform wage policies, 46 the union is submitting itself to
the danger of having a judge or jury inferring from such uniformity a
conspiracy to drive an employer's competitors out of business. This may
result in more bellicose bargaining attitudes by unions, as Justice Goldberg
suggests. At least a union will be forced to make public from the outset that
it is imposing or seeking uniform wages from an industry or else forego its
traditional aim of eliminating competition in the labor market."
The single employer situation, Jewel Tea, raises the problem of which
mandatory subjects of bargaining will be exempted from the antitrust laws.
Justice White makes clear in Jewel Tea that the extent of the exemption is
not co-extensive with the area of mandatory bargaining," the latter being
but a factor to be considered in the balancing of interests. Professor Handler
argues that the proper interpretation of Jewel Tea is that:
Agreements on all mandatory subjects are exempt and the test of
whether an agreement falls within this exempted category is whether
the subject is intimately related to the traditional union objectives
and is of direct and immediate concern to the union. 49
Whether the Court will in the future adopt Justice Goldberg's view
that unions have direct interests outside of the particular employees for
41 Id. at 480.
42 381 U.S. at 693,
43 Id. at 693 n.6.
44
 381 U.S. at 673.
45 Id. at 665 n.2.
46
 Ibid.
41 Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws—A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev.
252, 254 (1965).
48 381 U.S. at 689. See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 724.
49 Handler, supra note 2, at 831.
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whom the union is bargaining at the time (e.g., job security for other union
members in different bargaining units), or the narrower limits set by Justice
White, is unclear, since Justice Douglas never reached the problem.
The possible implications of these decisions are numerous. One of the
chief effects will be at the bargaining table: Employers will no longer be
able to discuss the union attitude toward imposing the same demands on their
competitors, for a jury might infer a conspiracy from such a discussion. What
of the position of non-formal employer associations seeking to impose uniform
wages on the union?" Most favored nation clauses may be doomed. And,
what may be disasterous to the process of collective bargaining, the threat
of antitrust liability will preclude a dynamic collective bargaining, which,
only so recently in Fibreboard," it appeared that the Supreme Court was
seeking to encourage.
VI. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Board Procedure
Two recent decisions have introduced significant changes into unfair
labor practice proceedings. The Supreme Court set the tempo in Local 283,
UAW v. Scofield:' Confronted with the right of a successful party to inter-
vene in an appeal from a Board decision, the Court unanimously upheld the
right of both charging and charged parties to intervene. Dealing first with
a successful charged party, the Court reasoned that, absent the right to
intervene, the charged party would be hard pressed to obtain relief from an
adverse decision rendered upon appeal. 2 Therefore, to insure the charged
party an adequate opportunity to prevent an adverse decision, he should be
allowed to intervene
With regard to the charging party, the Court rejected the Board's con-
tention that the charging party has the same status as any other member of
the public, and hence is adequately represented by the Board, as the cus-
todian of public rights. The right to protect the public interest, the Court
reasoned, does not preclude the rights of private parties. The LMRA gives
rise to "private rights" after the issuance of a complaint, 4 and the ability to
intervene is a necessary prerequisite to the preservation of these private
rights.
This decision paved the way for the Third Circuit decision in Leeds &
Northrup Co. v. NLRB. 5 In Leeds & Northrup, the employer filed an unfair
50
 See, e.g., Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir.
1965).
51
 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964).
1
 382 U.S. 205 (1965).
2
 If the charged party had an order entered against him on the circuit level, an at-
tempt to bring another action to obtain relief from the decision would run into the
obstacles of stare decisis and comity. Id. at 213; see Siegel Co. v. NLRB, 340 F.2d 309
(2d Cir. 1965).
3
 Another factor which the Court considered favorable to intervention by a charged
party is the prevention of duplicate proceedings. Also, the Court stated that intervention
would not bring about excessive delay nor be a complicating factor. 382 U.S. at 212, 215.
4
 Id. at 220.
5
 Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1966).
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labor practice charge and the Regional Director issued a complaint. While
awaiting a hearing, the Regional Director and the union entered into an
informal settlement agreement. The charging party objected to this settle-
ment and sought an evidentiary hearing on his objections. The Regional
Director denied this request and the General Counsel followed suit. For all
practical purposes, under the former procedure, this would end the employer's
right to redress, since the acceptance of the settlement agreement would
mean a dismissal of the complaint, with no right to judicial review. 6
The employer protested the denial of judicial review, contending that
the General Counsel's action was final and therefore judicially reviewable.
Otherwise, he argued, an anomolous situation would arise, whereby the choice
of a procedural course by the Regional Director or General Counsel could
foreclose review.'
The court denied the right of the Board, through delegation, to set up
a system which denies the right to a hearing. The court pointed out that, even
in cases which preclude judicial review, there is always a right to a hearing.
Furthermore, the court stated, for all practical purposes, the action by the
General Counsel was a final disposition by an administrative agency. There-
fore, once the Regional Director issues a complaint, the statutory scheme con-
6
 The usual Board procedure is as follows. The basic step in obtaining redress for an
unfair labor practice is to file a charge with the Regional Director. 29 C.F.R. § 101.2
(1965). The Regional Director has complete discretion over whether a complaint will
issue on the unfair labor practice charge. 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1965). While no court has
ever overturned a Regional Director's decision not to issue a complaint, one court has
stated that in a "most extreme situation" it might pierce the immunity. Local 954, Retail
Clerks Ass'n v. Rothman, 298 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1962). if the Regional Director refuses
to issue the charge, the only remedy from his action is an appeal to the General Counsel,
whose decision is final and unappealable. 29 C.F.R. § 101.6 (1965); see, e.g., Wellington
Mill Div., West Point Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 579, 590 (4th Cir. 1964); NLRB v.
Local 182, Teamsters Union, 314 F.2d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 1963). Under prior procedure, once
the complaint issued, the Regional Director was empowered to act in diverse ways. He
could withdraw the complaint prior to the hearing before the trial examiner. 29 CF.R.
§ 102.18 (1965). He could also enter into a settlement with the charged party and
dismiss the complaint despite the charging party's objections. Local 282, Teamsters
Union v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1964). The settlement could be formal or
informal. The former would be ratified by the Board, 29 C.F.R. § 101.9(b) (1965),
the latter by the General Counsel. Only the formal settlement was subject to judicial
review before the Leeds & Northrup decision. Once the proceeding entered into the
adjudicatory phase, the Regional Director would lose authority over the complaint
to the trial examiner. 29 C.F.R. § 102.9 (1965). The trial examiner would hold a
hearing at which the charged party, the charging party, and the Regional Director
would be accorded formal recognition as parties to the action with all the rights therein.
See 29 C.F.R. § 102.8 (1965) (definition of "party") ; 29 C.F.R. § 102.38 (1965) (rights
of a party at the hearing). The trial examiner would forward his findings and recommen-
dations to the Board at the conclusion of the hearing. 29 C.F.R. § 102.45 (1965). All the
aforementioned parties would be afforded the same rights before a Board hearing as they
had before the trial examiner. 29 C.F.R. § 102.46 (1965). Only an aggrieved party could
appeal the Board's decision. Scofield, of course, has changed this by extending the right
to intervene an appeal to successful parties.
7 The main contention of the charging party was that, were a formal settlement
made under the same facts in this case, he would have been entitled to judicial review.
Here, merely because the Regional Director decided to settle this informally, he has been
deprived of this right.
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templates Board action and the charging party is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing upon his objection to the proposed settlement, be it an informal or
formal settlement. This, the court felt, would insure that a record would be
created in order to protect private rights on review and to prevent their arbi-
trary eradication.8
These two decisions may have a significant impact on the application of
the Administative Procedure Acts to NLRB proceedings. In Local 282,
Teamsters Union v. NLRB," the Second Circuit rejected the union's argu-
ment that the APA gave it the right to a hearing:
Section 5(b) does not refer to all the "persons entitled to a notice
of an agency hearing" ... [but] refers only to "interested parties."
In this context "interest" means a legally recognized private interest
and not simply a possible pecuniary benefit. . .
The court there further pointed out that the NLRA vindicates only a public
interest and does not create private rights. The Supreme Court's rejection of
this reasoning in Scofield suggests that the APA must be given great weight
in determining the right to a hearing.
Concerning the type of hearing that must be given, the Third Circuit
required that, in the Leeds & Northrup situation, it be "evidentiary.
Apparently this is the type of hearing that, minimally, will provide a record
for review" and provide the charging party the right to prove or amplify the
charges which might enable his complaint to prevail before the Board or the
reviewing forum. 14 The precise form of the hearing will, however, likely
depend upon the type of unfair labor practice charge.
Thus, there has been a basic shift in the position and power of the
General Counsel. The onus is now upon him to undertake a more thorough
investigation and screening before determining whether a charge will become
a complaint. In addition, the ability of the Board to make settlements, espe-
cially informally, has been radically changed.
8
 Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, supra note 5, at 533.
9 The Administrative Procedure Act requirements, 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1006 (1964), apply to all agencies unless expressly superseded by subsequent legislation
respecting a particular agency, 60 Stat. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1011 (1964), or unless
expressly excluded from the APA definition of "agency," 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a) (1964).
10 339 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1964).
11 Id. at 800.
12 "[O]nce a complaint has issued, the charging party is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing upon its objections to the proposed settlement agreement." 357 F.2d at 533.
IS Ibid.; see NLRA	 10(c), 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(c), (f) (1964);
APA §§ 7, 8, 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1006(d), 1007(h) (1964).
14 The APA allows every party the right to present evidence, to rebut evidence, and
to cross-examine whenever these are necessary for full disclosure of facts. APA § 7, 60
Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c) (1964). Under the rules of the NLRB, all parties
at hearings must have the opportunity to present their respective position and evidence.
29 C.F.R. §§ 101.20, .31, .34 (1965).
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B. Duty to Bargain
I. Employer's Decision to Subcontract
In Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 1 the Supreme Court held
that "contracting out of ... work previously performed by employees in the
bargaining unit, which the employees were capable of continuing to perform
—is covered by the phrase 'terms and conditions of employment' within the
meaning of § 8(d)."2 Therefore, the employer violated section 8(a)(5) 8
by unilaterally deciding to subcontract work without bargaining with the
union.
The Board, however, has not read Fibreboard to require bargaining in
all subcontracting cases. In rejecting a per se approach, 4 the Board in
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (Mansfield Plant) 5 set forth criteria by which it
is to be decided whether the particular subcontracting involved is a subject
of mandatory bargaining. If the following tests are met there is no need to
bargain: (1) The contracting out is motivated solely by economic considera-
tions; (2) the contracting out is a customary method by which the employer
does business; (3) the particular subcontracting does not vary significantly
in kind or degree from the subcontracting of work under the employer's past
practice; (4) the union had an opportunity to bargain about changes in
existing subcontracting practices at general negotiatory meetings; and (5)
the subcontracting had no demonstrable adverse impact on employees in
the unit.° Since Westinghouse met these tests, there was no need to bargain
about its subcontracting in these instances. The Board also listed those cases
in which bargaining about subcontracting is required under Fibreboard:
(1) The contracting out involves a departure from previously established
operating practices; or, (2) it effects a change in conditions of employment;
or, (3) it results in a significant impairment of job tenure, employment
security or reasonably anticipated work opportunities for those in the bar-
gaining unit.?
It is clear, however, that the Board did not intend that all five of the
Westinghouse criteria be met in every case. Thus, in two American Oil Co.
cases,8
 Central Soya Co.,° and Fafnir Bearing Co.," the Board relied on only
two criteria, namely, the employer's past practice of subcontracting and no
379 U.S. 203 (1964).
2 Id, at 210.
Section 8(a) (5) of the LMRA states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees. . . .
61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.	 158(a) (1964).
4 The Board cited Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 305, 57 L.R.R.M. 1279 (1964).
5 150 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 58 L.R.R.M. 1257 (1965).
6 Id., 58 L.R.R.M. at 1259.
7 Id., 58 L.R.R.M, at 1258.
8
 152 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 59 L.R.R.M. 1007 (1965); 151 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 58 L.R.R.M.
1412 (1965). In a third American Oil Co. case, 155 N.L.R.B. No. 64, 60 L.R.R.M.
1369 (1965), it appears that all five criteria of Westinghouse were met.
9 151 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 58 L.R.R.M. 1667 (1965).
10 151 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 58 L.R.R.M. 1397 (1965).
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significant detriment to unit employees. The Board may have gone a step
further in General Tube Co.". where it relied on one factor alone, that of no
substantial impact on the unit employees.
Where it has been the employer's past practice to subcontract, it ap-
pears that the Board assumes that the union has had an opportunity to
bargain about such matters. The Board relied on this along with "no
significant detriment" in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (Bettis Atomic Plant). 12
In American Oil Co., 13 the Board held that bargaining with respect to
subcontracting is not limited to those periods when the parties are engaged
in negotiations for a new agreement but rather is a continuing duty through-
out the life of the contract in the absence of a specific contract clause covering
such a matter."
Thus, insofar as subcontracting is concerned, it appears that the Board
will not apply a per se rule,ls but will look at the circumstances involved,
and, especially, whether the subcontract has caused a significant detriment
to the unit employees involved.
The Board has, however, relied on the Supreme Court decision in Fibre-
board in its treatment of partial termination cases. In the original Board
decision in Royal Plating & Polishing Co.," the Board had found a section
8(a) (5) violation. An employer for strong economic reasons unilaterally
decided to terminate operations in one of his two plants and hence gave an
irrevocable ninety-day option on the plant to the Newark Housing Authority
(which had eminent domain power). Although involved in contract negotia-
tions with the union, he failed to notify it of his actions. The Authority
picked up the option and the employer closed his plant. In a split decision,' 7
the Board found that by failing to discuss the decision to terminate (as well
as the effects of the partial termination) the employer violated section
8(a)(5).
The Third Circuit remanded's this holding to the Board for recon-
11 151 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 58 L.R.R.M. 1496 (1965). That past practices may not be
crucial, see Westinghouse Elec. Corp, (Bettis Atomic Plant), 153 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 59
L.R.R.M. 1355, 1358 n.15 (1965).
12 153 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 59 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1965). Chairman McCollough dissented,
finding detriment in that the subcontracting meant that laid-off employees would not be
recalled.
13
 151 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 58 L.R.R.M. 1412 (1965).
14
 The Board has also allowed a waiver in this area. See International Shoe Co.,
151 No. 78, 58 L.R.R.M, 1483 (1965). The Board has also allowed subcontracting
in the face of an economic strike if such an arrangement was temporary. See Empire
Terminal Warehouse Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 125, 58 L.R.R.M. 1589 (1965), aff'd sub
nom. Local 745, IBT v. NLRB, 61 L.R.R.M. 2065 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Shell Oil Co., 149
N.L.R.B. 283, 57 L.R.R.M. 1271 (1964).
15 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (Mansfield Plant), supra note 5, 58 L.R.R.M. at
1258.
13
 148 N.L.R.B. 545, 57 L.R.R,M. 1006 (1964).
17 Id. at 546 n.2, 57 L.R.R.M. at 1006-07 n,2. Member Leedom based his concur-
rence solely on the employer's failure to discuss the effects of the shutdown. Member
Jenkins found that the failure to disclose the facts constituted sham bargaining and hence
would not reach the question of bargaining over the decision or the effects of the termina-
tion. Id. at 551, 57 L.R.R.M. at 1008.
18 See 152 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 59 L.R.R.M. at 1141.
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sideration in light of the Supreme Court decision in Textile Workers v.
Darlington Mfg. Co. 19 Upon remand, the Board again found a section
8(a)(5) violation,20
 relying on the holding and rationale of Fibreboard.
The Board indicated its awareness that the union may not always be able
to propose a solution for the employer's economic difficulties; but, neverthe-
less, the Board determined that the national labor policy, as expressed in
Fibreboard, reflects a congressional decision that chances of reaching a
solution are good enough to warrant subjecting the issues to the process of
collective bargaining."
Addressing themselves to the Third Circuit remand, the Board felt22
that Darlington had no application to the case before them. Noting that
Darlington concerned a section 8(a) (3) violation, the Board stated: "[W]e
perceive no reasonable basis on which it can be said that the Court's decision
[Darlington] requires a holding that a partial closing is not a subject for
scrutiny under section 8(a) (5)."23
Again, in Carmichael Floor Covering Co., 24 an employer who had sub-
contracted carpet installation work argued that there was no motive of
"chilling unionism" and hence no section 8(a) (5) violation, citing Darling-
ton. The Board found the controlling principle in Fibreboard, stating,
In Darlington the Court was concerned with an issue of discrimina-
tory motivation and its application, if any, to a complete or partial
closing of a plant. The charge in the instant case, however, relates
solely to Respondents' statutory duty to bargain. The alleged viola-
tion concerns the consequences of their failure to fulfill such duty
regardless of the existence of any discriminatory motivation. 28
The Board has recognized, however, that unions may bargain away
their right to discuss decisions to terminate various operations of the em-
ployer. Thus, in Ador Corp.28 and Druwhit Metal Prods. Co., 27 the Board
held that under the management rights clause of the contract, the union
had waived its right to bargain about employer decisions to terminate opera-
tions. The effect of a broad arbitration clause on such decisions is far from
clear.28
The circuit courts have been far from uniform in their understanding of
Fibreboard. In NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 2° the Fifth Circuit supported
the Board's view of Fibreboard. In this case an employer, who had been
19 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
20 152 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 59 L.R.R.M. 1141 (1965).
21 Id., .59 L.R.R.M. at 1142.
22 Member Jenkins had grave doubts that the Board's position on the inapplicability
of Darlington to partial termination cases is correct, but he did not reach that question,
relying on his prior position, supra note 17. Id., 59 L.R.R.M. at 1143.
23 Id., 59 L.R.R.M. at 1142.
24 155 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 60 L.R.R.M. 1364 (1965).
25 Id., 60 L.R.R.M. at 1366.
25 160 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 58 L.R.R.M. 1280 (1965).
2T 153 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 59 L.R.R.M. 1359 (1965).
28 See p. 912 supra.
29 351 F,2d 74 (5th Cir. 1965).
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delivering his own fuel product as part of his overall operation, unilaterally
decided to contract this work out without notification to, or consultation
with, the union with which it was negotiating a first contract. The Board
found violations of sections 8(a) (3) and (1) by the employer, as well as a
section 8(a) (5) violation. 3°
Although disagreeing as to the appropriate remedy, 31 the Fifth Circuit
upheld the Board's findings. Speaking of the section 8(a) (5) violation, the
court stated:
Of course it is now clear that the Board was correct in finding that
the Employer must negotiate the decision to subcontract. Quite
apart from anti-union conduct, or here the claim of economic justi-
fication, the decision to subcontract work is a subject for mandatory
bargaining. Any doubt which may have existed was put to rest by
Fibreboard. . . 32
The court felt that the substitution of employees herein involved dearly
fell within Fibreboard.
This decision is in conflict with the Eighth Circuit's decision in the
much litigated NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc 3' case. Again, as in American
Mfg. Co., in order to effectuate cost savings, the employer unilaterally de-
cided to terminate his milk distribution system, and allow independent con-
tractors to perform such distribution. He therefore discharged his driver-
salesmen and sold the trucks to independent contractors. However, as had
not been the case in American Mfg. Co., here there was already a contract
in existence and there was no section 8(a) (3) violation ruled on at the
Board level."
The Board found that Adams had violated sections 8(a) (5) and (1)
by his unilateral decision.35 The Eighth Circuit reversed the Board." After
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the circuit
court and remanded for reconsideration in light of Fibreboard.37 In re-
affirming its original holding, the Eighth Circuit distinguished its case from
Fibreboard on the facts involved. The court stated:
[T]here was a change in the capital structure of Adams Dairy
which resulted in a partial liquidation and a recoup of capital
investment. To require Adams to bargain about its decision to close
3° American Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 815, 51 L.R.R.M. 1392 (1962), Member Leedom
would find no § 8(a) (5) violation without the discriminatory § 8(a) (3) finding; and
member Rodgers dissented, refusing to find either a 8(a) (3) or (5) violation.
31 See p. 970 infra.
52 NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., supra note 29, at 80.
33
 137 N.L.R.B. 815, 50 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1962), enforcement denied, 322 F.2d 553
(8th Cir. 1963), vacated and remanded, 379 U.S. 644 (1964), modified, 350 F.2d 108
(8th Cir. 1965), Cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
34
 The trial examiner had found a § 8(a) (3) violation. 137 N.L.R.B. at 828, 50
L.R.R.M. at 1283.
35 137 N.L.R.B. at 81$, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1281. Member Leedom concurred on the
ground that the employer had to bargain about the effects of his decision.
36 322 F.2d at 553.
37
 379 U.S. at 644.
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out the distribution end of its business would significantly abridge
its freedom to manage its own affairs. Bargaining is not contemplated
in this area under the history and usage of Section 8(a) (5).38
It is submitted that even if Fibreboard is to be limited to its facts, the
essential facts in Fibreboard, substitution of employees to effectuate economic
savings, are clearly present in Adams Dairy. The Adams court's argument
that in its case there was a basic operational change and a change in the
capital structure of the business in addition to the substitution of employees,
has no crucial importance in the realm of national labor policy. Further, in
Adams Dairy, the Eighth Circuit buttressed its opinion by using Darlington.
Noting that there was no anti-union animus in the Adams case, the court
held that there could therefore be no section 8(a) ( 5) violation, since
Darlington requires, in a partial termination context, the finding of a motive
to "chill unionism." Such a holding is due to the court's failure to distinguish
between section 8(a) ( 5) and section 8(a) (3). As the Fifth Circuit in
American Mfg. Co. noted, section 8(a) (5) violations are "quite apart from
anti-union conduct. . . ."39 In Darlington, the Supreme Court itself acknowl-
edged that there was no section 8(a) ( 5) violation alleged or argued in
the case. 4 °
The Eighth Circuit also rejected the Board's holding in a second partial
termination case, NLRB v. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc:"
Here the employer, because of other contract terminations in the Omaha area,
unilaterally decided to terminate its sole remaining contract with Creighton
University for economic reasons. The Board found this to constitute a
section 8(a) (5) violation in that the employer neither gave notice of such
a decision to the union nor bargained about it. 42 Dismissing the notice argu-
ment as not properly presented,43 the court distinguished Fibreboard on the
facts involved: "No form of contracting out or subcontracting is here in-
volved. Burns for valid economic reasons has withdrawn completely. . . »44
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit seems on firm ground in distinguishing Fibreboard.
There is, for example, no substitution of employees here. Once again, how-
ever, the court has improperly used the motive requirements of Darlington
to support its holding: "Under Darlington, the finding of lack of antiunion
motivation in closing the Omaha division for economic reasons precludes a
38 350 F.2d at M.
39 351 F.2d at 80. The Board has also made this clear. See cases cited notes 23 & 24
supra.
40
 380 U.S. at 267 n.5. As a further point the court, in Adams Dairy, argued that
the decision to subcontract was made during negotiations for a new contract in Fibre-
board, while, in the case before it, there was an existing contract and there had been
prior discussions of the problem. Thus the court implied a waiver of the union's rights:
"There is no evidence that collective bargaining, as traditionally understood, did not
take place on the matters in dispute in this case." 350 F.2d at 114.
41 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1965).
42 William J. Burns Intl Detective Agency, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1267, 57 L.R.R.M.
1163 (1964).
43 346 F.2d at 902 n.2.
44 Id. at 901.
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finding of unfair labor practice in refusing to bargain with the union.... 2)45
In another circuit case, NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co.,"
discussed earlier in connection with the Board's approach to Fibreboard,47
the Third Circuit refused to find a violation in a partial termination case.
The court agreed with the Board that bargaining about the effects of the
decision was mandatory under section 8(a) (5) but felt that the decision
itself was not bargainable, distinguishing Fibreboard on the basis that, in
Royal Plating, there was no substitution of employees, while there was a
recommitment of capital and a change in economic direction.
In Royal Plating, however, it is apparent that the court was concerned
with the economic plight of the employer, stating, "There was no room for
union negotiations in these circumstances." 48 The court concluded: "[A]n
employer faced with the economic necessity of either moving or consolidating
the operations of a failing business has no duty to bargain with the union
respecting its decision to shut down." 48 In line with this approach, the court
noted the Board's own awareness of this problem in New York Mirror5°
where the Board, although finding a technical section 8(a)(5) violation,
ordered no remedy due to the circumstances involved.
Thus, while the court can accurately point to the factual differences
between partial terminations and the Fibreboard facts, still Royal Plating
is at bottom grounded on the improbability of the union's being able to
effectuate anything at the bargaining table.
That Fibreboard may limit union decisions, unilaterally made, was
pointed out by the Ninth Circuit in Associated Home Builders v. NLRB."
The union had set production quotas in the construction industry for its
members. The Ninth Circuit, in remanding the case to the Board, noted
that "a key issue presented by the evidence was the failure of the union to
bargain collectively."52 Hence in some instances management, too, may find
Fibreboard a valuable tool in forcing discussion of unilateral action.
Remedies.—In dealing with section 8(a)(5) violations, the Board has
generally attempted to fashion workable and practical remedies." In New
York Mirror," the Board found a technical violation of section 8(a) (5) 55
46 Id. at 902,
4° 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
47 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
4° 350 F.2d at 195.
43 Id. at 196.
5° 151 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 58 L.R.R.M. 1465 (1965).
51 352 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1965). At the Board level the issue was the ability of
the union to fine its members for exceeding production quotas. 145 N.L.R.B. 1775,
55 L.R.R.M. 1219 (1964).
52 352 F.2d at 752.
53 See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 788, 56 L.R.R.M. 1266 (1964);
Renton News Record, 136 N.L.R.B. 1294, 49 L.R.R.M. 1972 (1962).
54 Supra note 50. In the case, the New York Mirror, after prolonged secret negotia-
tions, executed a contract of sale for its name, goodwill and assets to the New York Daily
News. The Mirror then notified by telegram its employees and also the union involved
of its complete termination of operations.
55 Since this case was decided prior to Darlington, and involves a complete termina-
tion of business, it is doubted that there is even a technical violation; still, the remedy
aspect remains important as a reflection of Board thinking.
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but refused to enter any remedial order, basing this refusal on a number of
factors evidencing good faith on the part of the employer: (1) The decision
was motivated solely by economic pressures; (2) there was no anti-union
animus; (3) the acts of the employer permanently abolished all jobs in
the unit and the union did not seek to reinstate them; (4) there was a past
history of collective bargaining which had resulted in severance pay and
termination rights under the contract; and (5) the employer negotiated
concerning the effects after the shutdown.
The Board was, however, probably influenced by the realization that
the union could not have affected the termination in any manner, since it
had, in the language of Hartman Luggage Co.," been handed a "fait
accompli." It is nonetheless questionable whether this approach of recog-
nizing the hopelessness of the situation in effecting remedies is consistent
with the Board's Town & Country Mfg. Co. endorsement of collective bar-
gaining: "Experience has shown, however, that candid discussion of mutual
problems by labor and management frequently results in their resolution
with attendant benefit to both sides." 57
In NLRB v. American Mfg. Co.," the Fifth Circuit refused to enforce
that part of a Board order which required the employer to resume trucking
operations, unilaterally subcontracted in violation of section 8(a) (5), indi-
cating that there was no support in the record for such a broad order.
Noting that all the LMRA requires is bargaining about the decision to sub-
contract, the court stated, "When it [the employer] bargains it must do so
in good faith; but on this major issue [subcontracting] it may bargain to
the bitter end of an impasse. "55 Thus, to force the repurchase of the trucks
when the employer could win the right to subcontract at the bargaining
table, would give the union an unfair advantage at the negotiations.
The court was, however, careful to point out that it was not denying
the Board's power to order reconstitution of a partially terminated business
in the proper case."
On remand, the Board reconsidered its decision and order and deleted
that portion requiring the employer to resume its unilaterally discontinued
trucking operations.'"
2. Special Remedies
The Board's power to fashion remedies for unfair labor practices is
based on section 10(c) of the LMRA, which orders the Board "to take such
55
 145 N.L.R.B. 1572, 55 L.R.R.M. 1206 (1964).
57
 Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1027, 49 L.R.R.M. 1918, 1920
(1962). That such an approach may, however, be used by the courts to support a finding
of no violation at all in the partial termination area, is reflected in the Third Circuit's
awareness of the Board rationale in NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., supra
note 16.
58
 351 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1965).
Bo Id. at 80.
50
 Note, however, that American also involved section 8(a)(3) and (1) violations;
thus it appears that the Board will seldom be able to convince a court that a forced
reinvestment is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
0 1
 American Mfg. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (1966).
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affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back
pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act."' In NLRB v. Seven-Up Bot-
tling Co., Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that the proper test of the legality
of an order was whether it bears an "appropriate relation to the policies of
the Act."2
This section briefly covers the progress of the Board and courts in areas
where remedial problems have been especially troublesome.
Runaway Shop.—Perhaps the most important development at the Board
level has been the new remedy in the runaway shop situation. In Corwin
Corp.,3 the employer had abandoned his operation in New York and opened
under a new corporate name in Florida without notifying or bargaining with
the International Garment Worker's Union, in violation, the Board found,
of sections 8(a) (1), (3) and (5) of the LMRA. In rejecting the trial ex-
aminer's traditional remedy,4 the Board, for the first time, ordered the
employer to recognize and bargain with the union at the Florida plant, even
though the union might not 'represent a majority of the employees there. The
Board realized that this meant forcing a union representative on the new
employees in Florida but justified its decision by stating:
In the circumstances, the interest of newly-hired employees whose
very jobs, and hence statutory protection, exist by virtue of; (1)
Respondents' unfair labor practices, (2) the Board's unwillingness
to order the return of the plant to its original location, and (3) the
failure of discriminatees to displace them by accepting reinstate-
ment, should not be preferred at the expense of a bargaining order
which will dissipate and remove the consequences of a deliberate
violation of statutory obligations.5
The true effectiveness of this new remedy is open to question. Certainly
the discriminatees in New York are not benefited. The rationale of preventing
employer benefit is also of doubtful validity since all the employer is required
to do under the new order is to bargain; and, considering that such runaway
1 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
2 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1953).
a 153 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 59 L.R.R.M. 1405 (1965), 45 B.U.L. Rev. 582 (1965), 34
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 367 (1965), 79 Harv. L. Rev. 855 (1966), 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 997
(1965), 41 Notre Dame Law. 267 (1965). The case is presently awaiting decision in the
D.C. Circuit.
4 The trial examiner gave the employer the option to return to New York and
obey a conventional order to bargain. However, if the employer decided to stay in
Florida, then he was obligated to offer reinstatement to the discriminatees in Florida and
to reimburse the moving expenses of any who accepted. See NLRB v. New Madrid Mfg.
Co., 215 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1954). If the discriminatees did not relocate, they would be
entitled to back pay from the date of discharge to the date they secured substantially
equivalent employment. See Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547, 48 L.R.R.M. 1679
(1961), enforced per curiam, 305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1962). The trial examiner's bargain-
ing order in Florida was, however, conditioned upon the union's acquiring an actual
majority at the Florida plant.
5
 Garwin Corp., supra note 3, at 1409. The Board, conscious of the imposition of
an unelected representative in Florida, reduced the normal contract bar of three years,
General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 51 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1962), to one year.
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shops are typical to areas of minimum union strength, the union will likely
not be able to exert much pressure at the bargaining table .° Irrespective of
such doubts as to its true effectiveness, nevertheless, the new remedy does
reflect a growing awareness by the Board of the need for new approaches to
the runaway shop.?
Back Pay.—There has been significant circuit court action in the back
pay area. In NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 8 a case which has been in the
courts since 1953 in related proceedings, the Second Circuit spelled out the
burdens of proof in back pay proceedings. In generally reaffirming Brown
& Root, Inc.? the court held:
The Board properly placed on respondents the burden of al-
leging and proving that jobs were not available for all discriminatees
during the back pay period. However, we conclude that the General
Counsel had the burden of producing testimony by each available
discriminatee that a willful loss of earnings was not incurred. Never-
theless, we find that the burden of persuasion as to willful loss
should remain on the employer. . . . 10
The court justified placing the burden of proof with respect to job avail-
ability on the employer on the ground that this is a burden of production;
and since the lack of job availability is an affirmative defense, the employer
necessarily has such a burden. More practically, the employer has the
necessary records.
In requiring that the Board produce the discriminatees for testimony
concerning their efforts in seeking employment," the court relied chiefly on
the fact that the Board had almost always done this in the past and, hence,
such a burden was not oppressive and would not undermine the efficacy of
the back pay remedy. 12
 The court warned, however, that requiring the dis-
0 A further consideration is the effect of a jurisdictional dispute at the new area.
A preference for the old union at this stage would seem to be a more serious infringe-
ment of the new employee's rights.
I For an argument favoring more imaginative Board action in this area, see Note,
The Need for Creative Orders Under Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 69 (1963). It appears that the Board will limit this type of remedy
to the runaway shop area. In J.P. Stephens & Co., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 61 L.R.R.M.
1437 (1966), the Board refused to follow Garwin in the § 8(a)(1) area. The General
Counsel argued that due to the seriousness of the employer's unfair labor practices it was
impossible for the union ever to achieve a majority. The Board, while granting a broad
remedy, refused to order bargaining.
8 354 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1965).
9 132 N.L.R.B, 486, 48 L.R.R.M. 1391 (1961), enforced, 311 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1963).
10 NLRB v. Mastro Plastics, Inc., supra note 8, at 175.
11 The court pointed out that it is not always necessary to produce the discriminatee;
e.g., when he is dead. Id. at 178.
12 The court dealt with some further specifics concerning willful loss of earnings.
It held that a discriminatee can quit substantially equivalent employment if justified
and not relinquish his back pay rights. Back pay does not terminate automatically on
the employee's obtaining substantially equivalent employment or self-employment. "It
would be unjust to require him [discriminateel to mitigate his damages to the greatest
extent possible but then to penalize him for substantial but short-lived success." Id. at 178.
972
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
criminatee to testify before his award became final did not eliminate the
employer's need to raise the defense of willful loss of earnings."
In a second case involving back pay, Burinskas v. NLRB," the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded an order to the Board for
an explanation of the criteria the Board used in tolling back pay. The court
could find no standards in past Board proceedings and, in obvious reprimand,
stated:
We think the Board should come to grips with this recurring
problem, for the protection of the rights of the employee and for
the protection of the employer acting in good faith. It would seem
that the Board could, in the exercise of its expertise, develop appro-
priate policy considerations and outline at least minimal standards
to govern the ascertainment of tolling of back pay practices."
3. Nondiscriminatory Hiring Halls and Section 14(b)
In dealing with union security, Congress has been ambivalent. On the
one hand, section 8(a) (3) 1 clearly gives unions the right to secure collective
bargaining agreements protecting their status, while, on the other hand,
section 14(b) gives each state the right to prohibit "agreements requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment. "2 This
legislative purpose has generated many problems, 3
 among which is the re-
lationship of the two sections to each other: specifically, whether section
14(b) can prohibit only what the proviso to section 8(a) (3) allows. This
appears to be the interpretation of the Supreme Court in Retail Clerks Intl
Ass'n v. Schermerhorn /.4
 Thus, if a union arrangement does not depend
upon the proviso to section 8(a) (3) for its validity, states are without
jurisdiction under section 14(b) to prohibit it.
This is the result reached in two recent circuit court cases, NLRB v.
Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors 5 and NLRB v. Tom Joyce
Floors, Inc .° The question in both cases was whether an employer could
refuse to bargain about a nondiscriminatory hiring hall, on the grounds that
it was not a mandatory subject under NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner
13 Id. at 178.
14 61 L.R.R.M. 2273 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
15 Id. at 2276.
1
 LMRA § 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964):
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act . . . shall preclude
an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization .. . to re-
quire as a condition of employment membership therein. . , .
2
 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1964).
3 See Grodin & Beeson, State Right-to-Work Laws and Federal Labor Policy, 52
Cal. L. Rev. 95 (1964).
4 373 U.S. 746, 756-57 (1963).
5 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966).
6 353 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1965).
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Corp.7
 and that it would violate the state right-to-work law. 8 Since Tom
Joyce Floors substantially adopts the holding and reasoning of Associated,
we shall discuss only the latter in detail.
In Associated, at the Board level,° the chief obstacle was whether such
referral halls were mandatory subjects of bargaining under section 8(d).
The Fifth Circuit upheld the majority view of the Board that such referral
halls were mandatory subjects. The court analogized the pre-employment
conditions imposed by the referral hall to tenure of employment, recognized
as a mandatory subject in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB." Con-
struing Borg Warner as embracing any subject matter which would regulate
the relations between the employer and employees as well as any term or
condition of employment, the court viewed the referral hall as clearly affect-
ing the relations in the construction industry between employer and employee.
In rejecting the employer's argument that such an agreement violates
state right-to-work laws, the Fifth Circuit pointed out the relationship of
section 14(b) to section 8(a) (3) stating: " [T] he long and short of this
matter is that § 14(b) contemplates only those forms of union security
which are the practical equivalent of compulsory unionism."fi The court
then cited the Supreme Court decision in Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. NLRB," which held that such referral halls did not constitute compulsory
unionism. Thus, since they do not constitute compulsory unionism under
the proviso to section 8(a) (3), nondiscriminatory referral halls do not come
within the ambit of section 14 (b), and states are without authority to pro-
scribe them. Hence, the employer violated section 8(a) (5) by refusing to
bargain about them.
4. Per Se Violations
Union Access to Information.—Under NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-
Warner Corp., 1 an employer and a union must bargain "with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 2
 Such bargaining,
however, presupposes that the union has sufficient information to do so
intelligently. Hence, the Board and courts have generally required the em-
ployer to divulge information within his control which relates to these manda-
7 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
8 In Associated, the court cited the applicable state statute. 349 F.2d at 45! n.2.
In Tom Joyce Floors, there was a lower court ruling, unreported, that such halls vio-
lated Nevada law. 353 F.2d at 770 n.3.
9 Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors, 143 N.L.R.B. 409, 53 L.R.R.M.
1299 (1963). Members Rogers and Leedom dissented on the basis that wages, hours,
terms and conditions of employment did not apply to "obtaining" employment. Id. at
415, 53 L.R.R.M. at 1304. In Tom Joyce Floors, 149 N.L.R.B. 896, 57 L.R.R.M. 1390
(1964), the 3-member majority in Associated heard the case.
10 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
11 349 F.2d at 453.
12 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
1 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
2 LMRA § 8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
974
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
tory subjects,3 despite any claim of privilege. 4 Thus, in NLRB v. Truitt Mfg.
Co.,8 the Supreme Court held that an employer must substantiate with
financial statements a claim of inability to pay.
In a recent case, NLRB v. Western Wirebound Box Co.,° the employer
expressly avoided claiming inability to pay but did claim that forcing him to
pay increased wages put him at a competitive disadvantage. Nevertheless, the
court still applied Truitt:
We see no reason why, under the same rationale, an employer who
insistently asserts that competitive disadvantage precludes him from
acquiescing in a union wage demand, does not have a like duty to
come forward, on request, with some substantiation.?
The court emphasized, however, that they were not making such failure to
provide financial information a per se section 8(a) (5) violation. 8
At the Board level, in Boulevard Storage & Moving Co.,° an employer
claimed that, due to competition in the local moving business, it was necessary
for all employees, including over-the-road workers, to receive a wage de-
crease. 1° The union asked moving costs. To allow such fractionalization, said
the Board,
would be to sanction Respondent's efforts to isolate their local
moving from their total operations and to regard their dispute with
3 NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); Whitin Mach. Works, 108 N.L.R.B.
1537, 34 L.R.R.M. 1251, aff'd, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905
(1955).
4 In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 58 L.R.R.M. 1298 (1965),
the company was required to submit information, including names of the policyholders
upon whose complaints the company had discharged certain employees, to enable the
union to process grievances. The employer's claim that the names were privileged and
confidential was unavailing.
5 Supra note 3. Truitt has been subsequently applied where the employer has taken
the position that he is financially compelled to cut wages. Celotex Corp., 146 N.L.R.B.
48, 55 L.R.R.M. 1238 (1963). It has also been applied where an employer has claimed
that he cannot grant an increase and remain competitive, the Board finding such claim
equivalent to a plea of inability to pay. Peerless Distrib. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1510, 54
L.R.R.M. 1285 (1963); Cincinnati Cordage & Paper Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 72, 52 L.R.R.M.
1277 (1962).
6 356 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1966).
7
 Id. at 91. The court acknowledged that there was precedent limiting Truitt to a
claimed inability to pay, citing Metlox Mfg. Co., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 59 L.R.R.M.
1657 (1965), and Taylor Foundry Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 765, 52 L.R.R.M. 1407 (1963),
enforced per curiam, 338 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1964). The court felt, however, that the
Board had a right to change its position as long as it was not erroneous. The change
in the Board's position is confusing, since the Board decision in Western Wirebound Box,
145 N.L.R.B. 1539, 55 L.R.R.M, 1193 (1964), appeared a year before the Board's opinion
in Metlox, upon which the court relied. However, the broad Board language in Metlox,
limiting Truitt, was not germane to the Board decision therein.
8 As Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Truitt, points out, the mere withholding
of financial information is not a per se § 8(a) (5) violation. 351 U.S. at 157. The instant
court felt that the findings of the trial examiner showed clearly that he had not taken
a per se approach. 356 F.2d at 91.
9 152 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 59 L.R.R.M. 1136 (1965) (dissent by member Jenkins),
to "Manifestly, this was a plea of inability to take any action with respect to
wages. . . ." Id., 59 L.R.R.M. at 1137.
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the Union, which related to the wage rates, of all employees, as
confined to the local moving phase of their business. But this would
be wholly unrealistic as local moving data alone would not permit
of an intelligent evaluation of Respondent's declared necessity for
an overall wage cut."
The Board did not attempt to find a per se violation in the company's limited
disclosure, but rather stated that "upon the entire record, we find . . .
Respondents . . . in violation of Section 8(a) (5) and ( 1 ) of the Act." 12
The Seventh Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order." The court
felt that the Board had drawn the wrong inferences regarding the claim of
inability to pay, stating, "Where the evidence disclosed 'won't,' the Board
found 'can't.' "14 Thus the court did not reach the important question raised
by the Board decision, i.e., whether an employer, in claiming an inability to
pay, can satisfy his requirement to support his position by merely disclosing
that part of his operation which is losing money.
The Third Circuit was more hospitable to the Board in Curtiss-Wright
Corp. v. NLRB. 15 The union sought information on job classifications, job
descriptions, wages and certain administrative and confidential employees of
the company, in connection with the union's analysis of its rapid decrease in
membership." Although the data requested covered employees who were
not members of the bargaining unit, the Board had found a section 8(a) (5)
violation in the employer's failure to supply such information."
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the information sought was
"relevant" to the proper representation of unit employees and to the policing
of the collective bargaining agreement. In so doing the court approved the
Board's rule concerning employer disclosure of wage and other related
information:
[I] f the requested data is relevant and, therefore reasonably neces-
sary, to a union's role as bargaining agent in the administration
of a collective bargaining agreement, it is an unfair labor practice
within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act for an employer
to refuse to furnish the requested data."
Thus, once relevance is determined, an employer's refusal to honor the request
for information is a per se violation of section 8(a) (5)."
11 Ibid.
12
 Ibid.
18
 United Fire Proof Warehouse Co. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1966).
14
 Id. at 498. In support of its interpretation, the court relies on the trial examiner's
report and the dissent at the Board level. The court's holding would appear to go against
the rationale of such cases as Celotex Corp., supra note 5.
15 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965).
16
 The union percentage had slipped in 5 years from approximately 70% to less
than 50% of the employees. Id. at 64.
17
 Curtiss-Wright Corp., 145 N.L.R.B. 152, 54 L.R.R.M. 1320 (1963).
18
 Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 15, at 68.
19 The court cited other circuits holding the same view: Timken Roller Bearing Co.
v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964); J.I. Case
Co. v. NLRB, 253 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1958); Taylor Forge & Pipe Works v. NLRB,
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The court distinguished Truitt on the ground that the financial informa-
tion requested in that case was not "relevant" without a showing of other
circumstances. 2° The information sought in the present case, however, was
clearly "relevant," the Third Circuit said, since it was related to the search
for better terms in a new contract and the effective presentation of grievances
under the existing one. The fact that the information requested covered non-
unit employees did not preclude relevancy, the court held, even though
bargaining about such non-unit employees would not be mandatory.
In addition to the per se problem, the court also dealt with another
difficult problem: whether the contract's grievance procedure is the proper
channel for resolving the issue of relevancy of the requested data.2 t The court
rejected arbitration here, noting that only when the demand for information is
itself contractually subject to the grievance procedure will arbitration be the
exclusive remedy of the parties. Such a situation could exist, the court stated,
only where the contract contains both a broad disclosure provision and a broad
grievance and arbitration provision.22
 The court argued that the case at bar
fell within the dichotomy set up in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB23
in that the request for data was a statutory right under section 8(a)(5).
Presence of Stenographer.—A recurring problem for the Board and the
courts is the ability of a party to condition future negotiations on the presence
of a stenographer at the bargaining sessions. Although the majority of the
Board views such a demand as mere evidence of bad faith to be evaluated
as part of the total record of conduct,24 some members have been willing to
consider it a per se violation.25
The circuit courts, however, have not agreed with the Board. In NLRB
v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 26
 the First Circuit refused to view such a
bargaining condition as even evidence of bad faith, let alone as a per se viola-
tion. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit recently rendered a decision in NLRB v.
Southern Trans p., Inc., 27 refusing to uphold a Board order 28 which had
considered such conduct as evidence of bad faith. The court not only refused
to declare such conditioning of negotiations indicative of bad faith, but went
234 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1956) ; Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 58
(1st Cir. 1955).
20 In determining "good faith" in Truitt, the concurring opinion of Justice Frank-
furter states: "[T]he Board applied the wrong standard here, by ruling that Truitt's
failure to supply financial information to the union constituted per se a refusal to bargain
in good faith. . . ." 351 U.S. at 157. There is no discussion of relevance in Truitt, and
hence it would appear that financial information would not be considered per se relevant
by the Third Circuit, absent a showing of other circumstances.
21
 For a discussion of the area, see p. 912 supra.
22 Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 15, at 71.
23
 Supra note 19. In that case the Sixth Circuit made this distinction: If the in-
formation requested pertains to merely contractual rights of the union, then the Board
must allow the arbitrator to decide whether the union is entitled to it; but if the infor-
mation is relevant to the union's rights under the LMRA as statutory representative,
then the Board may decide the union's right to the information.
24
 St. Louis Typographical Union, 149 N.L.R.B. 750, 57 L.R.R.M. 1370 (1964).
23 See id. at 753, 57 L.R.R.M. at 1371 (members Brown & Fanning, concurring).
26
 205 F.2d 131, 139 (1st Cir,), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
27 355 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1966).
28
 150 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 58 L.R.R.M. 1017 (1965).
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on to assert the good effects of having a stenographer present at bargaining
sessions. It is clear that, in this area, the Eighth Circuit is not content to
defer such judgments to the expertise of the Board.
On a second important issue, the Eighth Circuit, in determining the
employer's present motive in demanding that a stenographer be present at
negotiations, refused to give any probative value to a past finding of bad
faith on the part of the employer. The court feared that if such a past finding
were able to be carried to a new proceeding, "the courts would be virtually
removed from the scene and the party, deprived of judicial protection, would
thereafter be at the mercy of an over-zealous Board." 2°
C. Employer Discrimination—The Economic Lockout*
In American ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB 1 the Supreme Court held that,
absent a showing of a discriminatory motive, an employer may temporarily
lock out his employees in support of his bargaining position without violating
sections 8(a) (1) or (3) of the LMRA. In NLRB v. Brown,2 the Supreme
Court held that members of a multi-employer bargaining unit might not
only lock out their employees when one member was struck and had hired
temporary replacements, but might also themselves continue to operate with
temporary replacements without violating sections 8(a) (1) or (3), absent
a specific showing of anti-union motive. Among the problems arising out of
these two cases with which the courts and Board have struggled during
the past Survey year are ( 1) the necessity of an impasse, and (2) what
employer activity will constitute a showing of anti-union animus such as to
render a lockout discriminatorily motivated and hence a section 8(a) (3)
violation.°
The importance of the impasse is raised by American Ship Bldg. itself.
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice White read the majority opinion as
allowing an employer to "lock out long before an impasse is reached" 4
since "a shutdown during or before negotiations advances an employer's
bargaining position as much as a lockout after impasse." 5 However, Mr.
Justice Goldberg, concurring, felt that the majority did not reach this ques-
tion:
IT]he Court itself seems to recognize that there is a difference be-
tween locking out before a bargaining impasse has been reached and
locking out after collective bargaining has been exhausted, for it
limits its holding to lockouts in the latter type of situation without
29
 NLRB v. Southern Transp., Inc., supra note 27, at 982.
* For a more thorough development of this topic, see Ross, Lockouts: A New
Dimension in Collective Bargaining, 7 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev, 847 (1966).
1 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
2
 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
3
 For a good general discussion, see Oberer, Lockouts and the Law: The Impact of
American Ship Building and Brown Food, 51 Cornell L.Q. 193 (1966).
4 380 U.S. at 324.
5 Id. at 325.
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deciding the question of the legality of locking out before bar-
gaining is exhausted.°
Both circuit courts which have dealt with the issue agree with Mr.
Justice White. The Second Circuit, in Body & Tank Corp. v. NLRB, 7 had
aligned itself with a number of other circuits in enforcing Board orders
premised on the illegality of lockouts in furtherance of bargaining posi-
tions.° Since this case had been decided prior to American Ship Bldg., how-
ever, the company was granted a rehearing. On the authority of American
Ship Bldg., the Second Circuit withdrew its previous decision and found
the employer lockout permissible.° The Board petitioned for a rehearing
on the ground that there was no bargaining impasse reached before the
lockout, but the Second Circuit denied the petition.
In Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB,1° the Sixth Circuit
clearly held that an impasse is not crucial. Two newspapers in Detroit,
the Free Press and the News, were engaged in collective bargaining with the
Teamsters union. Although both belonged to an association, there was no
multi-employer bargaining "unit" such as had been present in NLRB v.
Truck Driver's Union (Buffalo Linen)." After failing to come to favorable
terms with the Free Press, the Teamsters struck that paper. Pursuant to
an agreement, the News ceased publication and locked out its employees.
The Board found such conduct violated sections 8(a) (1) and (3). 12
The Sixth Circuit, although admitting the existence of an impasse in
American Ship Bldg., refused to consider this necessary to legalize the lock-
out: "While in American Ship Building there was an impasse in the negotia-
tions between the employer and the union, we do not think the teaching
of that case merely adds another exception to the Board's category of per-
missible lockouts.'" 3
 Thus, so far as the section 8(a) (1) violation was
concerned, the court found no hostility to the union in the company's past
bargaining history; nor was there shown any interference with the union.
Further, the court refused to find that the layoff was designed to discipline
the workers for adhering to the union's position. 14
 With regard to the 8(a) (3)
violation, the court, quoting from American Ship Bldg., concluded that
"where the intention proven is merely to bring about a settlement of a
labor dispute on favorable terms, no violation of § 8(a) (3) is shown.'"°
6 Id. at 337.
339 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1964).
8
 Other circuits supporting this result were: NLRB v. American Ship Bldg. Co., 331
F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Utah Plumbing & Heating Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 294
F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961); Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 917 (1959). Contra, NLRB v, Dalton Brick & Tile Corp.,
301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962); Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576 (7th
Cir. 1951). The presence of an impasse was not controlling in either of these latter two
cases.
9
 Body & Tank Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 330 (2d Cir. 1965).
to 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1965).
11 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
12 Evening News Ass'n, 145 N.L.R.B. 996, 55 L.R.R.M. 1091 (1964).
18
 Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, supra note 10, at 530.
14 Id. at 531.
15 Ibid.
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The position of the Sixth Circuit is, then, that under American Ship Bldg.,
all lockouts will be considered legal, absent a showing of union animus, and
that such animus is not shown by the mere absence of an impasse in bar-
gaining negotiations. The Supreme Court, upon the petition of the Board,
granted certiorari and remanded the case to the circuit court for further
remand to the Board for reconsideration in light of American Ship Bldg.' 6
Hence, it appears that the Board will continue to insist on an impasse
before an employer may legally lock out. The Board has not ruled directly
on this issue, but in Weyerhaeuser Co. 17
 the Board stated:
[W] e find that the principles announced by the Supreme Court in
American Ship Building and Brown apply to the situation where,
as here, two or more employers bargain jointly with a union, [and]
an impasse in negotiations is reached over a mandatory subject
of bargaining. . . .18
In this case, however, an impasse had in fact been reached. When the Board
is ultimately presented with a lockout taking place prior to a bargaining
impasse over a mandatory subject and lacking any anti-union animus, it
is questionable that the Board will legally be able to find such employer
activity "inherently so prejudicial to union interests and so devoid of
significant economic justification that no specific evidence of . . . anti-
union animus is required." 19
 The remand by the Supreme Court in Detroit
Free Press is equivocal and fails to give any indication of the Court's
feeling on the matter.
While the Board may limit American Ship Bldg. strictly to its facts
and require an impasse in negotiations in the single employer situation, the
Board has regarded the fact of a formal bargaining unit as not being crucial
in determining the validity of a lockout in a multi-employer bargaining
situation. In Weyerhaeuser Co., 2° among the issues facing the Board was
whether the employer was truly in a multi-employer bargaining unit. The
Board, however, felt that this was not crucial in determining the legality
of the lockout. The test, under American Ship Bldg. and Brown, was
whether the lockout was discriminatorily motivated and whether it served
a legitimate employer business interest. The Board, not deciding the status
of the employer as a member of a multi-employer unit, found that there
was no showing of anti-union animus, and that the lockout served a legiti-
mate business purpose. 21
18 Local 372, Newspaper Drivers v. Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, 382 U.S.
374 (1966). The circuit courts have remanded several cases for like consideration. See
Topeka Grocers' Management Ass'n v. NLRB, 59 L.R.R.M. 2736 (10th Cir. 1965), dis-
missed on remand, 155 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 60 L.R.R.M. 1428 (1965); NLRB v. Tonkin
Corp., 352 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1965), remanded by the court sua sponte.
17
 155 N.L.R.B, No. 82, 60 L.R.R.M. 1425 (1965).
1s Id., 60 L.R.R.M. at 1426.
19
 American Ship Bldg. v. NLRB, supra note 1, at 311; see NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
20 Supra note 17.
21 Id
., 60 L.R.R.M. at 1426. Whether a Board finding of lack of significant employer
interest is enough by itself to render an employer's action violative of § 8(a)(3) is an
open question.
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A second Board case failing to find that a lockout in a multi-employer
situation violated the LMRA is Acme Mkts., Inc.22 In this case the employer,
Acme, owned non-unit stores located in cities where unit stores, operated
by other employers in the bargaining unit were located. The union called a
strike against Acme's unit stores. The other employers in the unit then
closed their stores in a defensive lockout. Thereupon, Acme shut down its
non-unit stores in those cities in which the other unit employers had shut
down their unit stores. The union alleged that the employers' actions in
locking out employees who did not belong to the multi-employer bargaining
unit involved in the labor dispute with the union violated sections 8(a) (I)
and (3).
The Board, relying on Brown, found that the lockout of non-unit em-
ployers was in the legitimate interest of preserving the integrity of the
multi-employer unit. The Board reasoned that if the employer could not
close down his business where it competed with other association members,
then "the economic advantage would have passed to the Respondent, the
nonstruck employers would have been deterred from closing their stores as
part of the multi-employer defensive lockout and, as in Brown Food, the
whipsaw strike would have enjoyed an almost inescapable prospect of suc-
cess."" The Board also found that the action did not discriminate against
the non-unit employees, chiefly because they were being paid while locked
out. With regard to the unit employees, the Board, in rejecting the General
Counsel's argument that such employer activity restrained and coerced
employees, found no specific anti-union animus presented by the evidence.
" [I]t is difficult to discern a basis for finding that the lockout of non-unit
employees, aimed at achieving the same purpose as the unit lockout, was
unlawfully motivated vis-a-vis the unit employees. 124
The relevance of an intervening unfair labor practice to the specific
evidence of anti-union animus required by American Ship Bldg. was consid-
ered by the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. Golden State Bottling Co.25 In the
Board decision, handed down before American ship Bldg., the Board had
found that the employer violated sections 8(a) (1) and(3) by locking out
employees in support of his bargaining position, and had also violated
section 8(a)(2) by attempting to interfere with the administration of the
union."
The Ninth Circuit stated first that, under American Ship Bldg.,
[a] lockout by an employer used as a means of bringing pressure
on his employees in support of his bargaining position does not
violate section 8(a) (3) and (1) unless there exists a supportable
finding of unlawful intent on the part of the employer to injure
a labor organization or to evade his duty to bargain collectively,
or to discourage union membership.
22
 156 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 61 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1966).
23 Id., 61 L.R.R.M. at 1282.
24 Id., 61 L.R.R.M. at 1283.
25 353 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1965).
26 Golden State Bottling Co,, 147 N.L.R.B. 410, 56 L.R.R.M. 1229 (1964).
981
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
We do not think that the rationale of the American Ship Building
case is inapplicable merely because of the charges here under Sec-
tion 8(a) (2). . . . True, the effect of this lockout was to disrupt the
orderly internal functioning of the union, but this result of an other-
wise lawful act cannot make that act an unfair labor practice.27
Thus, the court upheld the finding of a section 8(a) ( 2) violation but re-
versed the finding of a section 8(a) (3) violation since there was no un-
lawful motive.
In dictum in Golden State, the Ninth Circuit answers one of the ques-
tions raised but unanswered by American Ship Bldg. and Brown, i.e.,
whether a single employer, after legitimately locking out his employees, can
temporarily or permanently replace such employees. In Brown, the Supreme
Court allowed temporary replacement of locked-out employees since the
struck employer in the multi-employer unit could do so, and, if other
members of the unit were prevented from such replacement, the whipsaw
strike would succeed in destroying the multi-employer bargaining unit.
In American Ship Bldg., the Court expressly reserved opinion on whether
Brown would authorize replacements in single employer lockouts. 28
The Ninth Circuit's advice to the employer was that the "legal course
... was to hire temporary replacements for the locked out employees." 29
However, we must wait for more definite litigation on this important
question before concluding that temporary replacements in a single employer
situation is permissible under section 8(a) (3).
In light of the ability of employers in a multi-employer bargaining
unit to lock out employees in furtherance of their bargaining position and
then to replace them with temporary replacements, it becomes important
to determine on what grounds a union may withdraw from such multi-
employer bargaining units.
The Board, in Evening. News Ass'n," has held that unions will be able
to withdraw from such units on the same basis as employers. The criteria
are: (1) The request must be made before the date set by the contract
for modification, or before the agreed upon date to begin multi-employer
negotiations, and (2) the withdrawal must be unequivocal."
In finding the section 8(a)(5) violation, based on the employer's refusal
to bargain except on a multi-employer basis, the Board could find no
rationale for distinguishing between union withdrawal from such units
and employer withdrawal. It found support for its position in two court
cases.92
 The Board, mindful of the reprimand it had received in NLRB v.
Insurance Agents' Union, 33
 felt that the bargaining power of the units was
not a proper criterion for determining appropriateness of the withdrawal.
Member Brown dissented; he would require unions to have a good
27
 NLRB v. Golden State Bottling Co., supra note 25, at 669.
28 380 U.S. at 308 n.8.
29
 NLRB v. Golden State Bottling Co., supra note 25, at 670.
so 154 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 60 L.R.R.M. 1149 (1965).
31 Ibid.
32
 Truck Drivers' Local v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1956); Retail Clerks
v, Leedom, Civil No, 966-58, 42 L.R.R.M. 2031 (D.D.C. 1958).
83 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960): "[Our labor policy does not] contain a charter for the
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reason before fragmentizing the bargaining unit. He distinguished union
withdrawal from employer withdrawal on the grounds that the union, in
withdrawing, compels dissolution of the multi-employer unit and forces
the employers to bargain individually.
Whether the Board rule will actually benefit unions attempting to
avoid the lockout and replacement weapons in the multi-employer unit is
questionable. In the decision itself, the Board was careful to point out
that it was reserving opinion on the legality of employers engaging in a
lockout, who were forced out of a formal multi-employer bargaining unit."
A clue to the Board's answer may be found in Weyerhaeuser Co.,a5 where
the Board upheld an employer lockout even though there was no formal
multi-employer unit proved, since there was no showing of anti-union
animus and there was a legitimate business purpose.
D. Secondary Boycotts
The secondary boycott prohibitions of the LMRA' were aimed generally
at the situation where the employees of employer A, with whom they have a
dispute, bring pressure on employer B, a supplier or customer of A, to force
B to terminate his dealings with A. However, one of the recurring problems,
due to the broad language of the statute, is whether it is necessary to have
a dispute with A (a "primary employer"), before a secondary boycott can
be found. The Boards and some courtsa have held that a primary employer
National Labor Relations Board to act at large in equalizing disparities of bargaining
power between employer and union."
34 Evening News Ass'n, supra note 30, at 1150.
35 Supra note 17.
1 Section 8(b)(4) states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed
by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to
engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manu-
facture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any services or (ii) to threaten, coerce,
or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com-
merce, where in either case an object thereof is—
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join
any labor or employer organization or to enter into any agreement which is
prohibited by section 8(e);
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor,
or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing
or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization
as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been
certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section
9: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to
make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary
picketing.. . .
61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(ii)(A), (B) (1964).
2
 Local 1355, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 146 N.L.R.B. 723, 55 L.R.R.M. 1389
(1964) ; Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers, 101 N.L.R.B. 1159, 31 L.R.R.M. 1202
(1952),
3
 NLRB v. Local 11, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 242 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1957);
NLRB v. Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers, 211 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1954).
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is not a prerequisite to a violation. 4
In two recent cases of the same name, National Maritime Union of
America v. NLRB,5 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit both held that the presence of a dispute with
a primary employer was not necessary for a section 8(b) (4) violation.
Both cases arose from the same union activity, which took place in
different ports. Since the rationale in both cases is similar, only the decision of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is discussed herein. In that
case, the ship Maximus was sold by the Grace Shipping Lines to Cambridge
Carriers. Due to the existing collective bargaining agreement between Cam-
bridge and the National Maritime Union (NMU), the new owner, Cambridge,
employed NMU personnel, which resulted in the dismissal of the old crew—all
members of the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association (MEBA). In an
effort to regain their jobs, the MEBA members picketed the Maximus. In
retaliation, the NMU began picketing ships in other ports employing MEBA
members, ostensibly to have these members apply pressure on their brethren
in Philadelphia to cease picketing the Maximus. This retaliatory picketing by
the NMU resulted in focal stevedores, repair concerns and general contrac-
tors refusing to cross the NMU picket line and hence ceasing to do business
with the shipowners employing MEBA members. The Board, relying on this
cessation of business, found that the NMU had violated section 8 (b) (4) (i)
(ii)B.0
The circuit court agreed. First holding that this inter-union dispute was
a "labor dispute," the court then discounted the necessity of a primary
employer. Conceding ambiguity in the area of requiring a primary employer,
the court nevertheless found in the legislative history the intent, " 'to confine
labor conflicts to the employer in whose labor relations the conflict had arisen,
and to wall off the pressures generated by that conflict from unallied em-
ployers.' . . . It is the victim's neutrality which we conceive to be the central
element of Congressional concern in this area." 7
With these two latest holdings it appears that any further argument that
section 8(b) (4) requires a primary employer will be futile.
The importance of the primary-secondary dichotomy also arises when
employees, in attempting to preserve available work which they have tradi-
tionally done, engage in activities aimed at their immediate employer but
which result in the cessation of business between such employer and his
suppliers or customers. Such activity falls within the prohibitory language of
section 8 (b) (4), but the Boards and the Court of Appeals for the District of
4 For an excellent discussion of this area, see Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary
Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA 1$ 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1000 (1965).
5 346 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965), 7 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 752 (1966) ; 342 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 835 (1965).
6
 National Maritime Union (Delta), 147 N.L.R.B. 1328, 56 L.R.R.M. 1412 (1964)
(D.C. case); National Maritime Union (Houston), 147 N.L.R.B. 1243, 56 L.R.R.M.
1410 (1964) (2d Cir. case).
7 346 F.2d at 417-18, quoting Miami Newspaper Pressmen v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 405,
410 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
8 Service Employees, 148 N.L.R.B. 1033, 57 L.R.R.M. 1099 (1964); United Dairy
Workers, 146 N.L.R.B. 716, 55 L.R.R.M. 1393 (1964).
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Columbia° recognize that such activity is really aimed at the immediate
employer, who is not a secondary employer but a primary employer.
In National Woodwork Mfg. Ass'n v. N.LRB, 1° however, the Seventh
Circuit has refused to follow the Board's distinction. Several construction
unions, bargaining through a council, had executed a collective bargaining
agreement with the local contractors in which there was a clause permitting
union members to refrain from handling precut or prefabricated work. The
union struck several contractors who attempted to install prefabricated doors.
The Board found that the clause in question was designed to protect unit
work and thus did not violate section 8(e). 11 Since there was no section 8(e)
violation in executing the contract, there was no section 8(b) (4) (i) (ii)B
violation. However, the Board held that the union had violated section
8(b) (4) by attempting to enforce the clause against three contractors, since
under the Board's test of control," these contractors had no control over
the type of doors, and hence the union must have been seeking to bring
pressure on the manufacturers of such doors."
The Seventh Circuit reversed the Board's finding that the clause was
designed to protect available unit work and thus was not a violation of section
8(b) (4). It is unclear whether such reversal was based on a different interpre-
tation of the facts involved or whether the court felt that section 8(e) of the
LMRA does not provide for such a distinction."
1. Publicity Proviso
In 1959 Congress amended section 8 (b) (4) of the LMRA by adding,
inter alia, a "publicity proviso," which states that nothing in section 8(h) (4)
shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the
purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and
members of a labor organization, that a product or products are
produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a
primary dispute and are distributed by another employer. . .
Although the proviso reads "other than picketing," the Supreme Court,
9 See, e.g., Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964); Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C.
Cir. 1964).
10 354 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1965).
11 Metropolitan Dist. Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters (National Woodwork
Mfg. Ass'n), 149 N.L.R.B. 646, 57 L.R.R.M. 1341 (1964).
12 Local 5, United Ass'n of Journeymen (Arthur Venneri Co.), 137 N.L.R.B. 828,
50 L.R.R.M. 1266 (1962), enforced, 321 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir, 1963).
13 Metropolitan Dist. Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters (National Woodwork Mfg.
Ass'n), supra note 11, at 658, 57 L.R.R.M. at 1344. Member Brown dissented on the
ground that the control test was not a valid one.
14 The
 Seventh Circuit relied on cases prior to the enactment of § 8(e) which
involved the necessity of having a dispute with a primary employer, equating the facts
in the case before it to the facts present in the cited cases. In regard to § 8(e) the court
stated that since the goods in question, prefabricated doors, were not made at the job
site, "We hold that § 8(e) unaffected by the proviso is controlling in this case." National
Woodwork Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB, supra note ID, at 599.
1 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964).
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in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers (Tree Fruits),2 rejected the Board's
interpretations that the 1959 amendments make consumer picketing illegal
per se. The Court distinguished picketing aimed solely at persuading customers
not to buy the struck product, which is permissible, from picketing aimed at
persuading customers not to deal with the secondary employer, which is
illegal.
In a recent decision, Alton-Wood River Bldg. Trades Council, 4 the
Board made it clear that it was going to read the Tree Fruits case very
narrowly. In Alton-Wood, a union council was seeking to have a real estate
developer cease dealing with non-union contractors. In line with this objective,
the union picketed a development in which the primary employer was seeking
to sell housing units. The signs merely named the primary employer (Storey-
land).
The Board found that the mere naming of the primary employer with
whom the union had a dispute was not sufficient to bring such picketing within
Tree Fruits, since "[the union] did not make any effort to limit the appeal of
the picketing by requesting customers not to buy the product of Storeyland."s
The Board thus appears to insist that the appeal by the union clearly reflect
that its aim is the struck product itself and not the secondary employer.
In a second Board case dealing with picketing and the "publicity
proviso," Chicago Typographical Union,° the Board has interpreted "picket-
ing" to require some sort of confrontation between the pickets and the
workers, customers or suppliers of a picketed employer. The union was
"picketing" at shopping centers and at the entrances to public buildings to
advertise their dispute with the newspaper (secondary employer). The
Board found no confrontation at these places and hence no "picketing"
within the meaning of the publicity proviso, even though the union was
patrolling with signs advertising a labor dispute.?
The publicity proviso also refers to a union having a primary dispute with
an employer who has products that are "produced." In NLRB v. Servette,
lnc., 8
 the Supreme Court gave a broad interpretation to the meaning of the
word "produced" in order to achieve the legislative intent of having the
.
proviso be co-extensive with the prohibition to which it is an exception.
On the basis of this Supreme Court decision, the Ninth Circuit
reversed its prior opinion in Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 9
2 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
a Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 132 N.L.R.B. 1172, 48 L.R.R.M. 1496 (1961).
4 154 N.L.R.B. No. 78, 60 L.R.R.M. 1067 (1965).
5 Id., 60 L.R.R.M. at 1069.
6 151 N.L.R.B. No. 152, 59 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1965). However, the Board found a
§ 8(b) (4) violation in that the union had also picketed the premises of the newspaper
publisher with the illegal objective of having him cease doing business with the non-union
printer with whom the union had a primary dispute.
7 The Board's reliance on Alton-Wood River Bldg. Trades Council (Jerseyville
Retail Merchants), 144 N.L.R.B. 526, 54 L.R.R.M. 1099 (1963), and Service Employees
Union, 136 N.L.R.B. 431, 49 L.R.R.M. 1793 (1962), indicates that the Board is looking
to the object of the picketing.
8 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
9 310 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1962).
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and held that a television station which advertises products is a "producer"
thereof for purposes of the publicity proviso." The court indicated that the
same reasoning which applied to "products" applied also to "services," such
as banking and dry cleaning."
2. Common-Situs Picketing
In Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB (General Electric),'
the Supreme Court held that picketing of a "reserved gate" at a struck manu-
facturing plant does not violate the secondary boycott prohibitions of the
LMRA, if the work carried out by those workers using the "reserved gate"
is related to the normal operations of the manufacturer. This case raised the
question as to what the Board would do when faced with "reserved gate"
picketing in the common-situs construction context: Would the Board incor-
porate the General Electric rule or would it continue to apply only the Moore
Dry Dock standards? 2
The Board has recently answered this question in Building Trades
Council.3 In a three-to-two decision, the Board has ruled that only the Moore
Dry Dock standards will apply. The reason given by the Board is simply that
the construction industry differs sufficiently from the manufacturing industry
so that the "reserved gate" picketing rules applied to the latter in General
Electric should not apply to the former. The Board determined that the
legislative history and judicial decisions dealing with common-situs picketing
in the construction industry clearly reflect a purpose to protect neutrals, and
this would be best accomplished by applying only the Moore Dry Dock
standards. In applying these standards, the Board found a section 8(b) (4)
violation since the union, in picketing the reserved gate, did not meet one of
the standards, namely, that picketing take place reasonably close to the situs
of the dispute.
The dissenting members of the Board could find no distinguishing aspects
of the construction industry such as would justify nonapplication of the
General Electric rules. Applying General Electric, the dissenters would hold
that the subcontractor's work was related to the normal operations of the
10 356 F.2d at 434 (9th Cir. 1966).
11 "[Nlothing has been called to our attention which indicates that Congress in-
tended to differentiate between primary employers engaged in the production of tangible
products and those involved in rendering services." Id. at 436.
1 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
2 Sailor's Union (Moore Dry Dock), 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 27 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1950).
The Board developed the Moore Dry Dock criteria to deal with the situation in which
the employer with whom the union had a primary dispute did business only on the
premises of a secondary employer—as for example a subcontractor on a construction
project—to determine if picketing the secondary employer's place of business was vio-
lative of section 8(b)(4). There will be no violation of section 8(b)(4) where (a) the
picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs of dispute is located on the secondary
employer's premises; (b) at the time of the picketing the primary employer is engaged
in its normal business at the situs; (c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably
close to the location of the situs; and (d) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute
is with the primary employer.
155 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 60 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1965).
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general contractor; therefore, under Moore Dry Dock, the union would
be picketing reasonably close to the situs of the dispute and hence would
not be violating section 8(b) (4).
This decision will allow a general contractor to insulate much of his
operations from the paralyzing effect of the labor troubles of his subcontrac-
tors. Whether non-striking union members will use a reserved gate set up by
their employer to avoid a shutdown remains to be seen.
E. Hot Cargo Clauses
Section 8(e), passed in 1959, bans entrance into "hot cargo" clauses. 1
The construction industry was partially exempted, but the extent of this
exemption has been the source of much litigation?
The present state of the law is that the construction proviso applies only
to work done at the job site .° Strikes or picketing to obtain subcontracting
provisions are valid. 4
 Economic force to enforce such restrictions is illegaI,° the
proper means of enforcement being through judicial enforcement of the con-
tract.° But if the union objective is a dual one—to obtain a subcontracting
clause in a contract and also to force an interruption between the neutral
general contractor and the subcontractor—the Board has held it to be
unlawful.?
In two recent cases, the Board has emphasized that the only means of
enforcing "hot cargo" clauses in the construction industry, under the proviso,
is through judicial action. Thus, in Muskegon Bricklayer's Union, 8 the union
insisted on a clause authorizing union members to refuse to work on any job
on which other craftsmen are not being paid union wages and benefits. The
Board first held that such a clause was not aimed at preserving the work
standards of the union and therefore was "not the type of 'work standards'
clause exempted from the provisions of section 8(e)." 9 Next, the Board felt
that the clause was illegal: "This proposal looks not to the courts for enforce-
ment, but to strikes."10 The Board continued:
1 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
	 158(e) (1964).
2 Section 8(e) reads:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any
employer to enter into any contract . . . to cease or refrain from . . . dealing
in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with
any other person, . . • Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply
to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the con-
struction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be
done at the site of the construction. ..
Ibid.
a International Bhd. of Teamsters (Local 294), 145 N.L.R.B. 484, 54 L.R.R.M.
1421 (1963).
4 Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
Construction Laborers Union v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963).
5
 Northeastern Ind. Bldg. Trades Council (Centlivere Village Apts.), 148 N.L.R.B.
854, 57 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1964).
6
 Local 48, Sheet Metal Workers v. Hardy, 332 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1964).
7
 Northeastern Ind. Bldg. Trades Council (Centlivere Village Apts.), supra note 5.
152 N.L.R.B. No. 38, 59 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1965).
9 Id., 59 L.R.R.M. at 1082.
10 Ibid.
988
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
Accordingly, we hold that where, as in this case, a limitation upon
contracting at a construction site is intertwined with a provision
permitting such self-help as striking or otherwise refusing to perform
services, e.g., by permitting employees to refrain from working
without suffering disciplinary action, in the event of a breach of the
"hot cargo" clause, the clause exceeds the prescribed bounds of the
first proviso to Section 8(e) and is therefore unlawful. 11
Member Fanning dissented on the ground that the clause was not illegal on
its face, although if the union did refuse to work, then the clause would be
no defense."
In the second case, Plumbers Union," there were two clauses in question:
one allowing unions to refuse to work on any construction project where any
of the employees are not covered by the agreement, and a second requiring
any signatory to the agreement to agree not to subcontract any work to any
contractor who is not a signatory to the agreement. The Board declared the
first clause illegal but upheld the second. In rejecting the validity of the first
clause under the proviso to section 8(e), the Board relied on the fact that the
clause on its face was intended to be enforced through economic action
against the employer. In sustaining the second clause, the Board stated:
"Moreover, unlike Clause 3, Clause 4 does not provide for its own enforcement
by the use of economic force prohibited by Section 8(b) (4)B."“
It appears that the Board, which has reversed its position on the ability
of unions in the construction industry to use economic force to secure "hot
cargo" clauses," is going to be assiduous in assuring that unions do not seek
to enforce such clauses by self-help: The only permissible forum is the
courtroom.
F. Union Discipline of Members
Section 8(b) (1) (A) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to
restrain employees in exercising their guaranteed rights, including the right
to refrain from engaging in concerted activity.' However, the proviso to that
11 Id., 59 L.R.R.M. at 1083.
12 Member Fanning's reasoning is similar to that of the Supreme Court in Local
1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door Case), 357 U.S. 93 (1958) where
the Court held, prior to the enactment of section 8(e), that a hot cargo clause was not
illegal on its face but that it would be no defense to a secondary boycott violation.
13 152 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 59 L.R.R.M. 1085 (1965).
14 Id., 59 L.R.R.M. at 1088.
15 Initially, the Board had taken the position that under § 8(e) unions could not
use economic force to have employers enter into such hot cargo clauses. Construction
Laborers (Colson & Stevens), 137 N.L.R.B. 1650, 50 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1962). It reversed
its opinion only after several circuits had ruled against this position. Northeastern Ind.
Bldg. Trades Council (Centlivere Village Apts.), supra note 5; see Orange Belt Dist.
Council of Painters v. NLRB, supra note 4; Construction Laborers Union v. NLRB,
supra note 4.
1
 LMRA § 8(b)(1)(A), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1)(A) (1964),
states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization . . .
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
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section specifies that it "shall not impair the right of a labor organization to
prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of member-
ship therein." The scope and meaning of section 8 (b) (1) (A) and the proviso
thereto have been, and still remain, a source of substantial controversy and
confusion.2
Access to Board Processes.—In the leading case of Local 138, Intl
Union of Operating Eng'rs (Skura), 3 the NLRB found that the union had
violated section 8(b) (1) (A) by fining a member who filed unfair labor
charges against it. The Board rejected the union's contentions that it had
fined the member not for filing charges, but for failing to exhaust his internal
union remedies, and that such fines were necessary for its control over its
internal affairs. The proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A), the Board felt, could
not immunize this violation because of the "overriding public interest" in
maintaining free access to the Board's processes, 4 especially in view of the
Board's inability to initiate its own processes. 5
Shortly thereafter, the Board was asked to decide a similar question:
whether a union could expel a member for filing and actively supporting a
decertification petition. In Tawas Tube Prods. Inc.,6
 the NLRB ruled that
such disciplinary action was within the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A). It
gave two major reasons for the decision: (1) The action only involved the
member's union status and did not affect his employment status; and (2) a
union can discipline those members who attack its very existence. The Board
thus reaffirmed its policy not to interfere with internal union discipline which
does not affect a member's status as an employee. It distinguished Skura
as an exception to the general rule by reason of the public interest in free
access to the Board's processes.
anteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of
a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition
or retention of membership therein. . . ."
2
 See, e.g., Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 24-34 (1947).
3
 148 N.L.R.B. 679, 57 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1964).
4 The Board stated:
Considering the overriding public interest involved, it is our opinion that no
private organization should be permitted to prevent or regulate access to the
Board, and a rule requiring exhaustion of internal union remedies by means of
which a union seeks to prevent or limit access to the Board's processes is beyond
the lawful competency of a labor organization to enforce by coercive means.
Id. at 682, 57 L.R.R.M. at 1010-11.
6
 The Board also rejected the contention that the proviso to § 101(a) (4) of the
Reporting and Disclosure Act immunized the violation, stating that the intent of that
section was to protect members from retaliation for suing unions. LMRDA § 101(a)(4),
73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1964), states:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to insti-
tute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency,
irrespective of whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as
defendants or respondents in such action . . : Provided, That any such mem-
ber may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to
exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting
legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or any officer
thereof. . . .
151 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 58 L.R.R.M. 1330 (1965).
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Decisions within the Survey year have strongly endorsed the holdings in
both Skura7 and Tawas Tube.8
Crossing Picket Lines.—An early Board case, Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co.,° upheld the right of a union to levy a fine of five hundred dollars
on a member who refused to perform picketing duty during a strike. Although
it regarded the fine as coercive, the Board pointed out that the section
8 (b) (1) (A) proviso precludes Board interference with internal union affairs
"except where the implementing of such rules is expressly prohibited, as in
the case of affecting an employee's employment rights." 10 In 1964, the NLRB,
in Local 248, UAW (Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.)," upheld the right of the
union to fine employees up to one hundred dollars" . for crossing lawful picket
lines." Again, the Board stressed that the enforcement of the rule affected
membership status only,14 and thus was protected by the proviso to section
8(b) (1) (A), since it was necessary to preserve the integrity of the union
during time of crisis.
In Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLR,13, 15 the Seventh Circuit upheld
the Board's finding. Rejecting the argument that a union could only discipline
strikebreakers by expulsion, the court stated: "This contention rests upon a
literal reading of Section 7. But a literal reading fails to take into account the
history and purpose of the Section, which shows that it was not intended to
immunize a union member from discipline for defiance of a decision of the
majority to strike." 16 The purpose of section 8(b) (1) (A), the court held,
was not to affect union fines, but to eliminate physical coercion and violence,
threats thereof, and economic reprisals against employers who would not
comply with union commands to discriminatorily discharge employees. It
concluded by stressing the union's need to be able to discipline members who
7 See Roberts v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965), and Local 1510, Millwrights
& Mach. Erectors, 152 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 59 L.R.R.M. 1310 (1965), which followed
Skura and found § 8(b) (1)(A) violations. Local 238, Wood Lathers' Union (Bill C.
Carroll Constr. Co.), 156 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 61 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1966), likewise followed
Skura even though the union member involved was not an employee of any company
in the case.
8 Local 4028, United Steelworkers, 154 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 60 L.R.R.M. 1008 (1965),
presented a slight change from the facts of Tawas Tube. Here, an employee was sus-
pended from membership for filing a petition seeking to withdraw authority from the
union to execute a union shop agreement. The Board ruled that Tawas Tube controlled,
and the suspension was proper, since it was aimed to protect the union from conduct
designed to undermine its existence.
9 109 N.L.R.B. 727, 34 L.R.R.M. 1431 (1954).
10 Id. at 738, 34 L.R.R.M. at 1432.
11 149 N.L.R.B. 67, 57 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1964).
12 For each crossing a member could be fined $100. Each offender involved here
made approximately 50 crossings, yet the fines levied were from $20 to $100.
19 The picket lines were established in compliance with the union constitution,
which required a majority vote to authorize a formal strike vote, notification to all
members of the vote, a two-thirds majority strike vote by secret ballot, and approval
of the International Executive Board.
14 The collective bargaining agreement required employees to join the union within
30 days and "remain members to the extent of paying dues."
15 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 60 L.R.R.M. 2097 (7th Cir. 1965). Judges
Knoch, Castle and Kiley heard the case.
16 Id. at 2098.
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defy majority rule." On rehearing en banc, the seven-member Seventh Circuit
withdrew its prior Allis-Chalmers decision and held that fines for crossing
picket lines violated section 8 (b) (I) (A). 1 B With a view toward maintaining
the historical liberty of the American workingman to remain free to work
without coercion from employers or from unions," 19 the court called for a
literal reading of sections 7 and 8(b) ( 1 ) (A).2° Under such a reading, a
substantial fine such as could have been levied here would be more burdensome
(financially) to a member than threats to secure his discharge. The court felt
constrained to preserve the "priceless American heritage" of the union
member's freedom to work without coercion, especially where, as here, a union
security clause results in a substantial number of involuntary members. Three
dissenters strongly urged the correctness of the court's original decision. 21
They argued that membership was voluntary since only membership to the
extent of paying dues was required, that a member must obey the union's
rules, that the fines could have been sizable but did not in fact exceed one
hundred dollars, that fines are necessary to maintain union solidarity and
bargaining strength and that the statutes involved were not unambiguous 22
Recently, the NLRB has considered the collateral issue of whether an
employer may give free legal assistance to employees who cross lawful picket
lines and face union fines. In Leeds & Northrup Co.,23 the union announced
that members who had crossed the picket line faced union disciplinary action.
The company immediately notified the nonstrikers that it would do every-
thing legally possible to protect their rights, short of paying the fines. The
company's attorney thus prepared a letter to the union, which most employees
signed, alleging that the signatory employees would not appear for any union
trial since the strike was illegal and their cases had been prejudged. The
attorney also later represented the employees in court proceedings by the
union to collect the fines; employees incurred no legal fees.
The NLRB found that the employer did not violate section 8(a)(1). But,
the Board carefully limited its holding, emphasing that the company did not
(I) encourage or solicit employees to cross the picket line, 24
 (2) induce them
17
 The court cited LMRDA § 101(a) (2), 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2)
(1964), to show the members' responsibility toward the union. It also observed that
without power to fine wildcat strikers or strikebreakers, unions could not enforce no-
strike clauses.
18
 61 L.R.R.M. 2498 (7th Cir. 1966). Judges Knoch and Castle departed from their
earlier opinion, while Judge Kiley adhered to it.
13 Id. at 2499.
20
 The court stated that the sections "present no ambiguities whatsoever, and there-
fore do not require recourse to legislative history for clarification." Id. at 2500.
21 Chief Judge Hastings stressed that an employee acquires burdens as well as
benefits with union membership. Id. at 2503. Judge Kiley restated the reasoning of the
court in the original hearing. Id. at 2505-09. Judge Swygert emphasized what he termed
the "erroneous premises" of the majority opinion, that is, involuntary membership, unrea-
sonable fines and unambiguous statutes. Id. at 2509.
22 Judge Swygert noted that the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Drivers' Union (Curtis
Bros.), 362 U.S. 274 (1960), found it necessary to consult the legislative history of
§ 8(b)(1)(A). Id. at 2510.
28 155 N.L.R.B. No. 125, 60 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1965).
24 It distinguished Scherer & Sons, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1442, 56 L.R.R.M. 1408 (1964),
where the NLRB found a § 8(a)(1) violation by an employer who inspired and directed
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to resist the fines, (3) offer legal assistance until after the union threatened
disciplinary action or (4) offer to pay fines. Leeds & Northrup, it should be
noted, however, assumed under the first Allis-Chalmers decision the union's
right to fine members for crossing a picket line, which the full court subse-
quently overturned. Unless the Supreme Court or other circuits reaffirm the
right to fine for crossing a picket line, Leeds & Northrup will have merely
historical significance.
Exceeding Union Production Quotas.—The right of the union to fine
members for violating traditional union production quotas was first upheld
by the Board in Local 283, UAW (Wisconsin Motor Corp.)?'' The union had
applied such a rule for twenty-five years,2° and, although the quota rule was
not in the collective bargaining agreement, it had been discussed in negotia-
tions and was considered as an important element in the wage structure."
Although the company set no limits on the employee's daily earnings, it co-
operated with the union in administering the rule. The Board emphasized
that section 8(b) (1) (A) was not meant to restrain "internal union disci-
plines," especially where the member's status as an employee was not
affected.28 Member Leedom dissented, finding that section 8(b) (1) (A) pro-
hibited such fines as a form of economic reprisal. Further disagreeing with the
majority, he stated: "I am satisfied that the Union's attempt to control
production and wages, which are subjects clearly related to employment and
not to membership, is not merely an internal matter."29
Shortly thereafter, in Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters (Asso-
ciated Home Builders),3° the Board upheld the union's right to fine members
for exceeding its production quotas under Wisconsin Motor, but found
a section 8(b) (1) (A) violation because the union applied dues payments of
members to cover fines levied against them. Unlike Wisconsin Motor, here the
collective bargaining agreement contained a union shop clause and, when
members refused to pay the fines, the union sent warnings that they could lose
their jobs. The Board thus saw the union action as affecting the employment
status. Member Leedom, agreeing that the transfer of dues payments to cover
fines violated section 8(b) (1) (A), would also find the mere imposition of
fines an 8(b) (1) (A) violation 3 1
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, in dictum,
agreed with member Leedom that the fines themselves may have violated the
an employee petition to restrain a union's informational picketing. The attorney who
represented the employees was under company retainer.
25
 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 55 L.R.R.M. 1085 (1964).
26
 The rule limited the amount of daily incentive pay a member could earn. When
a member attained the ceiling rate for the day, he could continue working but could
not report any further production. The excess production was "banked" for future
payment.
27
 There was evidence that the company had unsuccessfully sought to induce the
union to drop the ceilings on various occasions.
28 It stated: "iTlhe Board has not been empowered by Congress to police a union
decision that a member is or is not in good standing or to pass judgment on the penalties
a union may impose on a member so long as the penalty does not impair the member's
status as an employee." 145 N.L.R.B. at 1104, 55 L.R.R.M. at 1088.
29 Id. at 1111, 55 L.R.R.M. at 1091.
30 145 N.L.R.B. 1775, 55 L.R.R.M. 1219 (1964).
31 Id. at 1777, 55 L.R.R.M. at 1221.
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act, but stressed sections 8(b) (3) and 8(d) rather than section 8 (b) (1) (A) . 82
The court focused on other facts in the case, namely, that the rule imposing
production quotas was not traditional but had been adopted by union resolu-
tion after a collective bargaining agreement had been signed which provided
that "the wages, hours and working conditions of this Agreement are the
wages, hours and working conditions in the area." 33 The court found that the
fine constituted unilateral action by the union to fix terms and conditions of
employment in violation of Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co. v. NLRB," and
since a collective bargaining agreement was in effect, the union was avoiding
compliance with section 8(d)." The court thus remanded the case to the
Board for findings with respect to the apparent failure of the union to bargain
about the quotas.
The court, however, ultimately specifically declined to decide whether
the fines themselves coerced the employees. 33 It did rule that unilateral action
as to terms and conditions of employment was not within the proviso to
section 8(b) ( 1) (A) since it was not purely an internal concern of the union.
Finally, the court distinguished Wisconsin Motor" in that it involved a long-
standing rule which had become a part of the wage structure and which had
been discussed in negotiations."
MATTHEW T. CONNOLLY
JAMES J. DEAN
ANDREW F. SHEA
32
 Associated Home Builders v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1965).
33
 Id. at 747. There were no quotas in effect in the area.
34 379 U.S. 203 (1964). The Court held a company guilty of §§ 8(a)(5) and 8(d)
violations in not bargaining before subcontracting work.
as LMRA § 8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1965), requires an
employer and union to meet and confer regarding terms and conditions of employment.
A proviso thereto requires also that whenever a collective agreement is in effect, no
party shall modify such agreement unless specified procedures are followed.
86
 The court stated: "[Me find it unnecessary to decide whether 8(b)(1)(A),
apart from the proviso, requires a finding that this labor organization's conduct operated
to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in § 7 of the Act."
Associated Home Builders v. NLRB, supra note 32, at 750.
87
 Local 283, UAW (Wisconsin Motor Corp.), supra note 25, has been presented
to the Seventh Circuit for review.
88
 It should be remembered that neither Fibreboard, supra note 34, nor the act
requires agreement, but merely good faith bargaining on the issue.
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